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Contemporary discussions around issues of data privacy tend to focus on the 
potential for data hacks and stolen identities, however, this is not something that 
many people will need to deal with.  Individuals are much more likely to face 
issues around ‘context collapse’ (Vitak, 2012 p.451) and the daily work involved 
in negotiating the boundaries of internet privacy.  Based on 26 interviews and 
over three-hundred internet surveys, this thesis examines concerns regarding how 
respondents feel about how much information they share with companies and 
online as well as their worries in terms of how much control they believe they 
have.  I demonstrate how concerns tend to be around the contextual nature of 
privacy (Nissenbaum, 2010), in particular the type of information being shared 
and who it is being shared with.  I make particular use of Raynes-Goldie’s 
categorisations of privacy in terms of whether it is ‘social’ or ‘institutional 
privacy’ (p.81), as well as Floridi’s (2005) categorisations of ‘arbitrary’ and 
‘ontic’ (p.197/8) information.   
 
Today, many believe they have little control over what happens to their data, 
however that is not to say that they have given up and I argue that small acts of 
‘evasion’ and ‘subversion’ (Fiske, 1989 p.2) are employed to avoid sharing 
information when people do not want to.  While these ‘tactics’ (de Certeau, 1988 
p.185) can feel empowering to those employing them, ultimately, withdrawing 
from social media is not easy, particularly given the way in which it has become 
part of our daily lives. Eschewing social networking sites completely offers 
greater inconvenience, and potentially a loss of social connection with friends and 
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In June 2013, Central Intelligence Agency sub-contractor Edward Snowden 
released documents regarding covert surveillance being carried out by the US and 
UK governments on ordinary citizens (Greenwald, et al., 2013) although it was 
widely reported on at the time, this was not sustained over a longer period.  While 
I was vaguely aware of his claims at the time, I did not become particularly 
interested until I saw the film Citizenfour, the following year (CitizenFour, 2014), 
this film offered further details of the claims made by Snowden and his 
motivation for releasing the data.  After I saw this film, I found it surprising that 
many of my friends and contemporaries did not appear to be interested or 
concerned by the claims Snowden had made.  This caused a feeling of dissonance 
for me as I began to consider not only the volume of information I shared on 
social media but how much those around me were also sharing, seemingly without 
a second thought.  When I spoke to people about Snowden’s claims, many were 
unconcerned, citing national security concerns as being valid justification for the 
collection of information by the government.  Whilst I understood this argument, 
it concerned me that there appeared to be such apathy towards the issues 
highlighted by Snowden and I began to wonder whether I was alone in my 
concern regarding this. 
 
Given the apparent lack of interest from those I knew, my interest waned over 
time, and I gave the issue less thought, although I did reduce my sharing on social 
media.  However, my interest was reignited late one evening in April 2015, when 
I saw an episode of Last Week Tonight with John Oliver which contained an 
interview with Edward Snowden (Carvell, et al., 2015).  While the interview itself 
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was interesting, what was of particular note was that when people on the street 
were canvased regarding whether they knew anything about Edward Snowden or 
his claims, many did not know who he was.  Regardless of whether they had 
heard of him or not, many were not worried about the claims that he had made, or 
what it meant for their data, however this changed when they were presented with 
a scenario whereby the government could view intimate pictures they had sent to 
others.  At this point, people became much more concerned and/or angry, feeling 
that their privacy had been violated.  This led me to consider the change in 
attitude that occurred when discussing specific information rather than the broad 
(and often abstract) notion of privacy itself.  It was from here that I came to 
formulate the outline of my project and consider ways in which I could examine 
how individuals feel about their internet privacy. 
 
It will be useful to pause here to briefly explain what I mean by two key phrases 
which are used throughout this thesis.  When I talk about social media privacy, 
this is our privacy as it relates to social media sites, broadly in terms of 
information we share with other users of the site (but potentially also with the 
owners and/or developers of the site).  This definition includes sites such as 
Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.  While much of the work in this thesis focuses 
on social media and our privacy in relation to it, I do not limit myself solely to 
these sites and so often refer to ‘internet privacy’.  When I refer to internet 
privacy, I am talking about an individual’s privacy in relation to the information 
they are often required to share with companies through websites, in order to gain 
access to a service or product.  While this encompasses social media sites (and 
thus social media privacy), it is not limited to them, and also includes internet 
banking websites, consumer websites (such as Amazon) and so on.  As such, I 
8 
	
employ the phrase internet privacy to encompass all information that we share 
(whether we know about it or not), when online. 
 
It is important to consider issues such as our internet privacy and how this affects 
us because our daily lives have evolved and changed to such an extent that we 
have become accustomed to sharing our information on a daily basis with a 
multitude of companies, in numerous ways, such as: 
 
• Checking our account balance using online banking; 
• Updating our status on social media; 
• Accessing and amending our tax details online; 
• Applying for a job online. 
 
We carry out various tasks online in the course of a day but have little 
appreciation of what happens to that information once we have shared it and are 
often oblivious to the potential repercussions of this.  Contemporary concerns 
regarding data privacy tend to be around online accounts being hacked, or identity 
theft, however, data collection by commercial companies and sharing on social 
networking sites are potentially a greater issue.  It is difficult to achieve control 
over the data we share, especially as companies are often able to generate income 
from collecting and selling information about their customers.  Therefore, 
allowing customers to have more agency over what happens to their data may be 
detrimental to their business model and the income generated by it.  Media 
advertising campaigns by companies and banks tend to highlight the importance 
of setting strong passwords to keep our data secure and to ensure that we do not 
fall victim to any kind of phishing scam or have our identity stolen.  This, 
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however, distracts us from considering what the companies themselves do with 
the data we share with them.  We worry about our Facebook account being 
hacked and a virus being spread amongst those on our friends list but may not 
think about what Facebook themselves are doing with that information; who they 
sell it to and whether we consent to that.  We are often oblivious to the vast 
amount of data that is stored and shared in and between electronic databases, 
which are updated every time we carry out a task online. 
 
Companies that we have chosen to share our information with (and even those we 
have not) often know more about us than the people we share our lives with, to 
the extent that inferences can be made regarding our likes, dislikes and even 
sexual orientation (although it must be noted that the accuracy of this varies) 
(Kosinski, et al., 2013).  Despite this, we continue to share our information, often 
complaining and/or making jokes regarding algorithms, and how ‘creepy’ it is 
when advertisements appear on our social media feed for items that we have been 
searching for elsewhere.  This suggests that we are complicit in this data 
collection and either do not mind, or do not care enough about it to take action, 
but is this the case?  The introduction of the General Data Processing Regulation 
2018 (GDPR 2018) and Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018) offer individuals 
the opportunity to have some autonomy regarding their information and who they 
share it with.  However, it is unclear whether this has happened or whether it 
merely served to confuse people as they received numerous GDPR notices prior 
to the introduction of the legislation which many felt unable to deal with 




When I began working on my project (in 2015), contemporary concerns were 
around the Investigatory Powers Bill/Act and what it might mean for individuals’ 
data privacy.  Concerns at this time were focused on the potential for Internet 
Service Providers to retain people’s internet browsing history and how this may 
cause issues, depending on what sites an individual had been searching for and 
accessing.  The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA 2016), was introduced in 
2016 and extended the reach of surveillance in a number of areas (Travis, 2015).  
However, in 2018, judges in the UK high court ruled that the IPA 2016 breached 
EU law and ordered the UK government to make amendments within six months 
(Cobain, 2018).  In October 2018, the government introduced the Data Retention 
and Acquisition Regulations 2018 (DRAR 2018), which dealt with the issues 
raised previously and reduced police powers in terms of when they could obtain 
information.  It should be noted that the successful legal challenge against the IPA 
2016 was crowd-funded by the civil rights group Liberty (Cobain, 2018), 
suggesting that individuals are not necessarily passive when considering their 
privacy and the information they share.  This sequence of events belies the general 
belief that people’s concerns are focused on ensuring that they do not say 
something potentially damaging on social media (Ronson, 2015) and suggests that 
we are invested in our privacy.  Rather than individuals being unconcerned about 
their privacy, it is more likely that the potential for inaction arises due to the 
difficulty involved in gaining more control over our data.  As noted above, it is 
not necessarily something that companies are in favour of, fearing a reduction in 
profits, if customers learn more about what happens to their information and as a 
result, withdraw their consent.  It is also important to recognise that using the 
internet and sharing information in order to complete mundane daily tasks has 
become a habit which is difficult, if not impossible to break.  We strive to make 
11 
	
our daily lives more convenient, especially if it reduces the amount of time we 
spend on necessary but boring tasks (Wu, 2018).  Therefore, if gaining control 
over our data leads to reduced convenience, it may be deemed too high a price to 
pay for many.  This is part of the reason that negotiating internet privacy can be 
particularly complex; we may want more control over our data, but not 
necessarily if it means that our lives become more difficult as a result. 
 
The introduction of the GDPR 2018 and DPA 2018 suggests that the government 
is attempting to take action in a bid to restrict the actions of social media, as well 
as the sharing of data between companies, which individuals may not be aware of.  
It potentially offers us the opportunity to take back some control and have greater 
autonomy regarding what companies can do with our information.  This can also 
be seen in the action being taken against Facebook in the wake of the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal in terms of fines that have been issued (BBC News, 2018a).  At 
this stage however, it is too soon to be able to draw conclusions regarding the 
impact this has had on individuals’ autonomy or their attitudes regarding their 
data privacy.  My research, however, took place before these events and as such 
was carried out in the wake of Edward Snowden’s claims regarding the covert 
collection of data by the US and UK governments (Greenwald, et al., 2013) in fact 
this is the event that sparked my interest in attitudes towards data privacy initially, 
as discussed previously.  On the surface, it appeared that people were simply not 
concerned or interested, and suggested that privacy is not important to people, 
however, as I will demonstrate throughout this thesis, this is not the case, and this 
topic is much more complicated than it seems.  This can be seen if we consider 
the impact context can have in terms of the type of information we are being 
asked to share in a given situation.  There are likely to be certain pieces of 
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information that an individual would not mind sharing, while a different item may 
elicit greater anxiety.  The type of information being requested makes a difference 
to the person being asked for it, for a number of reasons, however that is not to 
say that the type of information is the only factor here, and who the information is 
going to be shared with will also play a role.  Therefore, contextual issues affect 
an individual’s decision regarding whether to share information or not.  It is 
important to point out that an individual’s willingness to share some information 
with some audiences cannot be taken as a proxy for their sharing behaviour for 




My thesis aims to gain a greater understanding of how individuals feel about their 
privacy in terms of the information they are asked to share online and with 
various companies.  It explores this by considering how individuals negotiate their 
internet privacy, with particular focus on the role that context plays. 
 
I aim to explore issues that are fundamental to people when they consider their 
privacy and the extent to which they feel they have control in these situations.  
This is a difficult area to explore and much has been written regarding the sharing 
that takes place on social networking sites.  However, where my thesis differs and 
offers an original contribution is in my consideration of companies that we are 
often required to share information with, in addition to sharing that occurs on 
social media.  This offers a different lens through which to consider how much 
choice we can truly have regarding whether to share our information or not.  It 
also offers a deeper examination of the consideration made when people share 
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information on social networking sites.  Previous research has tended to focus on 
concerns regarding other social media users’ perceptions and how people attempt 
to hide or share information with other users (Nippert-Eng, 2010 and boyd, 2014), 
there has been little research into concerns regarding what the sites themselves do 
with users’ data.  
 
I am also interested to discover how individuals behave in situations whereby they 
are asked or required to share information that they are uncomfortable sharing.  
This raises questions regarding whether people share the information regardless of 
concerns they have or employ tactics whereby they attempt to withhold the 
information while still gaining access to the service they require.  While some will 
share the information regardless of concerns, others may choose to either provide 
false information, which bears no relation to the actual data or refuse to share the 
information even if it means utilising a different service provider.  This highlights 
the limited but often creative ways in which people exercise control over sharing 
(or not) information. 
 
Counter to the commonly held belief that we are living in a post-privacy age, 
whereby those utilising social media or online companies do not consider or care 
about the implications of sharing information, I will demonstrate the nuanced 
nature of privacy, in particular considering the role that context plays.  As such, I 
will highlight the impact that type of information being requested can have on 
levels of concern.  Furthermore, the role of audience will also be considered and 
as such, the same piece of information can be considered to be problematic or of 
little concern, depending upon who is asking to see it.  This is an area in which I 
am offering an original contribution in that previous research has seldom 
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considered the implications of the type of information being requested or the 
audience for that information.  Therefore, I am offering the first in-depth 
exploration of the issue of context with regard to internet privacy, which will 




My thesis will be separated into five main chapters, with a conclusion drawn at 
the end.  I will now provide a brief summary of each chapter. 
 
Chapter One: Literature Review 
This chapter will consider problematic nature of the public/private divide as well 
highlighting the difficulties involved in defining privacy itself. 
The main discussion centres around the key issue of commercial surveillance, as 
this is the focus of my thesis.  I will examine issues around how much control 
individuals can be said to have in terms of the data that is collected about us on a 
daily basis.  This will be dealt with in terms of how companies commodify and 
aggregate the information they have collected to serve their own ends.  It will also 
consider how we are persuaded to share information with companies and whether 
users can be said to be exploited in the current situation.  Finally this chapter 
considers the importance of context in terms of the impact that the type of 
information has on how concerned people are when being asked to share data.  
There will also be a brief consideration of the effect that the type of audience has 
on concern levels.  This chapter will highlight the research previously carried out 




Chapter Two: Methods 
Here I will provide details of my methodological approach, in particular my 
rationale for utilising a qualitative approach.  I will consider the merits as well as 
the design process involved in the production of my interviews and surveys and 
highlight the relevance of the vignettes that were utilised in the closing section of 
my interviews. 
My role as researcher will be examined, with particular focus on the interviews 
and the measures I put in place for the benefit of the participants.  This will also 
include a discussion of the ethical implications of my research and the 
considerations made in terms of my treatment of participants. 
 
Chapter Three: Standing in the way of control 
This is the first of three analysis chapters, which examine the findings of my 
project.  This chapter deals with issues of trust, particularly in terms of companies 
sharing information with unknown third-parties, after individuals have shared it 
with them.  This is problematic for participants and often leads to a lack of trust in 
the intentions of the company.  I will then examine the level of control individuals 
feel they have over their data more generally.  It is felt that companies attempt to 
restrict control by making terms and conditions incomprehensible, ensuring that it 
is impossible to make an informed decision in terms of sharing information with 
them.  I then discuss the potential barriers that exist when individuals attempt to 
gain more control, highlighting that it is not simply a matter of companies making 
things more difficult; maintaining the level of control we would like requires 
additional time and effort that we do not necessarily have.  Finally, I address the 
often proposed solution to issues of control: opting out of using social media or 
refusing to share information with companies altogether, however, this is not as 
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straightforward as it appears, as there are a number of benefits to engaging with 
companies and social networking sites, which cannot be easily dismissed. 
 
Chapter Four: Fight The Power 
This chapter offers a further exploration of the decision-making process that 
people engage in when being asked to share information.  I will consider how 
individuals employ tradeoff decisions in order to decide whether the benefits they 
will receive (such as greater convenience and social contact with friends and 
relatives) are likely to be greater than any costs incurred (such as a loss of 
privacy).  I will provide counter arguments suggesting the use of bias and 
heuristics, which suggest that we are not necessarily making logical decisions. 
Finally, I will consider the ‘tactics’ (de Certeau, 1988 p.185) used by individuals 
in a bid to gain (limited) control over their data, focusing on methods which 
utilise ‘evasion’ and ‘subversion’ (Fiske, 1989 p.2). 
 
Chapter Five: Context Matters 
This final analysis chapter focuses on the importance of context, which is where 
my original contribution is located.  I will consider the importance of context to 
individuals, particularly in terms of the difficulties many now encounter in terms 
of maintaining different contexts separately and the issues that can arise when 
‘context collapse’ (Vitak, 2012 p.451) occurs and different contexts merge.  I also 
utilise Raynes-Goldie’s work (2012) to propose that levels of concern around 
sharing information differ depending on the type of information being requested.  
Here, Raynes-Goldie’s distinction between ‘social’ and ‘institutional privacy’ 
(2012 p.81) will be particularly instructive and I will utilise it to argue that social 
privacy can be further broken down into ‘intrinsic’ and ‘issued’ information, 
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which, while not mutually exclusive categories, offer potential insights into 
varying levels of concern regarding different types of information.  Finally, I 
consider the impact of different audiences upon levels of concern expressed by 
participants when sharing information. 
 
Conclusion 
Finally, I will conclude my thesis by re-visiting my research questions and 
demonstrating my original contribution to this field, highlighting the important 
role that context plays when we are asked to share data, particularly in terms of 
the type of information we are asked to share and who we are asked to share it 
with.  I will also discuss recent events which have taken place (such as the 
Cambridge Analytica Scandal) and the impact this has potentially had upon 
attitudes.  My project is exploratory in nature and so I will also offer suggestions 





Chapter One: Literature Review 
 
In March 2018 news broke that Facebook users’ data had been harvested and used 
to influence the outcome of the 2016 US Presidential election and the UK’s 2016 
EU referendum (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018).  The accused company 
was Cambridge Analytica and although initial estimates regarding the number of 
users affected was 50 million, the final figure was claimed to be 87 million 
(Cadwalladr, 2019).  When this story broke Mark Zuckerberg issued apologies, 
both in a Facebook post and in national newspaper advertisements in the UK and 
US.  Many articles appeared in the media at the time, offering information 
regarding what happens to individuals’ data once they have shared it, and 
suggesting that deleting their Facebook account may not offer enough protection  
(Anthony & Stark, 2018; Glance, 2018; Lin, 2018 and Mitchell, et al., 2018).  For 
those deciding to remain on the platform, advice was offered regarding keeping 
their data safe from being harvested (Kleinman, 2018).  While it initially appeared 
that there had been little impact on Facebook (revenues actually rose following 
the scandal), this did not last.  Since the allegations were revealed, the FBI, US 
Justice Department and the Information Commissioner’s Office (UK) (ICO) have 
all launched investigations into Facebook and the role it played in harvesting 
users’ information.  In July 2018, Zuckerberg announced that large numbers of 
users were leaving Facebook and that the stock value of the platform had been 
significantly reduced (Cadwalladr, 2019).  Further to this, Facebook has been 
fined £500,000 by the ICO in the UK for not doing ‘enough to protect users’ 




Although this has been a difficult period for Facebook, there are few signs that the 
issues related to this scandal will be so severe that the site will be forced to close 
down and it is still used by millions of individuals worldwide.  In the time I have 
been conducting my research, various social media sites have gained prominence 
(such as Snapchat and Instagram), all of which offer new and interesting ways for 
users to connect.  Despite various privacy issues, social networking sites continue 
to thrive, and while a scandal such as Cambridge Analytica may cause some to 
consider leaving, or actually leave Facebook, they may simply move to another 
site.  Connecting with others via social media has become so engrained in our 
daily lives that it is difficult to imagine a time when we will no longer use these 
sites, as illustrated in the below comment from one of my interviewees: 
 
“…when I’m going about my day-to-day routine, on my phone, like, even 
when I wake up, I look straight on social media.” (TJ, female, 23) 
 
The Cambridge Analytica Scandal (as it has become known), has raised 
awareness and concerns regarding how much control we have over our 
information and what happens to it once we have shared it.  Striking a balance 
between participating in the online world, while retaining the level of privacy we 
are comfortable with is an imprecise art, which many struggle to navigate.  This is 
not new and before we are able to examine how people attempt to negotiate the 
boundaries of internet privacy, it is important to briefly consider privacy more 
broadly.  
 
This literature review will be separated into three main sections, and will be 
organised by literary themes, which will then be further divided by questions I 
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utilise to interrogate these themes.  The first section will define privacy, 
examining how various theorists have defined privacy previously and whether 
these definitions remain relevant (Westin, 1970; Nippert-Eng, 2010 and Spinello, 
2017 [2003]).  I will then consider the divide between public and private spheres 
and how this divide has been conceived, while recognising the difficulty in 
maintaining this separation. 
 
The second section will then focus on the key issue of commercial surveillance, 
which is the focus of my thesis.  Here I concentrate on the collection of data 
which has become a part of many people’s daily lives and examine the issue of 
control.  Moreover, I explore Bucher’s (2018) work regarding programmed 
sociality and the impact this has on our relationships.  I then consider how the 
work of Foucault (1977) has been developed and argue that it remains relevant in 
terms of our behaviour online. Following this, I will consider the aggregation of 
data and how this can reveal more about an individual than intended (Kosinski, et 
al., 2013 and Miller, 2016).  The penultimate sub-section will contemplate debates 
around whether social media users are being exploited by the owners of these 
sites.  Finally, I examine the opportunities available to individuals in terms of 
regaining limited control through small ‘act[s] of defiance’ (Fiske, 1989 p.9, and 
de Certeau, 1988).   
 
The final section will review the complicating nature of context, and how it has 
been considered in previous research.  I begin by focussing on the work of 
Nissenbaum (2010), particularly her theory around contextual integrity; this 
compelling research will be considered alongside that of other theorists who have 
attempted to categorise types of information.  This offers a useful way of 
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considering the importance of type of information when examining how 
individuals feel about sharing data.  It will examine how the sharing of different 
types of information may cause different levels of concern in individuals 
(Huberman, et al., 2005), as well as the impact that various audiences may have 
(Consolvo, et al., 2005).  The second and final sub-section will examine 
explanations that have been put forth which attempt to explain why an 
individual’s actions may not match their purported level of concern.  This will 
include themes such as the privacy paradox, tradeoff decisions and the impact that 
the collapse of contexts can have on those concerned.  Finally, there will be a 
summary of the literature review itself before moving on to discuss how my 
research will aim to reduce the gap in existing knowledge.  The discussions 
throughout this literature review offer a starting point from which to consider not 
only the current and previous research on this topic but will allow me to identify 
the gaps in literature that my work will fill.  This reflects the central arguments of 
my thesis, which are that the decisions and concerns that individuals have around 
their data privacy very much depend upon the context in which they are being 
asked to share information.  Further, the use of social media sites, should not be 
taken to be a lack of concern regarding one’s privacy, and individuals often 
implement measures they deem necessary and manageable when managing the 
boundaries of internet privacy. 
 
Public versus private 
 
Attempts to define privacy are not new, in fact, almost five decades ago, Westin 
offered an explanation of four types of privacy: ‘solitude, intimacy, anonymity 
and reserve’ (1970 p.31).  Within Westin’s definitions, solitude refers to a state 
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when an individual is not part of a group; they are unobserved, and this is the 
most privacy that an individual can experience.  Following this is intimacy, which 
is when a small group is separate from others, this is often seen in family 
relationships, but those involved do not have to be related.  Thirdly is anonymity, 
which is when an individual is in public, but unknown to those around them, 
therefore they are literally a face in the crowd.  In this context, the individual can 
be freely observed, but they are relaxed as they do not know those who are 
observing them (and they are unknown by the observer).  The final type of 
privacy is that of reserve.  This is when an individual wants to be left alone, and 
so restricts their communication with others; this is acknowledged by others in the 
act of allowing that person to be alone. 
 
A common feature of all of these types of privacy is the element of control, while 
not explicitly stated, it is hinted at, in that the individual appears to be able to 
control access to themselves.  Therefore, this is often deemed to be an important 
feature of privacy – the ability to control who is able to observe or identify an 
individual; the importance of control will be considered in much greater detail in 
the commercial surveillance section of this literature review.  The theme of 
control links with Nippert-Eng’s (2010) conception of privacy; she suggests that 
on a daily basis, individuals want to feel comfortable with how much they conceal 
or reveal, but it is an ongoing balancing act, rather than an absolute measurement.  
Further, she suggests three key themes around privacy: control, solitude and 
autonomy.  She suggests that most of all, people want to be able to manage their 
privacy.  Nippert-Eng argues that nothing is private by nature, and so in theory 
anything can be shared, although this raises questions regarding whether 
everything should be shared.  The most important consideration is that individuals 
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have control over whether to share specific information with others; this is key.  
This simplifies what is acknowledged to be a very complex situation but does 
offer a foundation upon which to build.  It is important to note that control is not 
easily achievable, and it takes a lot of work for individuals to achieve their desired 
level of control over their privacy, especially given that it is more difficult to be 
private than public (Nippert-Eng, 2010).  It is often the case that privacy cannot be 
achieved simply because the individual involved decides to be private and it 
requires the assistance or support of others. 
 
Spinello appears to agree with this viewpoint, suggesting that two popular 
theories when dealing with data privacy are ‘control theory and restricted access 
theory’ (2017 [2003] p.163).  He argues that control theory relates to the work of 
Fried and suggests that an individual can only have privacy if he or she has 
control over his or her data while restricted access theory revolves around being 
able to limit the sharing of information about oneself in particular situations.  
Spinello also offers a number of types of privacy: ‘secrecy, anonymity and 
solitude’ (2017 [2003] p.163).  Secrecy relates to the ability of an individual to 
restrict the dissemination of information about themselves to others.  Anonymity 
offers a shield from unwanted attention, while solitude gives individuals the 
ability to be physically distant from others.  These definitions share the view that 
control is vital when considering privacy and is one of the key themes that I will 
explore within my research into how people navigate the boundaries of internet 
privacy.  However, it is important to note that not all theorists in this area deem 
control to be vital.  Nissenbaum (2010) goes so far as to suggest that, ‘privacy is 
neither a right to secrecy or a right to control, but a right to appropriate flow of 
personal information’, (p.127).  From Nissenbaum’s perspective, control is less 
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important than context, which dictates the type of information that can be shared 
with whom under which circumstances. Under the framework of contextual 
integrity, Nisenbaum suggests that when concerns are raised regarding 
contemporary data collection, it is not the lack of control that is at the root of this, 
rather it is how these practices ‘transgress context-relative information norms’ 
(Nissenbaum, 2010, p.186).  These norms are important as they support the social 
contexts in which we live our daily lives, and interact with others, which in turn 
promote the information-sharing practices that are and are not acceptable.  
Therefore, control is not the issue, as we are happy to have less control in 
situations where it is contextually appropriate, however, where it is not 
appropriate, this is when tensions occur. This will be discussed further in the 
context section of this literature review. 
 
Are public and private areas mutually exclusive? 
The separation between public and private areas is not only taken for granted but 
is deemed to be mutually exclusive.  Discourse around these terms is particularly 
problematic when it fails to recognise the complex nature and multiple meanings 
of these categories (Arendt, 1958; Weintraub, 1997 and Wacks, 2015 [2010]).  
Despite a lack of clarity around the terms public and private, they continue to be 
widely used in a way that suggests common agreement regarding what they 
represent (Habermas, 1989).  In fact, Wolfe (1997) states that while the distinction 
between the two categories is not perfect, it is necessary.  The reason for this is 
that there is behaviour which should be hidden, and thus kept in private; clearly if 
there were no private realm, this would not be possible.  However, there is more at 
stake here than simply practical considerations of behaviour and Arendt (1958) 
suggests that we all need the private sphere as it provides the foundation for the 
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public sphere and is therefore vital for humans’ existence.  The mental health of 
individuals may depend on the existence of a private realm where they are able to 
relax and reflect while hidden from society’s watchful gaze (Arendt, 1958; 
Westin, 1970; Berger, et al., 1977 and Goffman, 1980).  Indeed, legal scholar, 
Cohen (2017) argues that privacy is essential to allow individuals to engage in 
‘boundary management through which they define and redefine themselves as 
subjects’ (p.459), this is something that would be impossible to carry out in public 
and once again demonstrates how necessary the private area is. 
 
The existence of a separate, private space is vital because people are required to 
be constantly engaged in impression management, in a bid to ensure that they give 
out the ‘right’ impression to others when in public (Goffman, 1990 [1969]).  
Often this means that individuals must hide their actual feelings when interacting 
with others for fear of showing their ‘true’ selves and losing the respect of others.  
Under this conception, the private sphere is necessary for people to be able to 
participate in society as it also offers them a space to be self-reflective.  Arendt 
(1958) offers a similar argument, suggesting that privacy offers a hiding place for 
individuals, and a way to give their lives added depth.  She puts forth that 
although those living in complete privacy almost cease to exist, those living in 
complete publicity fare no better, as they live a shallow life, which lacks meaning.  
As such, the private sphere is necessary to maintain well-being and to allow 
recovery from too much time spent in the public realm.  Given this, it is perhaps 
not surprising that as the concept of the private space develops, it becomes 
inextricably linked with the home.  As such it is broadly seen as a sanctuary 
where individuals can be themselves, sheltered from the outside world.  However, 
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the link between the private realm and the home is not without issue, although a 
fuller examination of this is beyond the scope of this literature review. 
 
The relationship between the public and private spheres is often characterised as 
being one of dependence, requiring balance (Westin, 1970; Weintraub, 1997 and 
Nippert-Eng, 2010).  As discussed previously, Arendt (1958) subscribes to this 
view of balance, arguing that it is necessary for an individual to have balance 
between privacy and publicity in their life as any imbalance would be 
problematic.  However, Lyon (2005 [2001]) suggests that the distinction between 
public and private is becoming more blurred due to increased surveillance in 
individuals’ day-to-day lives.  He puts forth that many interactions now take place 
regardless of physical boundaries and therefore it is harder to discern where the 
boundary between public and private space lies.  There are also numerous 
electronic devices within our homes, which connect wirelessly to various external 
computer networks to pass on data.  Examples of this include the Amazon Echo 
range of products which all feature their personal assistant ‘Alexa’ (Amazon, 
2019) not to mention individuals updating their status on social networking sites.  
Given these examples, it seems that locating the line between the public and 
private spheres is becoming increasingly difficult. 
 
While there is little doubt that a relationship exists between the public and private 
spheres, to treat these categories as mutually exclusive is a problematic approach, 
which has been pointed out by various theorists.  Weintraub (1997) in particular 
suggests that the taken for granted nature of this dichotomy suggests that the two 
concepts can be easily categorised as binary opposites.  Rather than there being a 
single divide between the two spheres, he argues there are a multitude of 
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frameworks in which they can be used, however, this is rarely considered by those 
using them.  Given the problematic nature of this binary divide, Nippert-Eng 
(2010) offers an alternative conceptualisation.  She puts forth that it may be more 
helpful to consider the public and private spheres as opposite ends of a spectrum.  
At one end there would be total privacy, which would be characterised by an 
individual’s complete inaccessibility, while total publicity would be at the other 
end and would be characterised by an individual’s complete accessibility.  This is 
an idea that could be worth developing further, however, it may lead to the same 
issues of definition as we try to decide where different actions and information 
should be placed upon that spectrum.  Further, I suggest that this boundary is 
context-based and as such is dependent upon each individual situation, which 
makes a clear definition impossible. 
 
Nissenbaum (2010) contends that while it may seem obvious to restrict concerns 
about privacy to the private realm, this makes problematic assumptions about the 
relationship between privacy and the public/private dichotomy.    Her framework 
suggests that it is ultimately reductive to suggest that we are limited to only two 
contexts – public or private, instead putting forth that there are numerous social 
contexts, each of which have specific rules which regulate how information 
should flow within that context.  This framework allows us to consider each 
situation and context as a separate case, rather than having to use broad 
categories, which obscure the fundamentally nuanced nature of privacy and 
information-sharing.  This recognises the multi-dimensional nature of 
appropriateness, rather than attempting to separate situations into private or 




Ultimately, the categories of public and private are not mutually exclusive, and 
the concept has shades of grey, which further complicates the task of defining 
privacy.  Helpfully, Nissenbaum (2010) suggests that privacy can be linked with 
three areas of the public/private distinction.  These areas are the actors involved, 
the space itself, or the type of information and each of these areas can be separated 
into public or private, which can be helpful.  In circumstances where this 
approach is taken, there is often an emphasis on one of the above areas, however, 
issues occur when these dimensions become confused or they are not explicitly 
recognised.  Essentially, this approach considers each context separately, on an 
individual basis, recognising the importance of considering the complicated 





Historically, work around surveillance has tended to focus on government 
surveillance, not least because of the usefulness of this practice to the government.  
However, the focus of my work is commercial surveillance, in particular social 
media platforms and commercial companies.  That being said, many of the 
discussions around government surveillance can be applied to the practices of 
commercial surveillance.  Cohen (2017) suggests that those who study 
surveillance consider it to be ‘a mode of social control’ and rather than it being 
passive or reactive, ‘surveillant attention is productive,’ (p.456) highlighting the 
importance of considering what is produced by it.  When considering the role of 
surveillance, it is important to examine the link between surveillance and 
economic development.  Cohen highlights the importance of doing this as she 
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discusses how surveillance as a form of social control has contributed to the 
‘ongoing shift from industrialism to informationalism’ (p.457) in developed 
countries.  Increasingly, the way in which companies make money is by 
collecting, collating and selling users’ data, thus highlighting the greater value 
assigned to information.  This commercial surveillance is also beneficial to 
governments, who ‘routinely access…and use flows of behavioral [sic] and 
communications data for its own purposes’. (Cohen, 2017, p.457).  Therefore, 
Cohen (2017) suggests that it is not enough to consider this kind of surveillance as 
merely social control, contending instead that it is ‘a mode of governance’ (p.457) 
which is inextricably linked with ‘the rise of informational capitalism as a model 
of political economy’ (p.457).  
 
Social connections 
As discussed briefly in the previous section, control is purported by some to be 
vital to our ability to achieve the level of privacy we desire; however, this is 
problematic for those collecting our information for a number of reasons.  The 
main issue is that companies collect vast amounts of data about their customers so 
that it can generate income; this is essentially the business model for many social 
networking sites, as well as large corporations such as Google.  Previously, 
companies made money from selling items or services, and while this is still true 
for many, user data itself has become a valuable commodity (Lyon, 1994 [1988]; 
Lyon, 2000 [1994]; Nissenbaum, 2010; Miller, 2011; Pierson, 2012; van Dijck, 
2013; Fuchs, 2014 and Miller, 2016).  The value of this information lies in its 
ability to allow advertisers to allocate their resources in a more efficient way by 
targeting their advertisements towards those who are more likely to be interested 
in purchasing their products.  In order to do so, companies need to collect as much 
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data as possible, as this then enables them to create profiles of consumers which 
can then be aligned with potentially suitable products.  This is why companies 
often introduce a loyalty or rewards scheme for customers, as it allows them to 
collect a greater amount of data, and through the individual’s account, link it 
together (Miller, 2011 and Cohen, 2019).  Although some companies have offered 
premium services or content for a fee in order to generate profit, customer data is 
often much more profitable than subscription fees and so many are reticent to do 
this (van Dijck, 2013).  Companies also join their data with that of other 
companies to create profiles of their customers and build a more detailed picture 
of them, their behaviour and habits, which can be utilised when marketing to 
them.  This is the role that Big Data fulfils in that the aim of it is to collect ever-
increasing amounts of data (Andrejevic & Gates, 2014).  Proponents of Big Data 
suggest that more data offers greater insights, and as such any issue is deemed 
solvable if enough data has been collected.  The issue for companies is that if 
individuals are granted greater control over whether to share information or not, 
they may choose not to share their data, thus reducing the effectiveness of these 
profiles and the targeted marketing.   
 
This is not necessarily the case, particularly if we consider Chauncey Starr’s 
concept of ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ (1969 p.1233) tasks.  Starr suggests that 
tasks can largely be separated into two categories, those that we choose to 
complete (those that are voluntary) and those that we have no option but to 
complete (involuntary).  In terms of sharing data, we are the initial decision-maker 
in that when a company requests information from us, we can decide whether to 
share the information or not.  However, if the company then shares the 
information with a third-party that we have no knowledge of (and have therefore 
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not consented to), it becomes involuntary, and we lose control over our data and 
what happens to it.  This offers an explanation for the concern expressed by 
companies, if they allow the further sharing of data to become a voluntary 
activity, people may exercise their control and refuse consent.  However, Starr 
also suggests that ‘we loathe to let others do unto us what we happily do to 
ourselves’ (1969 p.1253), therefore, as individuals appear happy to share 
information with companies initially, if they were given the option of sharing with 
a third-party, they may also agree to it, the issue here is that the choice has been 
removed from the situation, rather than the sharing of data itself.  This suggests 
that increased control for users may actually be beneficial to companies, despite 
their assumptions to the contrary. 
 
Regardless of who has control in these situations, it is clear that we have become 
much more connected through our use of social media sites.  Van Dijck (2013) 
considers the connections we are forming with each other through the use of 
technology and how this has developed into a culture of connectivity.  Utilising 
the example of Facebook, he examines its ethos of sharing and openness and what 
this truly means for users.  Essentially, the term ‘sharing’ does not have a clear 
definition.  Taken at face value, it appears to denote users sharing information 
with each other through their use of Facebook, however, Facebook also shares 
user data with third-parties.  It is also important to note that sharing itself is not a 
social norm, it is something that is negotiated between the owners of social 
networking sites and their users.  This has not necessarily been straightforward 
and social media users have not simply followed the sharing norms set out by the 
owners of these sites (this will explored in greater detail later in this review).  
Nevertheless, van Dijck (2013) puts forth that due to its position as the leader of 
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social networking sites, ‘Facebook’s ideology of sharing…set the standard for 
other platforms and the eco system as a whole’ (p.46).  It is in the best interests of 
the platform owners to encourage users to be as open as possible (Couldry and 
Mejias, 2019b) as the more information they can collect, the more they have 
available to sell to third-parties.  It also allows them to aggregate more 
information regarding each user, which creates value (aggregation will be dealt 
with in greater detail later in this review).  Social networking sites encourage 
users to create and maintain connections through using the platform and it can be 
argued that ‘Facebook’s connective functions provide empowering and enriching 
social experiences’ (van Dijck, 2013, p.47) for users.  However, complete 
openness is not necessarily the best thing for the site’s users, who may not want 
all (or any) of their information to be shared with third-parties.  As such, it is in 
Facebook’s interests to focus its users’ attention on their social connections (to 
encourage greater sharing) while obscuring the third-party sharing.  There is the 
potential for users to become disenfranchised if they learn more about what 
happens to their data.  In fact, owners of these sites have an advantage in that they 
employ those who write the code, and so ultimately, they hold greater control over 
user-data than the users themselves.  An example of this disparity is that 
following a user backlash after introducing Facebook Beacon, rather than 
reverting to the existing norms in terms of sharing data, Facebook began working 
on ways to alter the norm around sharing to expand what the term actually meant.  
This suggests that once a new routine becomes accepted as regular practice it 
becomes the standard against which all new systems are measured. This is 
problematic as it may take time for people to realise that they are uncomfortable 
with a new practice, by which time is it too late to challenge it as it has become 
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commonplace, rendering complaint or protest moot (Nissenbaum, 2010 and van 
Dijck, 2013). 
 
Users are integral to social networking sites, because the information they provide 
(through status updates, liking others’ posts and so on) is fuel for the algorithms, 
which are constantly changing in response to this (van Dijck, 2013).  However, 
not all social media users are of equal value to the owners of these sites and those 
with more connections with other users generate more information and links and 
as such, more profit.  To encourage this, Facebook has worked hard to ensure that 
its reputation encourages users to visit the site, spend time there and make 
connections with other users (van Dijck, 2013).  There is a fine balance to be 
struck on these sites, between ‘attracting and exploiting communities’ (p.62).  It 
needs users to enjoy using the site, but it also needs to encourage them to be 
active users, as this will generate greater profit through increased content and/or 
connections.  However, this needs to be dealt with delicately as sites such as 
Facebook need users to be willing ‘to contribute data and to allow maximum data 
mining’ (p.64), this can be a difficult balance to strike and as such, Facebook 
employs creativity to encourage greater sharing.  It has also been aided in this by 
other companies who are willing to allow Facebook to verify user credentials 
(though the ‘Sign in with Facebook’ button).  This allows users to sign in to other 
websites, using their Facebook logon details, thus offering a frictionless 
experience, which makes the process much more convenient for users, who can 
create a new user account without having to remember yet another set of login 
details.  This then links all of their activity on the new site with their Facebook 
account, thus generating further data for Facebook. This is also another layer of 
the culture of connectivity in that the companies themselves are inextricably 
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linked, just as the users are (van Dijck, 2013).  As discussed previously, the 
connections between users provides fuel for the algorithms that social media sites 
rely on, algorithms, which in turn shape the experiences of those using the site. 
 
Programmed Sociality 
Through her exploration of algorithms, Bucher (2018) argues that ‘platforms act 
as performative intermediaries that participate in shaping the worlds they purport 
to represent’ (p.1), thus suggesting that these sites cannot be separated from our 
daily lives.  In fact, she does not view platforms as neutral tools, due to the 
analytical work that takes place behind these sites, usually hidden from the users’ 
view.  Users receive numerous recommendations based on computer-aided 
analysis of their previous actions and preferences, which they may be unaware of.  
This is not problematic in and of itself, however, Bucher argues that this has led to 
our online lives becoming much more mediated, meaning that we are led in 
particular directions based on our past behaviour. 
 
Bucher’s (2018) work on ‘programmed sociality’ (p.1) is heuristic in nature, 
suggesting that we rely on algorithms in various ways.  Social media platforms 
are a part of our social relationships, rather than merely offering a space for them 
to exist.  Facebook prompts users to provide personal information as soon as they 
have set-up an account and to add people to their friends list.  Templates tell users 
what information to enter and the format that these entries must take, which 
allows the algorithms to function efficiently.  Facebook needs engaged and well-
connected users and so it offers various ways for users to engage with the 
platform itself, as well as each other.  Algorithms create value, offer accurate 
predictions and encourage users to engage with and continue to use the platform; 
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Facebook does this by reminding users of ‘friends’ that they have not interacted 
with for an extended period, for example.  However, that is not to say that 
Facebook friendships are not authentic, rather Bucher (2018) argues that, they are 
‘highly mediated and conditioned by algorithmic systems’ (p.7).  It is also 
important to remember that people appear on a user’s newsfeed regardless of 
whether they are close friends or acquaintances.  This is because social 
networking sites are not interested in differentiating between these groups as it 
does not serve their mass collection of data (Blank, et al. 2014 ).  As such the 
newsfeed will not show a user all updates by everyone on their friends list, rather 
it will show those calculated to be most important (and that will garner the 
greatest level of interaction and engagement from the user concerned).  This 
demonstrates programmed sociality in action, as users’ online experiences are 
shaped by algorithmic systems, and this is where the power lies in these 
exchanges.  Bucher calls forth Foucault to suggest that ‘this would be power seen 
as a form of political, social and economic domination, where one entity prevents 
another from seeing or doing something’ (p.34 & 35).  In other words, social 
networking sites employ algorithms that ‘decide’ which information a user sees 
and what is hidden from them.  It is also important to remember that algorithms 
are programmed by humans, and so, the suggestion that algorithms have power, is 
not accurate.  More broadly, it is important to note that there is more to this than 
computer code. 
 
Bucher also raises the point that when we post on social networking sites, we do 
not just reveal information about ourselves, but others too.  As such, from the 
perspective of these sites, ‘friends are in the data delivery business’ (p.13).  
Therefore, when a user posts little information about themselves, the algorithms 
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will utilise information posted by those they are linked with as friends to target 
and tailor the advertisements seen.  Therefore, when an individual posts on 
Facebook, they are not merely affecting the content that they will be presented 
with at a later date, but also what their friends will see.  Everything a user does on 
the site becomes a data point which is then utilised by algorithms, that are ever-
changing based on the information they gather.  As such, how users connect with 
friends is altered through their use of Facebook; this, Bucher argues is due to 
programmed sociality, which does not simply transpose friendships, rather it 
generates new ways for friendships to exist.  In this sense, technology is 
productive; it produces friendships rather than offering a platform for them to 
merely exist on.  However, it is important to note that programmed sociality 
should not be perceived to operate in isolation and ‘their capacity to produce 
sociality always already occurs in relation to other elements’ (Bucher, 2018, 
p.153).  As such, people’s behaviour changes in response to programmed sociality 
due to the way it guides their actions by reminding them of a friend’s birthday or 
encouraging them to message a friend they have not interacted with recently. 
 
Updating Foucault 
It will be helpful here to consider Foucault’s work regarding disciplinary power 
(1977) and offer an update of it, with regard to social networking sites and how 
contemporary theorists have linked this.  Foucault argues that disciplinary power 
sets out the expected, normal behaviour which is rewarded.  Further, given the 
way in which disciplinary power functions, individuals do not notice they are 
being restricted, however they feel pressure when they attempt to behave in a way 
which does not conform.  Foucault puts forth that ‘Discipline ‘makes’ individuals, 
it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and 
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as instruments of its exercise’ (1977, p.170).  Therefore, as discussed above, 
social networking sites make money from users’ actions (in terms of what they 
post or like), and as such, moulds them to be active members of the site by 
sending users emails when they have not logged onto the site or posted an update 
for a period of time.  This encourages them to share more regularly, and as such 
directs users to behave in the way that will generate the most profit for the site 
(because the more information users share, the more data the site has to sell to 
advertisers).   Therefore, through the use of disciplinary power, users come to 
behave in the way that generates the greatest income for the site, while at the same 
time, believing that they are choosing to share information.  This offers the 
illusion of control for users who believe they only post information when they 
choose to and fail to recognise the ways in which they are compelled to do so. 
 
Foucault also argues that these systems function efficiently due to individuals 
being constantly observed; he perceives observation to be coercion (1977).  While 
those subject to this kind of coercion need to be seen, the opposite is true for those 
carrying out the observations.  Surveillance becomes embedded into the 
environment and as such the design of the environment centres around observing 
those within it, rather than any other function.  Again, this can be linked to social 
networking sites, as the design of them facilitates and encourages the sharing of 
information, and/or linking individuals together (through ‘tagging’ them in a post 
or photograph), allowing observation to occur, while appearing to offer a space 
for individuals to connect with their friends and family.  Social media users are 
observed by the site, so that patterns can be identified, and users’ behaviour is not 
only predicted, but once the site has enough information, it can be manipulated 
(Bucher, 2018).  This occurred in 2014, when findings were published from an 
38 
	
experiment that researchers carried out with Facebook (Kramer, et al., 2014) 
during which users’ moods were manipulated by altering the proportion of 
positive or negative postings appearing on their newsfeed.  This caused concerns 
to be raised regarding informed consent at the time (Booth, 2014) and highlights 
how useful observations can be to the social networking site itself.  This is also 
the issue that is at the centre of the Cambridge Analytica Scandal (Cadwalladr & 
Graham-Harrison, 2018), in which those involved have been accused of 
influencing voting behaviour in both the US presidential election in 2016 and the 
EU referendum earlier that year.  While it is important to note that as yet, there 
has not been any concrete evidence that individuals changed how they voted 
depending on the information they were presented with on their Facebook feed, it 
has caused a degree of concern for many regarding the reach and influence of 
social networking sites. 
 
Foucault (1977) suggests that the environment thus becomes a tool for training 
those within it.  Although Foucault’s focus was upon physical structures and 
architecture, I suggest that his work can be applied to contemporary social 
networking sites and the online space they offer to users.  As discussed above, the 
environment offered by social networking sites (the platform itself) trains 
individuals to behave in a particular way.  For example, through suggesting others 
they may know, it encourages them to connect with more people, which will help 
the site’s algorithms to make more accurate inferences about that individual.  
There are also ways in which users’ behaviour is explicitly directed on these sites, 
in terms of how they can express themselves, for example, Twitter only allows 
280 characters in a tweet, therefore users must restrict themselves to this or spread 
their thoughts across a number of Tweets.  Similarly, up until 2016, Facebook 
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users could only express how they felt about a post through the use of a single 
‘Like’ button however, Facebook introduced five additional ‘reaction’ buttons 
three years ago, which allow users to express a number of emotional responses.  
Therefore, Facebook is directing the way in which users are able to express how 
they feel about a post without typing a comment, while also allowing the site to 
collect more nuanced information regarding how users feel about particular posts.  
However, we do not question why we are restricted, instead, we are coerced into 
behaving ‘correctly’ without question.  Cohen suggests that this is due to 
surveillance itself having become a norm for us, so much so that ‘The awareness 
of surveillance fosters a kind of passivity – a ceding of power over space’ (2017, 
p.461).  In this situation, we come to expect to be watched, which is problematic, 
as this leads to the normalisation of ‘the disciplinary effects of surveillance, 
making them more difficult to contest’ (p.461), therefore, we no longer consider 
this type of surveillance to be a problem and may in fact internalise this so that we 
feel safer in spaces with greater levels of surveillance.  As noted earlier, even if 
we do become concerned, it is often after the practice has become embedded and 
so it is too late to make any complaint or attempt to remove the practice. 
 
Foucault suggests that under the rule of discipline, subjects become objects, who 
do not see power directly, but do feel it upon their bodies.  I argue that this 
happens whenever an individual is unable to carry out a task in the way that they 
would like such as when registering with a website.  This view is shared by Cohen 
(2012), who suggests that system ‘design make some actions seem easier and 
more natural, and other activities more difficult.’ (p.131), this tends to be done in 
such a way as to make it appear to be the norm, so that users do not question why 
they are directed a certain way when carrying out actions.  This can clearly be 
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seen if we consider how Facebook has changed its structure from ‘a database 
structure into a narrative structure’ (Van Dijck, 2013, p.54).  Originally, users 
were free to enter whatever information they chose to on their profile, however, as 
time went on, Facebook became more prescriptive.  The introduction of the site’s 
timeline organised everything a user had posted, uploaded or interacted with into 
chronological order, this makes every user’s page appear more uniform, while 
also helping Facebook as it collects information that can be used to fuel 
algorithms (Van Dijck, 2013). 
 
Foucault’s work on disciplinary power is popular amongst various theorists when 
discussing issues around social media, and Bucher (2018) updates Foucault’s 
work in her examination of algorithms.  She suggests they are a tool used to 
govern populations of social media users by directing ‘the flow of information 
and the practices of users’ (p.38) to specific areas or activities.  By doing so, 
users’ attention is directed towards certain activities, often connecting with other 
users and/or generation of information for the site to collect and sell, and away 
from other activities, which are less valuable to the site owners.  She goes as far as 
to suggest that they are ‘political devices…that represent certain design decisions 
about how the world is to be ordered’ (Bucher, 2018, p.68), thereby signalling to 
users what is or is not important.  This is not necessarily noticed or considered by 
users, who deem this to simply be ‘the way things are’, rather than questioning the 
system, much less try to change it.  In this sense, power does not reside with the 
algorithms, rather it is through ‘algorithmic techniques and practices’ (p.68) that 
‘power is exercised’ (p.68).  In this way, disciplinary power has become 
integrated and (to a certain extent) invisible.  As discussed above, disciplinary 
power requires covert surveillance to take place and this is where social 
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networking sites come into their own, in terms of the level of surveillance they 
facilitate.  Foucault suggests that ‘The perfect disciplinary apparatus would make 
it possible for a single gaze to see everything constantly’ (1977, p.173), and I 
argue that this is how social media operates.  The sites record everything that 
users do there, including their status updates, other statuses that they like or 
comment on, as well as who they are linked with through their network and this 
information is not only collected and analysed, but also re-visited and repackaged 
to be sold to advertisers.  As noted above, it is also used to predict and influence 
users’ behaviour.  This surveillance is largely invisible to users (or, at the very 
least, not considered by them). 
 
This leads to disciplinary power being simultaneously ‘indiscreet’ (in that nothing 
is ever hidden because it sees everything) and ‘discreet, for it functions 
permanently and largely in silence’ (Foucault, 1977 p.177).  Cohen (2017) also 
highlights the disparity between the transparency of the watched and the opacity 
of the watchers.  Building upon Foucault’s work, she suggests that surveillance 
works to generate categories based on various attributes, which can then be used 
to classify individuals and organise them into groups of those who share those 
attributes, this is then taken to be factually accurate.  It is also important to note 
that this is effective without any official coercion and is not administered 
centrally, in fact this process is most effective when ‘widely dispersed among 
civil and market institutions that govern everyday life’ (p.460).  In other words 
when they are covert, occurring in the background as we go about our daily lives, 
without considering it.  In this way, everything is known about users through the 
information they share and the connections they make, however, little is really 
seen in terms of what social networking sites do with users’ data.  It often takes 
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large-scale media reporting, such as that around the Cambridge Analytica Scandal 
of 2018 to reveal the extent of the surveillance being carried out.  Despite this, 
there does not appear to have been a mass exodus from Facebook, and although 
between July and October 2018, it lost a number of users in Europe, worldwide, 
the number of users continues to increase (The Independent Online, 2018). 
 
Bucher (2018) also updates Foucault’s (1977) theories around categorisation and 
how this can be a form of discipline when she discusses the way in which 
algorithms categorise users according to the information it has collected and 
processed.  This then leads to decisions regarding which users are able to access 
which information, it is also used to categorise users hierarchically according to 
how useful the data they generate is, and this then determines how visible (or 
invisible) they are to others.  Bucher (2018) also takes Foucault’s concept of the 
panopticon further, in terms of the use of visibility.  The way that the panopticon 
works is that those within it are regulated through the potential of visibility, and 
thus are encouraged to behave ‘correctly’, as they can never be sure whether they 
are being watched or not. Under the conditions of the panopticon, all individuals 
are equally likely to be watched at any given moment, which leads to uncertainty 
around visibility.  However, Bucher (2018) argues the opposite is true when we 
consider Facebook, and so the concern is not around being visible at any given 
moment, but in being invisible.  As such users are subtly directed to behave in 
certain ways to ensure that the content they post does not disappear, rendering 
them unimportant and invisible; this invisibility is both literal and metaphorical.  
By encouraging us to re-think the importance of visibility, Bucher encourages us 
to consider how within the panopticon, all were equally visible, however, this is 
not the case on social media.  Algorithms work to prioritise some users over 
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others, creating a hierarchy of visibility, and so users are encouraged to post more 
information, to include photographs and so on, to remain important enough to be 
visible.  In direct opposition to the punishment of being visible within the 
panopticon, visibility is the reward on Facebook, it is the goal of users.  In this 
sense, visibility has become aspirational, as opposed to problematic.  However, 
Bucher contends that this does not mean that there is no place for discipline under 
these circumstances, as she states: ‘Discipline denotes a type of power that 
economizes [sic] its functioning by making subjects responsible for their own 
behavior [sic]’ (p.88).  This continues on social networking sites, in that users are 
disciplined to behave in specific ways (which is how Foucault argued disciplinary 
power worked) in order to be considered important enough to be rewarded with 
visibility.  As such users appreciate that their behaviour will be rewarded if it is 
deemed to be ‘useful’ (in other words, if it generates profit for social media 
owners).  However, it is important to recognise that Bucher (2018) is not 
suggesting that algorithms directly tell social media users how to behave, rather 
‘they shape an environment in which certain subject positions are made more real 
and available to us’ (p.156). 
 
When considering online spaces, it is impossible to ignore the role that algorithms 
play in terms of what is or is not visible to differently profiled users.  Content can 
be withheld, and access mediated simply by the use of algorithms which allow or 
deny pieces of information to be accessed.  More than that, algorithms are also 
able to alter how content is presented to different users based on their attributes 
and so on.  Therefore, our experience of online spaces is mediated by algorithms 
which also offer different suggestions to us based on our defined characteristics.  
As well as normalising the collection of our information, these companies have 
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also made sure that they articulate the benefits of sharing our data, so that we are 
able to appreciate the advantages of engaging with these companies and sharing 
our information.  As such Cohen (2017) highlights the importance of considering 
how useful this kind of data sharing can be, although to gain these benefits, ‘the 
surveillance society demands full enrolment.’ (p.462), suggesting that we gain 
more if we share more.  There are also issues when we consider that rather than 
information sharing leading to a level playing field in which all can participate, 
the current system of information gathering is asymmetric, offering the greatest 
benefits to those who are able to collect, store and process the greatest volume of 
customer information.  At the same time, the purported benefit of consumers 
being offered greater choice when purchasing items has become confusing, rather 
than empowering especially given that companies are able to manipulate 
customers, in terms of ‘tailoring promotions and disclosures to consumers with 
particular profiles’ (Cohen, 2017, p.468). 
 
Aggregation of information 
In order to tailor promotions and information, companies often draw data together 
from disparate sources to create a profile of an individual; this is known as 
aggregation.  This can be problematic for individuals, who are often unaware of 
this practice.  Miller (2016) hints at a loss of control by suggesting that those who 
possess data, possess power, therefore once individuals share their data with 
companies, whether they realise it or not, they are also giving them the power 
contained within that data.  This occurs because the more data companies are able 
to collect and aggregate, they more they ‘know’ about individuals and this 
knowledge is then used to make decisions regarding these people.  It is also 
possible to make inferences from data and so additional information can be 
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revealed despite not having been explicitly shared (Kosinski, et al., 2013; Hern, 
2015; Ward, 2017 and Nurse, 2019).  Given that many people are unaware of the 
sheer volume of data that are collected and stored about them and how they have 
been merged with other data, it is hard to characterise this as a situation in which 
the individual is in control.  This is especially problematic because data is often 
collected for one purpose and then through the creation of profiles and utilisation 
of data brokers, is re-used for a different purpose (Garfinkel, 2001 and Miller, 
2016).  This causes problems related to consent, as an individual may consent to 
the initial use of data, but as they are unaware of the potential secondary uses, 
consent is impossible.  This causes issues for people as they want to feel 
comfortable with how much they conceal or reveal on a daily basis (Nippert-Eng, 
2010), however this control is simply not possible if they do not know what will 
happen to their data.  Gadzheva (2008) puts forth that even when individuals are 
aware of what happens to their data, there is still little possibility for them to have 
control as companies are not particularly forthcoming in detailing who they will 
share an individual’s data with or which other pieces of data it will be linked with. 
 
A common defence of aggregation (by the aggregators) is that the information is 
already available, albeit in different places, and so putting it together should not 
be an issue.  Further, they argue that the individual in question has already shared 
the information freely and so there should be no issue with pulling innocent 
information together.  However, this misrepresents the revealing nature of 
aggregated information, especially as ‘third-party harvesters are keenly aware of 
the qualitative shifts that can occur when bits of data are combined into collages’ 
(Nissenbaum, 2010, p.203).  This is problematic because numerous inferences can 
be made from seemingly disparate pieces of information (which may be accurate 
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or inaccurate).  Aside from the issue of potential exploitation, there is the issue of 
whether the information held by the organisation itself is correct, this is another 
issue with Big Data’s adage that more data is better, it assumes that data is 
reliable when it may not be (boyd & Crawford, 2012).  Any decision based on 
incorrect data could be disastrous, leading to individuals being treated differently 
due to an assumption based on incorrect data.  Although in theory, the Data 
Protection Act 2018 gives data subjects the right to check and correct data where 
necessary, given the burgeoning data broker industry outlined above, this is a very 
difficult task.  People may know who they shared their data with originally, but it 
is unlikely that they will be able to trace every other company that the data has 
subsequently been sold to (Lyon, 2000 [1994]; Gadzheva, 2008 and Miller, 2016) 
in order to correct it.  This issue is further exacerbated by the fact that data is now 
stored forever.  Previously, hard copies of data had to be destroyed in order to 
make room for more recent data, however, given the increased storage capacity 
offered by technology, there is no need to do this anymore.  As nothing is ever 
forgotten, incorrect data can follow an individual around for the rest of their life, 
without them ever being able to correct it (Miller, 2016).  This can cause a loss of 
‘social forgetfulness’ (Blanchette and Johnson, 2002 p.33), meaning that no one is 
afforded a second chance, either for mistakes that have been made in the past or to 
rectify inaccurate data.  Individuals thus come to lack autonomy over their lives as 
discrepancies in the data leave them open to issues arising from acts they have 
never committed and can never correct (Westin, 1970, Bucher, 2018).  Therefore, 
the aggregation of data can cause numerous issues for individuals, whether the 
data are correct or not.  The subject of aggregation has also raised questions 
regarding who actually owns the data stored in these databases.  While the 
individual data subject may believe that as the data relates to them, it is theirs, the 
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company who has created the profile by aggregating data from various sources, 
often believes that the data are theirs as they have created the profile. 
 
This matter is further complicated by the fact that when data is drawn together 
from numerous sources, it means that context is lost and so a collection of details 
can appear suspicious, when they are innocent.  Linked to the loss of control 
described above, individuals are not able to add context or provide any sort of 
explanation in these cases, as they do not know which pieces of data have been 
linked together, or what inferences have been made.  As the government collects 
data in order to identify terrorist behaviour, for example, an individual may be 
classified as a potential threat simply for having a similar behaviour pattern to a 
member of a terrorist organisation (Miller, 2016).  It is possible that an innocent 
individual could be misidentified, and harm may be caused, this highlights 
another issue with Big Data, in that the volume of information collected may 
appear to answer numerous questions, however, without context, it is meaningless 
(boyd & Crawford, 2012).  A further issue here is that once data has been 
decontextualized, it is also very difficult to tell what the intentions behind the 
posting were, and so something that was posted in an ironic manner, or as a joke 
may not be seen as such once the context has been stripped from it.  Context and 
meaning are necessary in order to fully understand the social world, if this is lost, 
then it is difficult to fully appreciate what the data are telling us, if indeed they are 
telling us anything at all. 
 
Are social media users exploited? 
An often-cited issue with social media and their encouragement of users to share 
as much information as possible is the potential for users to be exploited.  In his 
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examination of Facebook, Fuchs (2012) suggests that the commodification of 
individuals’ data is a way of exploiting users.  He (2013) argues that this 
exploitation occurs due to the creation of surplus value by users.  Profit is 
generated when items are sold for prices which are higher than the costs incurred 
in producing them.  Zuboff names this accumulation of vast amounts of data 
‘surveillance capitalism’ (2015, p.77), and suggests (as many others have), that 
people utilising these sites are no longer deemed to be customers; they simply 
supply the raw data that owners of the site repackage and sell for a profit.  
Similarly, Couldry and Mejias (2019a) argue that information is not a ‘natural’ 
resource that is simply collected by these companies, rather, the nature of our 
everyday lives are being altered to better facilitate the collection and capture of 
information.  However, companies must do this in such a way that we barely 
notice it.  If it is noticed and questions are raised by users, companies argue that 
we are simply sharing our data, while they have the expertise to render the 
information valuable (as in its ‘natural’ state, it has no value) (Couldry & Mejias, 
2019a).  This then allows companies to collect our information and sell it on 
without considering those supplying the information.  As social networking sites 
do not pay users for the data they provide (which is then collected and sold), it 
generates a profit without requiring any investment from the owner (Fuchs, 2013 
and Dyer-Witheford, 2015).  Fuchs suggests that this process means that ‘users 
are unpaid and therefore infinitely exploited’ (p.218), because as long as users 
continue to share and generate content, they continue to generate profit and as 
such can continue to be exploited.  If social networking sites had to pay 
employees to generate content (rather than relying on users to do this for free), 
staffing costs would increase, and so profits would be reduced (Fuchs, 2013).  It is 
also worth noting that although users provide the content, which some take to 
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demonstrate a level of agency, they have no control over how it is displayed to 
others (van Dijck, 2013) or who sees it.  Another issue for social networking sites 
would be if users were to stop sharing information (and thus withdraw their 
‘labour’), this would result in a loss of revenue for the company and if enough 
individuals stopped using a particular site, it would no longer generate any income 
and would cease to exist (Cohen, 2008 and Fuchs, 2010). 
 
This links to the work of Dallas Smythe (2012 [1981]), who despite writing about 
media audiences at a time before social media and the internet, remains relevant.  
Smythe recognises that audiences are vital to the marketing system.  He suggests 
that audiences are sold to advertisers, and although they are paid for their labour 
time while at work, the same is not true when they are at home.  In effect, by 
watching television advertisements in their leisure time, Smythe argues that 
audiences’ leisure time is being sold, but they are not seeing any return on that 
sale, which is the argument being made regarding social media sites and their 
users.  This perpetuates the asymmetric power relations that exist between those 
who create content and those who sell it and make money from it (Cohen, 2008).  
In this sense, Andrejevic (2013) argues that exploitation takes place because the 
owners of the site use the resources they own to collect information from users.  
As owners of these resources, they have complete control over who can or cannot 
access the resource and what behaviour is or is not permitted on the platform once 
access has been granted. 
 
The theory of exploitation regarding social media users is not without its critics 
and it is important to recognise that the term ‘exploitation’ in itself can be 
problematic.  This is especially important when it is being used to describe those 
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using social media to engage with friends from the comfort of their own homes as 
opposed to those working in dangerous conditions in sweatshops around the world 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2010 and Andrejevic, 2013).  In these cases, the argument is 
often made that individuals are not forced to join social networking sites and 
given the enjoyment that many gain from using them, it is not exploitation.  The 
belief that participation in social networking sites is completely voluntary is one 
that works in favour of these sites, in fact the term ‘prosumption’ (Toffler, 1980 
p.271) has been put forth in a celebratory manner.  It is often suggested that it 
allows users to have a creative outlet that they may not have in other areas of their 
lives offering them the opportunity to create their own identity (Comor, 2010, van 
Dijck, 2013).  In this sense it is perceived as almost being emancipatory for those 
choosing to express themselves by sharing their likes and dislikes and so forth 
using social media.  Others suggest that users are able to take advantage of social 
networking sites for their own ends and utilise the tools available to push posts to 
go viral and crowd source opinions (van Dijck, 2013).  Critics of the exploitation 
argument suggest that it is unrealistic for individuals to expect to be paid for 
everything that they do in their daily lives, as they are often happy to volunteer to 
carry out particular activities (such as volunteering on a community-based litter 
picking day), and as such, do not necessarily expect to receive a financial payment 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2010).  It is also worth noting that financial recompense is not 
the only way to feel rewarded, and as such many social media users feel that the 
pleasure they gain from connecting with friends and family through these sites is 
reward enough for sharing some of their information.  This offers a counterpoint 
to the exploitation argument and raises questions regarding how far we are willing 
to accept this loss of privacy.  As such, part of this project will consider how 
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people attempt to negotiate the boundaries of their internet privacy and where they 
draw the line in terms of what is or is not acceptable. 
 
Is it possible for individuals to achieve greater control? 
The issue of control can be difficult for individuals to navigate and Fuchs (2014) 
suggests that Facebook, in particular merely offers the illusion of control through 
its privacy options.  While these options allow people to choose who can see the 
information contained within their status updates on the site (Facebook, 2019), 
there are limited menu options which allow individuals to choose which data (if 
any) they are willing to share with advertisers (Raynes-Goldie, 2012; van Dijck, 
2013 and Stoilova, et al., 2019a).  This suggests that while companies are aware 
that control is an important issue to individuals, they are not willing to give users 
any tangible control, potentially fearing that they will opt out of sharing data, thus 
reducing revenues.  As per the earlier discussion, this is not necessarily the case, 
and commercial research shows that when companies are more transparent, 
customers tend to be more willing to share information (Benson, et al., 2015 and 
Martin, et al., 2018).  That is not to say that companies do not offer individuals 
any control over what happens to their data, and most apps and websites allow 
limited control over which information is shared with the company.  Again, this is 
not as straightforward as it appears, and it is often the case that those who are the 
least familiar with software and how technology works are the most likely to 
leave privacy settings as the default options (Pierson, 2012).  This is problematic 
as often the default settings are the least secure and so individuals may be leaving 




To remedy this, awareness is often cited as an issue that needs to be addressed, 
with the belief being that if individuals are more aware of what happens to their 
data, they will do more to protect their privacy (Gadzheva, 2008 and Fuchs, 
2012). However, the issue of awareness only tells part of the story, as people also 
need to have the necessary skills and knowledge to make changes which afford 
them greater privacy.  It is not enough for people to want to do more to control 
their privacy, they also need to know how to put this into action (Buchi, et al., 
2017 and Cohen, 2017).  In research carried out by the Pew Research Centre 
(Shelton, et al., 2015) some respondents felt that they lacked the skills necessary 
to be able to protect their privacy, as such they may be more pro-active if they felt 
able do so.  However, many of the methods available to protect their privacy are 
relatively straightforward and require very little technical knowledge.  Therefore, 
this leads to questions regarding whether individuals lack confidence, rather than 
the skills needed to protect their privacy and as such, do they assume that 
anything involving computers will be too difficult for them?  This is borne out in 
research carried out by Nippert-Eng (2010) who finds that those who are taking 
action to protect their privacy are often using tools that are sub-optimal but are not 
overly onerous to employ.  This is another potentially interesting point, 
individuals may want privacy, but not if it disrupts their daily lives to an 
unacceptable level.  Given the additional convenience brought to our lives due to 
making purchases online, or utilising social media, there is the potential that 
people are only willing to do more to protect their privacy until it makes their 
lives less convenient.  A seemingly simple task such as reading the terms and 
conditions before signing up to create an online account has become onerous and 





Most of the time, users are not concerned with what algorithms do with their data 
or with the data stored about them in databases (Nissenbaum, 2010).  However, 
this changes when something appears on their page that is not in line with their 
preferences (or, paradoxically is too in line with their preferences), this causes 
them to pause and consider the algorithms that are working in the background 
(Bucher, 2018).  Concerns are also raised, when individuals ‘discover that they 
are “known” when they enter what they believe to be a new setting’ (Nissenbaum, 
2010, p.50).  This causes individuals to feel unnerved by this sharing of 
information that they were unaware of and did not consent to.  People do not like 
to feel that others know more about them than they have allowed.  Broadly, 
platform owners pay little attention to any privacy concerns expressed by users, 
stating that they do not charge users to access their platform and users are free to 
leave and use an alternative platform if they wish to (van Dijck, 2013).  However, 
this is not as straightforward as it seems and will be further explored later in this 
review.  The other issue for users, is the terms of service for these sites, which 
have become onerous to read and understand.  Further to this is that owners can 
change them as and when they choose to, and it requires a certain level of skill to 
amend privacy settings to make them more secure than the default setting.  
Additionally, while individual privacy and control is considered, the same 
attention is rarely given to the aggregation of data – there is little detail regarding 
this in the terms of service and so users are left with very little information in 
terms of what companies do with their data and who they sell it to.  Therefore, the 
biggest issue facing users of social networking sites, is how opaque business 
models are in terms of the algorithms that are utilised by companies.  As such, 
‘we do not know how connectivity is exploited’ (van Dijck, 2013, p.171), 
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therefore as discussed above, transparency only applies to site users, rather than 
the site itself.  As discussed previously, these platforms tend to highlight the 
human connections that users can create and maintain through use of the site, 
while obscuring the automated processes that occur in the background, 
particularly as it relates to the way in which these companies not only collect 
information on users’ social connections, but manipulate them (van Dijck, 2013). 
 
This lack of control is often deemed to be a strategy on the part of data collectors 
(Cohen, 2012; Blank, et al. 2014 and Coll, 2014) to ensure that people only have a 
vague idea of what happens to their information.  Raynes-Goldie (2012) suggests 
that a site’s terms and conditions are purposely made incomprehensible in order to 
discourage individuals from attempting to gain more control.  She is not alone in 
this view and research devoted to this topic finds that, broadly speaking, people 
do not read terms and conditions (Milne & Culnan, 2004 and van Dijck, 2013).  
This is not necessarily because they are not interested in doing so, but because it 
has become an impossible task (Turow, 2003; McDonald & Cranor, 2008; Vitak, 
2012; Hoofnagle & Urban, 2014; Obar, 2015; and Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018). 
The time-consuming nature of reading terms and conditions is examined by 
McDonald and Cranor (2008) who calculate the amount of time it would take the 
average individual to read the privacy policies of the websites they visit regularly.  
Even though they only include each website once, they suggest that it would take 
the average individual over two-hundred hours per year just to read the policies; 
this does not include any time spent comparing policies between sites.  This 
suggests that an individual needs to devote approximately four hours per week to 
reading privacy policies, before they access the content they are interested in.  It 
also does not take into account re-reading privacy policies when they change and 
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so this is actually a conservative estimate.  Therefore, it is clear that while the 
self-management of privacy is a good idea in theory, in practice, it is an 
unrealistic burden to place upon individuals (McDonald & Cranor, 2008; Solove, 
2013 and Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018). 
 
This is an important issue because in order to trust others, we need to have 
sufficient information upon which to base this decision.  Generally speaking, the 
more information we have when making a decision, the better able we feel to trust 
those involved (O'Neill, 2002; Benson, et al., 2015 and Martin, et al., 2018).  
However, this information must be meaningful, if we are simply given a barrage 
of information, it will not help us to make a decision as it will be overwhelming 
and so lose meaning (O'Neill, 2002).  It can be argued that this is what is 
happening when companies supply lengthy terms and conditions documents; the 
information is so difficult to understand (or there is simply so much of it) that it 
becomes a hinderance in the decision-making process.  There are a number of 
factors that can have an impact on the level of trust afforded to companies and it is 
unsurprising that those with good reputations are more likely to be trusted than 
those with a poor reputation (Jarvenpaa, et al., 1999; Swaminathan, et al., 1999 
and Metzger, 2004).  Given the discussion of issues around the Cambridge 
Analytica Scandal at the beginning of this chapter, this raises a number of 
questions.  If people are less likely to trust an organisation with a poor reputation, 
why do they continue to use Facebook following the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal? 
 
There are a number of potential explanations here, which suggest that decisions 
regarding the use of social networking sites are much more complex than they 
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appear.  Aside from the privacy paradox, which will be discussed below, it is 
difficult to deny that social networking sites have become integrated into many 
people’s daily lives to such an extent that it is almost impossible to eschew them.  
People often join social networking sites in order to maintain or create social 
connections with others, and once they have done so, there is external peer 
pressure from friends and/or relatives to remain a user of the site (as well as the 
sites themselves making it difficult for a user to delete their account) (Van Dijck, 
2018).  There are a number of potentially negative consequences which 
individuals may suffer if they delete or close a social media account including a 
loss of convenience (Nissenbaum, 2010; Vertesi, 2015; Hargittai & Marwick, 
2016, and Anthony & Stark, 2018).  There are also a number of social costs 
associated with not having a social media account (Dommeyer & Gross, 2003; 
Raynes-Goldie, 2012 Scholz, 2013 and Van Dijck, 2018), such as missing out on 
invitations to social events or losing contact with friends and family.  These are 
issues that are likely to weigh heavily on an individual’s mind when they are 
considering leaving social media and may be enough for them to decide that 
leaving would be too costly for them.  The use of social networking sites has 
become so integrated in our daily lives that those choosing not to engage may 
appear suspicious to others, as it raises questions regarding what that person may 
be trying to hide (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2003; Bennett, 2012; Vertesi, 2014 and 
2015).  Blank, et al. (2014) even go so far as to suggest that because our social 
lives are maintained through these sites, individuals must share information on 
them despite existing privacy risks.  Therefore, it may actually be more logical for 
people to continue to engage with social media despite negative media stories or 
wanting increased control over their data.  This suggest that we have limited 
choice in how far we participate in social media, and will be revisited later in this 
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thesis, when I consider the ways in which individuals attempt to exercise greater 
control. 
 
Aside from this it is also possible that those continuing to use social media 
platforms may face costs if their participation is not deemed beneficial enough to 
the owners.  Bucher (2018) suggests that because social media sites need users to 
participate and interact with others using the site, Facebook uses techniques which 
train people to behave in the way that is most desirable to the site.  As discussed 
previously, there is the ‘threat of invisibility’ (Bucher, 2018, p.89), which is a 
punishment for those who do not engage with Facebook in the ‘correct’ manner.  
This punishment is described above in the social cost of not being a member of a 
social networking site, according to Bucher, ‘not participating on Facebook will 
get you punished by making you invisible, and not seeing what may be “the most 
interesting” content to you’ (p.89).  Therefore, users are trained to behave in the 
way that is in the best interests of Facebook in order to ensure that they do not 
miss out on important events, or even miss out on being a part of something that 
everyone else is participating in (using the site itself).  While social media 
platforms do not name these issues as a punishment, it is clear that this is deemed 
to be a cost, and for many a cost that is too much to bear. 
 
It is important to note that individuals are not necessarily resigned to sharing 
information and having less privacy than they would like, and small acts of 
defiance may offer a way for people to maintain some level of control.  This can 
be difficult to enact, because, as Gillespie (2007; van Dijck, 2013; Cohen, 2017 
and Bucher, 2018) suggests, technology guides us along a specific path, by 
restricting which options are available to us.  We tend to use technology in the 
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prescribed way, often without question, however, there are ways around this that 
do not require technical knowledge, which we know can be a barrier to people.  
De Certeau (1988) suggests that individuals can utilise tactics in order to subvert 
the dominant culture in small ways.  He argues against the characterisation of 
individuals as being submissive and instead suggests that subversion is possible 
and those who appear to have had a particular culture imposed upon them have 
not necessarily accepted this, in fact they have been able to subvert the dominant 
culture, in a subtle way.  While they do not openly reject the dominant culture, 
individuals instead use the tools afforded to them to their own ends, while 
appearing to have accepted it.  In this way, despite being unable to challenge the 
dominant power in any real sense, they can divert it through this subversion.  In 
the words of de Certeau, ‘they escaped it without leaving it.’ (p.xiii), which means 
that although they may appear to have accepted the dominant culture in the 
expected way, in reality they have adapted it to give it greater utility for their own 
purposes.  Those who utilise tactics in this way, are necessarily those without the 
power to affect the dominant social order and so have to operate within it. 
 
Writing only a year later, Fiske (1989) offers a similar view, suggesting that 
through employing defiance at a micro level, people are able to gradually erode at 
the macro level, by working from the inside.  He argues that people within society 
are disempowered and are only able to create popular culture through utilising the 
available cultural resources (as did de Certeau (1988)).  This can be difficult as 
the cultural resources are put forth first and foremost to further the interests of 
those who are dominant, thus supporting the status quo.  This view is shared by 
Cohen (2017) who argues that individuals will not simply accept the constraints 
they are faced with on an institutional or cultural level and will utilise the tools 
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available to them to develop their own strategies.  However, resistance is a 
necessary part of this power dynamic, because if there is no mechanism for 
individuals to employ a counter-reading of the available cultural resource, it will 
not be accepted (therefore, they need to be able to create their own meanings).  As 
such, it is important to acknowledge that the dominant message is not merely 
accepted without question.  By employing tactics, when dealing with online 
companies, it is possible for individuals to feel that they are in control.  For 
example, in their research, Hargittai and Marwick (2016) found that students 
utilised tactics to avoid sharing their real name on social networking sites.  Much 
of the research into methods of subversion have dealt with the ways in which 
users hide information from other social media users (Nippert-Eng, 2010 and 
boyd, 2014), however, the usage of tactics to gain more control in terms of users’ 
relationships with those collecting their data is an area that has yet to be fully 
explored.  Research that has previously been carried out in this area has shown 
that individuals show a preference for refusing to share private information rather 
than sharing false information to obscure it (Dommeyer & Gross, 2003 and 
Preibusch, et al., 2013).  Often users will use multiple tactics to avoid sharing 
more than they are comfortable with; this is not limited to adults, and young 
people often employ numerous tools too (Stoilova, et al., 2019a).  It is also 
important to remember that these platforms will do whatever they can to maintain 
the level of data collection they deem necessary (such as ensuring that default 
privacy settings are the most open) and ‘resisting or subverting default settings 





Van Dijck (2013) argues that how much action an individual decides to take 
ultimately rests on the level of concern they feel regarding the practices of the 
social media platform.  He suggests that users fall into two categories: ‘implicit 
and explicit’ (p.160).  Here he argues that those who are broadly satisfied with 
what the owners do with their information, are passive and as such, are classified 
as implicit users.  Those, however, who question what happens to their data and 
feel concerned about the underlying motivations of the site’s owners are 
categorised as explicit users.  For van Dijck (2013), the implicit users will 
continue to use the platform as before, however, the explicit users will take action, 
which will generally take the form of supplying false information or making 
changes to the default privacy settings of the site.  Some will even go so far as to 
actively hack into the site to make their disquiet clear, although this is usually 
dealt with swiftly by the platform. 
 
What role does context play? 
 
A complicating factor when considering privacy is that it is not a single category 
into which we can easily file everything that we do not want others to know; the 
situation requires a level of nuance in order to appreciate its complex nature.  In 
the same way that we would not generally want to share everything with 
everyone, neither would we want to withhold everything from everyone.  For 
example, I may have little concern when being asked to share my annual income 
with a financial institution, however, I would not necessarily wish for my friends 
or neighbours to know that information.  Therefore, the same information can be 





‘Context relative informational norms’ (Nissenbaum, 2010 p.140) offer some 
guidance and indicate to us what type of behaviour is or is not appropriate in a 
given situation and are the reason we may feel uneasy when witnessing certain 
behaviour in a particular context.  Issues can arise when we believe that we are 
operating in one context but find that others have taken us to be operating in a 
different one, leaving us with a feeling of discomfort.  In a similar way, Blank, et 
al. (2014) agree, suggesting that contexts can be said to be represented by circles, 
in which different behaviour is appropriate.  These circles ‘have different norms 
for what is expected to be disclosed and what is thought to be private’ (p.26).  
They argue that what is deemed to be private is not a universal standard, and very 
much depends on the social context.  As long as these circles remain separate, 
there are no issues, however, increasingly these circles are beginning to overlap 
which is problematic as it can have a negative impact on how we are perceived by 
others.  The issue, broadly speaking, is that information that is problematic in one 
context (or circle), is not an issue in another.  When these circles or contexts 
overlap, it can cause an issue, which is referred to as ‘context collapse’ (Vitak, 
2012 p.451), and will be discussed at the end of this section. 
 
Nissenbaum (2010) suggests that personal information flows in accordance with 
rules and norms in specific social contexts.  When she discusses norms, she 
suggests that ‘context-relative informational norms define and sustain essential 
activities and key relationships and interests, protect people and groups against 
harm and balance the distribution of power’ (p.3).  Individuals become upset or 
concerned when information technology does not adhere to these rules, because 
the ‘contextual integrity (p.3) of the situation has been violated.  While 
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technologies that reduce how much control individuals have over their 
information cause concern, Nissenbaum believes that it is more problematic when 
these norms of a situation are ignored as this risks social life itself.   
 
Nissenbaum (2010) argues that while everyone has different expectations 
regarding what information they would like to share or remain private, when 
context is applied to a situation, privacy expectations become much more similar.  
Accordingly, context-relative informational norms tell us what is expected in 
terms of the flow of information in a given situation.  It is also important to note 
that an individual’s role varies between each situation they find themselves in, this 
is in line with the context, such as the workplace, or family.  These roles govern 
how we behave in relation to others in those contexts; however, it is the context 
itself that sets out the overarching expectations of that situation.  Contexts are not 
necessarily set in stone and vary across time, place and the society that they exist 
in; the level of detail afforded to the characteristics of a certain context may even 
vary.  Contextual norms function in that those involved in a particular context feel 
that they should behave in a certain way.  There are various types of norm; some 
are moral norms (such as being faithful to a romantic partner), some are social 
conventions (such as purchasing a present for a friend when it is their birthday) 
while others are rules and/or procedures that are formally set out, and as such the 
seriousness with which the norms are considered also varies.  The norms must be 
considered in conjunction with the system itself, rather than in isolation as it will 
make more sense when the context is taken into account. 
 
In terms of the information that we share with each other, Nissenbaum (2010) 
suggests that when these norms have been adhered to, that is when ‘contextual 
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integrity’ (p.129) has been retained; the opposite is true when these norms have 
been ignored.  When individuals are considering a new technology, and feel 
uncomfortable, it is often due to the potential for the new technology to violate 
‘context-relative informational norms’ (p.129).  Informational norms are crucial 
as they set out the types of information that can and cannot be shared between 
individuals in specific roles (this is governed by ‘transmission principles’ 
(p.141)).  Transmission principles determine whether the data subject’s 
permission must be sought before information can be shared, or they are merely 
given notice that it has been shared.  Information can be bought, sold, traded or 
leased, depending upon the transmission principle.  However, it is important to 
remember that transmission principles are one of many parameters within an 
informational norm in a particular context and work in conjunction with other 
parameters (such as actors and attributes).  The contextual nature of sharing 
information has also been considered by Bucher (2018), who discusses the 
different views on algorithms in her work to suggest that an individual may view 
an algorithm to be ‘problematic in the contexts of one platform but not seem to 
have a problem with a similar mechanism on another platform’ (p.107), thus 
highlighting the potentially contextual nature of online platforms and their use of 
algorithms.  Returning to the earlier discussion around the public/private 
dichotomy, Nissenbaum suggests that ‘the framework of contextual 
integrity…postulates a multiplicity of social contexts each with a distinctive set of 
rules governing information flows’ (p.141).  As such, it offers a much more 
nuanced view of the privacy of individuals’ information and offers a response to 
many of the issues cited by privacy sceptics who suggest that those sharing their 




It is also important to consider who is involved in a particular context.  Within 
any given context, there will be three types of actor – the sender of information 
(which may be an individual or organisation), the receiver of information (which, 
again, may be an individual or an organisation) and the data subject (the 
individual concerned).  In any situation, it is vital to ensure that the role of each 
actor has been identified as far as possible; this is important in terms of whether 
an individual feels that their privacy has been violated in a particular situation.  It 
is important to note that when people talk about particular information being 
private, they do not necessarily mean that is it completely private, rather it is 
private from specific actors (and not others).  The issue is usually ‘that it 
[information] is shared in the wrong ways with inappropriate others’ (p.142), this 
is when the sharing of information becomes an issue for the individual concerned.  
The relationship between people sets out what information it is appropriate or 
inappropriate for them to have or know about the subject.  Another important 
factor in a given context is the type of information.  Nissenbaum’s approach does 
not follow the previously considered dichotomy between public and private, 
neither does it offer a scale to denote whether a particular piece of information is 
more or less private, instead it recognises the multi-dimensional nature of 
appropriateness, which she argues are ‘simultaneously variable’ (p.144). 
 
While much of this literature review has discussed privacy in relation to control, 
there is not widespread agreement on this, as others suggest that privacy is a right 
to limit access, rather than an absolute right to control.  This disagreement does 
not exist under the contextual integrity framework (Nissenbaum, 2010), 
suggesting that control is one of a number of transmission principles and as such 
the importance of control will vary depending on a number of factors within that 
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situation.  Other research into context has focused on specific contextual matters, 
such as the type of information that is being shared.  Nissenbaum highlights the 
importance of type of information when she discusses how restrictions should be 
placed on different types of information in terms of whether it’s release could be 
harmful, whether it is intimate information and whether those wishing to view it 
are legitimately entitled to have access to it.  Personal information cannot be 
shared without restrictions being in place and these restrictions will need to adhere 
to the ‘appropriate flow of personal information’ (Nissenbaum, 2010, p.127).   
 
Research by Huberman et al. (2005) examines how sensitive different types of 
information are and found that people are often more concerned about information 
being revealed when it makes them stand out in some way.  When they ask 
participants how much they would need to be paid in order for them to divulge 
different pieces of information, they find that weight is contentious.  If an 
individual feels themselves to be below average or around the average weight for 
the group, they require little payment to reveal it, while those who feel they weigh 
more or much more require a much higher payment.  Overall, weight is not the 
most sensitive piece of information and other types of data are deemed to be much 
more concerning for people.  When the researchers rank pieces of information by 
the proportion of respondents who would require payment of over $100 to reveal 
it, they find that financial information is deemed to be of greatest concern. 
 
Although it can be helpful to consider how people feel about specific pieces of 
information, others attempt to create meaningful categories, which can be applied 
more broadly to types of information.  Stoilova, et al., (2019a and 2019b) suggest 
three different contexts which prioritise different types of data and thus offer a 
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potential explanation for different levels of concern amongst young people 
regarding the sharing of their data.  For them, the ‘Interpersonal privacy’ 
(Stoilova, et al., 2019a, p.7) context is the area in which individuals create their 
‘data self’ and as such, the most important data here is that which is given by 
individuals, actively through their online interactions and activities.  Under the 
‘Institutional privacy’ (p.7) context, which is when information is dealt with by 
public agencies, such as the government, ‘data traces’ (p.7) take priority, and 
these are the breadcrumbs that people leave behind, often without realising, when 
online; it includes items such as cookies and other metadata.  Finally, the 
‘Commercial privacy’ (p.7) context is the area in which businesses collect our 
information in order to further their marketing, and so the most important data 
here is ‘Inferred data’ (p.7), which is derived from inferences made through the 
aggregation of data, as discussed previously.  It is important to note, that only 
‘data given’ is consciously shared by individuals, the other two types of data 
collection are obscured, and so are less likely to arouse concern or suspicion (as 
people may not be aware that they are happening).  This is a concern, particularly 
as research in this area tends to focus only on data that is knowingly shared 
(Stoilova, et al., 2019b).  As discussed previously, under the guise of ‘surveillance 
capitalism’ (2015, p.77), Zuboff argues that companies collect as much data as 
possible which is then used to create profiles and sold for a profit.  This may be 
information that is explicitly shared in the form of status updates or Tweets or 
incidental information that is left without thought; the so-called ‘exhaust’ (2015, 
p.79) that is left behind as a by-product of these interactions.  Therefore, despite 
the lack of awareness shared by many users of the site, they are nevertheless 




Raynes-Goldie (2012) has also put forth ways of categorising information and 
suggests that our privacy broadly falls into two categories: ‘social’ and 
‘institutional privacy’ (p.81).  She argues that of the greatest concern is social 
privacy, which relates to our identity and the impression we make on others.  In 
this regard, she considers information we might share on social networking sites 
to be included in this category.  Institutional privacy relates to information that 
institutions collect and store; information in this category is hidden from the 
public view as are the processes that the information is subject to.  Raynes-Goldie 
suggests that people are more concerned with their social privacy (Sujon & 
Johnston, 2017), and as discussed above, social networking sites allow us much 
more autonomy in terms of what we share in this area (with fellow users) as 
opposed to what we share with the site itself and connected third-parties (where 
we are afforded very little autonomy).  Floridi (2005) offers an alternative, but 
helpful categorisation, when he discusses how information can be categorised as 
‘ontic’ (p.198) or ‘arbitrary’ (p.197).  For him, ontic information is part of who 
we are, it consists of our values and beliefs and is akin to a limb, in that it cannot 
be easily separated from us.  Information that is categorised as arbitrary is 
assigned to us by others, and as such can easily be detached from us, with little 
issue; it is deemed to be items such as account numbers, passport numbers and 
other items such as these.  The distinction between these types of information is 
important because it affects how we feel about the information itself, and 
potentially offers an explanation for different levels of concern relating to 
different types of information. 
 
It is important to remember that while the type of information is clearly important 
to individuals, this is not the only factor to consider.  Limited research examines 
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how people feel about the audience who has access to their information and what 
impact that has upon levels of concern.  In particular, Consolvo et al. (2005), 
suggest that when people are asked for information, they are concerned with not 
only who wants the information, but also why they want it.  Another important 
finding from this study is that ‘How participant feels about the requester at the 
time of the request’ (2005 n.p.) also has a bearing on their willingness to share 
information.  Therefore, while initial research into this area has provided a 
foundation upon which to build, there is still much to learn in terms of the impact 
context has on how concerned individuals are when being asked to share certain 
types of information. 
 
Alternative explanations 
While Nissenbaum’s (2010) contextual integrity framework offers a compelling 
lens through which to consider discrepancies between our concerns and behaviour 
with regard to our privacy, other theorists have offered alternative explanations 
for this.  The term ‘privacy paradox’ (Utz & Krämer, 2009) is used to describe the 
difference between what individuals say and do in terms of their privacy.  It is 
often used in situations whereby people express concerns regarding their privacy 
and the amount of data that companies collect about them, while at the same time, 
continuing to share that information, through using online shopping websites or 
social networking sites.  Although it is not necessarily named in such terms, the 
privacy paradox is apparent in various pieces of research which examine 
individuals’ attitudes towards and behaviour around privacy.  A pertinent example 
of this is the research carried out by Preibusch, et al. (2013), which examines the 
choices made by consumers when presented with a choice between two online 
retailers in order to purchase a DVD.  In one iteration, individuals are given the 
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choice between purchasing the DVD from one company which collects more 
personal data but charges less, or one that charges more, but collects less 
information.  In the second iteration, the price of the DVD is the same regardless 
of seller with the only difference being how much data each company collects 
from purchasers.  In both versions of this experiment, the company that collects 
more data makes the majority of the sales.  While this was somewhat expected in 
the version of the experiment with a price difference, suggesting that individuals 
were happy to lose a little more of their privacy in order to save money, the 
researchers were very surprised that this was the case when there is no difference 
in price.  Possibly the most startling part of the experiment is that when people 
purchase the DVD from the company which collects more information, they then 
complain about the amount of data they are asked to share.  This reflects the 
privacy paradox and bears a resemblance to day-to-day situations whereby 
individuals often share data with companies even if they are not particularly 
happy about it.  However, it is important to note that the researchers recognise that 
the study was carried out in an experimental setting and as such could not be 
assumed to represent the real world. 
 
Further evidence of the privacy paradox can potentially be seen in commercial 
research carried out by Gordon (2003) and the EMC Corporation (2014).  
Gordon’s research focused on those working in the computer security sector, and 
so there would be an expectation that these individuals would be more concerned 
with regard to their privacy and therefore behave as such.  However, as with the 
research above, Gordon finds that those she spoke with express concerns 
regarding their privacy yet, they do not behave in this way, often doing very little 
to protect their privacy, despite having the technological capability to do so.  This 
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suggests that technological knowledge or capability is not always a barrier to 
protecting an individual’s privacy, especially given that those working in the 
computer security sector appear unwilling to take action to protect their own 
privacy.  Research carried out by the EMC Corporation (2014) also appears to 
demonstrate the existence of the privacy paradox.  The results of this research 
show that while individuals express a belief that their data should be stored 
securely, they do not behave in a way that would achieve this.  Many had not 
changed their behaviour despite media reporting on data breaches and most said 
that they do not read the permissions they are allowing companies when installing 
mobile apps onto their smartphones.  Perhaps most astonishing of all, was the fact 
that while almost two-thirds of participants stated that they do not trust websites 
which only use password authentication, one-third of respondents use the same 
password across numerous websites.  This suggests that individuals place the 
responsibility for their security and privacy with the companies they are dealing 
with, rather than with themselves. 
 
While the concept of the privacy paradox can be a useful tool in explaining the 
disparity between individuals’ expressed concerns and their actions around 
privacy, it is important to note that the research above requires further unpacking.  
As discussed above, Nissenbaum’s (2010) contextual integrity framework offers a 
resolution to the issue that those who say they are concerned about privacy, do not 
necessarily behave in a way that indicates that they do.  She argues that the 




‘caring deeply about privacy and at the same time, eagerly sharing 
information, as long as the sharing and withholding conform with the 
principled conditions prescribed by governing contextual norms’ (p.187).   
 
As such, when a person is sharing their information it is governed by different 
flows of information and contextual norms and differs from a situation where they 
are not sharing their information.  As discussed throughout this literature review, 
it is important to consider each situation separately, rather than assuming that if a 
person shares information in one situation, they will necessarily share it in all 
situations. 
 
For those that subscribe to the privacy paradox theory, there are other 
explanations for the disparity between what people say and how they behave.  It 
could be, for example, that people are less concerned than they state when 
completing a survey or being interviewed but feel they should be concerned and 
want to make a good impression on the researcher (Bryman, 2012) as such, they 
may over-state privacy concerns.  Therefore, outside of the research situation, the 
person’s actions could be much more aligned with their concerns regarding 
privacy.  It is also important to consider that while the above research has 
identified a disparity between concerns expressed by individuals and their 
behaviour, none of them appear to have delved any deeper to attempt to uncover 
reasons for this.  It is also important to consider that individuals may not feel that 
they lack control and as such are happy with the choices they are making. 
 
Individuals may believe that they are making logical decisions and so are 
willingly sharing their data.  Further, it has been suggested that we are actually 
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much more aware of what is going on and simply weigh up the advantages and 
disadvantages of sharing data and make the decisions regarding whether to share 
data based on this internal calculation (Nippert-Eng, 2010 and Van Dijck, 2018).  
This would explain why individuals often comply with the collection of data, as it 
suggests that they believe that the advantages to be gained from sharing data 
outweigh the potential disadvantages from doing so (Giddens, 1991; Lyon, 2000 
[1994] and Lyon, 2005 [2001]).  Under this view, people are said to be willing to 
give up some of their privacy in order to gain greater convenience; therefore, it is 
deemed to be a price worth paying.  This suggests that individuals are thoughtful, 
rational beings who make logical choices with regard to their privacy.  It is also 
important to remember that as companies collect greater amounts of data, it means 
that they can target special offers and advertisements, therefore individuals are 
more likely to receive offers that are of interest to them.  As such, individuals are 
willing to give up some of their privacy in order to gain special offers, or greater 
convenience (Gadzheva, 2008; Nippert-Eng, 2010 and Miller, 2011).  
 
Theory around tradeoff decisions very much depends on the person involved 
believing that the benefit they will receive for sharing information is greater than 
the costs they will incur from doing so.  This is often referred to as the ‘calculus 
of behavior’ [sic] (Laufer and Wolfe, 1977), and suggests that when individuals 
are offered a choice, they will internally calculate which behaviour is likely to 
reward them the most.  Therefore, in this case, the calculation made will be based 
upon whether a person believes they will see greater benefits from sharing 
information than not.  Aside from the issue of a lack of information, Acquisti and 
Grossklags (2005) suggest that it may be useful to consider potential biases that 
people may be unconsciously applying when attempting to make a decision under 
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uncertain conditions.  These biases can lead individuals to believe that the benefits 
far out-weigh the costs (even when this is not true), as is often the case when a 
person is asked to share information with a company.  This bias has been 
described as the ‘availability heuristic’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982 p.20).  
People use heuristics as a way to ‘reduce the complex tasks of assessing 
likelihoods and predicting values to simpler judgemental operations’ (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974 p.1124).  In the case of tradeoff decisions, the availability 
heuristic suggests that when we are trying to assess how likely something is to 
happen, we attach a greater probability to instances that we can recall more easily.  
Therefore, in a situation where an individual is being asked to share information, 
if they can remember someone they know having an issue after sharing data, they 
would be more cautious.  In situations where no real-life examples are 
forthcoming, an individual may move onto ‘imaginability’ (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974 p.1127), which is similar except that the bias is towards 
instances that the individual can more easily imagine (rather than recall).  In both 
of these instances, bias can play a role and due to this, the individual may be 
overly cautious or not cautious enough depending on how easily they are able to 
recall or imagine the benefits and costs of following a particular course of action.  
This suggests that while tradeoff decisions appear to be rational to the individual 
making the decision they could be a reflection of biases held.  It is also important 
to note that behavioural economics recognises that the rational actor model is 
limited and as such does not necessarily govern every decision that we make 
(Hogarth & Reder, 1987). 
 
Nissenbaum (2010), however, suggests that contextual integrity itself is a decision 
heuristic.  She argues that when there is a proposed change to socio-technical 
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systems and/or practices people respond in various ways, and these responses are 
prompted by contextual integrity.  Essentially, if a new system is proposed and an 
individual’s response is feelings of discomfort, it is likely to be because there is 
the potential for a violation of contextual integrity to occur.  What is happening in 
this situation is that the current practice is being compared with the new practice 
under the guise of contextual integrity and thus concerns centre around the 
‘context, actors, attributes and transmission principles’ (Nissenbaum, 2010, 
p.149).  However, this is not something that necessarily happens on a conscious 
level, but because the framework of contextual integrity is integral to how people 
interact with each other, it nevertheless happens.  This may also explain why it is 
so difficult for people to express the concern they feel when systems change, 
because they are unaware of contextual integrity on a conscious level.  This is 
because it is ‘rooted in convention, habit and custom’ (Nissenbaum, 2010, p.164) 
and so is not necessarily something that individuals consider, due to its subtle 
nature.  However, it will manifest itself in feelings of discomfort when the 
contextual integrity of a situation is being threatened. 
 
Similarly, Lyon (2000 [1994]) also suggests that individuals find it harder to be 
concerned about the negative aspects of commercial surveillance if they have 
never suffered an invasion of privacy.  This also links with the suggestion 
(Solove, 2009) that the benefits of reduced privacy, such as greater convenience, 
are often easier to express, than the potential issues.  This is because people tend 
to feel uneasy when they have privacy concerns, but struggle to express exactly 
where this feeling of unease has come from or what it relates to.  Garfinkel (2001) 
suggests that this could simply be because individuals have become used to this 
kind of data collection and so it is not really at the forefront of their minds, 
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especially as so much of it occurs in the background of our daily lives.  It has 
become taken for granted to such an extent that we only tend to think about it 
when an issue occurs (Lyon, 2005 [2001]).  This suggests that individuals only 
consider their privacy after it has potentially been violated, this is borne out in the 
concern expressed around the reporting of various data hacks in the media (BBC 
News, 2015a and BBC News, 2015b) and more recently, the Cambridge 
Analytica Scandal (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018). 
 
However, this is not the only issue to consider when examining the tradeoff 
decision-making process.  Another factor which complicates this process is that 
issues around sharing information tend to offer an immediate benefit versus a 
future cost (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005 and Stoilova, et al., 2019b). Economists 
believe that we are ‘time consistent’ (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2000) and so we will 
make the same tradeoff decision regardless of when we will have to face the 
negative consequences of that choice.  This highlights the issue that individuals 
have with immediate gratification more generally.  O’Donoghue and Rabin (2000) 
suggest that we all struggle with self-control and as such have a tendency towards 
immediate gratification; they take issue with economists’ assumption that we are 
all ‘time-consistent’.  O’Donoghue and Rabin (2000) suggest that people tend to 
be ‘time-inconsistent’ (p.233), meaning that they err towards immediate 
gratification and do not make the same decision at different times.  This suggests 
that we are not as rational as we appear or would potentially wish to be.  
Therefore, even when we feel that we are in control, this may be an illusion, 





Research by Turow, Hennessy and Draper (2015) challenges the suggestion that 
individuals choose to share information with companies based on a trade-off 
between privacy and preferential treatment.  Instead they put forth that individuals 
are actually resigned to the collection of their data, and in fact feel so 
overwhelmed by the volume of data collected that it has led to feelings of 
powerlessness.  Turow, Hennessy and Draper (2015) contend that individuals 
often do not have enough information to enable them to make trade-off decisions 
and so can never be the well-informed decision-makers they are purported to be.  
This links with the above discussion regarding the issue of onerous terms and 
conditions and suggests a lack of control for individuals.  Worryingly, they even 
go so far as to suggest that those who know the most about the level of data 
collection actually tend to be the most apathetic, which offers a potential 
explanation for Gordon’s (2003) above findings.  This is important as often 
companies take the use of their products as being tacit acceptance of an unspoken 
bargain between the two parties, however, this research suggests that the opposite 
is true, individuals use these products in spite of the reduction in privacy, not 
because the loss of privacy is deemed to be beneficial.  The situation appears to be 
one in which we have very little control, suggesting that we are unable to have the 
level of privacy we would like, or to have any level of autonomy.  Finally, it is 
important to note that for Nissenbaum (2010), there is no tradeoff decision to be 
made.  Tradeoffs suggest that some privacy must be lost in order to gain an 
increase in another characteristic, such as convenience, however, under the 
contextual integrity framework, it is merely a case of information flowing in the 
prescribed way for that context, adhering to the expected and accepted norms, 
without issue.  This means that there is no need for tradeoffs to occur as each 




As noted above, aside from the type of information being shared, the context in 
which it is shared can also have an impact.  Although previously, it was relatively 
straightforward to maintain different contexts separately, this is becoming more 
problematic as the issue of ‘context collapse’ (Vitak, 2012 p.451) demonstrates.  
The potential for context collapse links with Goffman’s (1990 [1969]) conception 
of the ‘front’ (p.109) and ‘back’ (p.114) regions, suggesting that our carefully 
choreographed performance in the ‘front region’ can be undermined if conflicting 
information is revealed to others.  Due to increasing issues of social convergence 
(boyd, 2008), whereby numerous contexts overlap, individuals must now manage 
different contexts simultaneously which is not only stressful, but also potentially 
damaging.  Nissenbaum (2010) also recognises the potential for conflict as people 
attempt to negotiate numerous contexts, often simultaneously.  However, she 
argues that the real issue here is that ‘the norms from one context prescribe 
actions that are proscribed by the norms of an overlapping context’ (p.157), thus 
furthering her belief in contextual integrity and the rules that govern everyday 
situations.  However, she is unable to offer solutions for when these conflicts 
occur, as they are often specific to each individual situation and as such cannot be 
generalised.  In some cases, it may not be possible to find a resolution and so 
become challenges that everyone must face. 
 
Context collapse can also be said to occur when information is aggregated as 
discussed previously.  This is a form of context collapse, in that information that 
has been shared in different contexts is joined together to create a profile of an 
individual, without that person’s consent or awareness.  When data is aggregated 
in this manner, individuals become reduced to data points which can then be 
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reconfigured continually to look for particular patterns and correlations (Miller, 
2016 and Cohen, 2017).  It is also necessary to consider how individuals may 
share different pieces of information with various companies, never once 
considering that this data could become linked in one large profile and used to 
make assumptions about them.  This can lead to issues particularly around how 
individual pieces of data on their own may not be particularly revealing, but when 
they are linked together in a profile, they can reveal a lot more than was intended 
when the information was shared initially.  This is particularly worrying when 
considering that this data can be used to predict traits that the individual has not 
chosen to share (Gadzheva, 2008; Pierson, 2012 and Seneviratne et al., 2014).  
For example, when using a single piece of data (Facebook ‘Likes’), a study was 
able to predict with reasonable accuracy various pieces of data which had not 
been explicitly shared, such as sexual orientation and religious beliefs (Kosinski, 
et al., 2013).  While there were varying levels of accuracy in terms of what could 
be predicted, this demonstrates how individuals may share far more than they 
intend or consent to, when their data are aggregated into a single profile.  This 
offers an example of context collapse which the individual concerned may be 
completely unaware of, although they will potentially have to deal with the 
repercussions of decisions made based on the aggregated profiles or inferred 
information.   
 
As discussed throughout this literature review, this highlights a lack of control as 
individuals choose who to share information with initially, but once they have 
done so, control is lost as data is matched with other information shared with 
other organisations at different times and under different circumstances.  It is also 
problematic in that any additional information that is inferred, even if it is correct, 
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it is not information that has been freely given by the individual concerned.  
Therefore, it is difficult to argue that control is something that people can be 
confident they have in terms of their internet privacy. 
 
Summary and research questions 
 
Much has been written about privacy, and despite changing conceptions, it 
remains a contentious issue.  This literature review has examined various aspects 
of privacy in order to build an understanding of its complex nature.  The three 
main sections dealt with various positions relating to privacy.  In the first section I 
discussed the concept of privacy itself, with particular focus on how various 
theorists have attempted to define it (Westin, 1970; Nippert-Eng, 2010 and 
Spinello, 2017 [2003]).  This led to an examination of the divide between public 
and private areas, where there is a considerable lack of agreement.  This divide is 
not straightforward and the issues with it were discussed at length.  This 
highlighted the problematic nature of this divide. 
 
The second section focussed on commercial surveillance, and in particular, the 
issue of control, in terms of the collection of data.  It began by discussing the 
commodification of individuals’ data, which has led to large profits for social 
networking sites, amongst others.  It also recognised how the use of online social 
media platforms has become a part of many individuals’ everyday lives and as 
such requires critical examination.  This led to a discussion of how our 
relationships are mediated through the online platforms that we utilise (Bucher, 
2018).  Next, I considered Foucault’s work on discipline (1977) and how it has 
been utilised and updated by various theorists to offer explanations of how 
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commercial surveillance can be said to shape our behaviour online.  This was 
followed by a discussion on to the aggregation of data and how this can reveal 
more about an individual than intended (Kosinski, et al., 2013 and Miller, 2016).  
This led to an examination of the debate around user exploitation.   The final sub-
section considered whether it is possible for users to gain increased control over 
their information and considered the opportunities available to individuals through 
small ‘act[s] of defiance’ (Fiske, 1989 p.9 and de Certeau, 1988).   
 
The final section considered issues around the context in which an individual is 
being asked to share information, and what impact this can have.  In particular, I 
focused on Nissenbaum’s (2010) work on contextual integrity and the framework 
it offers in terms of offering an explanation for differences in responses from 
individuals when considering sharing information.  It highlighted Nissenbaum’s 
focus on the contextual norms related to a situation and considered this to be one 
of the defining factors in terms of the information we share and how we feel about 
it.  Within my discussion of context, I also considered theories around the 
categorisation of information, with specific focus on the work of Raynes-Goldie 
(2012) and Floridi (2005).  Both offer new ways of considering the categorisation 
of information and potentially explain why concerns may differ with regard to the 
type of data being requested.   
 
The second sub-section considered alternative explanations for why an individual 
might be happy to share information in one situation but not another one.  This 
included the ‘privacy paradox’ (Utz and Krämer, 2009), which is used to describe 
the difference between how people talk about privacy concerns and how they tend 
to behave.  This was followed by an examination of the suggestion that 
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individuals make tradeoff decisions regarding the reward or benefit they will 
receive if they share information (Nippert-Eng, 2010 and van Dijck, 2018).  
Finally, this section considered the issues that can arise from ‘context collapse’ 
(Vitak, 2012 p.451), whereby previously separate contexts overlap, which can 
result in conflicting information being revealed.   
 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, despite various social media 
scandals regarding user data being shared without consent, such as the Cambridge 
Analytica Scandal (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018) and the claims made 
by Edward Snowden (Greenwald, 2013), social networking sites continue to 
thrive.  This raises questions regarding whether people care about privacy, and 
where privacy is considered, whether social connection is deemed to be more 
important than a potential loss of privacy. 
 
As examined throughout this literature review, there has been a great deal of 
research carried out relating to individuals’ privacy and how they behave in 
relation to protecting it. However, much of this research has left questions 
unanswered, particularly in relation to how people feel about privacy, and how 
they conceptualise it.  It is clear that there is no overriding view of what privacy 
is, therefore, it is necessary to examine how individuals consider privacy in their 
daily lives.  This raises questions regarding when it matters, when people are 
unconcerned about privacy and what they are willing to share and under which 
circumstances.  At the root of this is whether individuals care about privacy in 
their day-to-day lives, the lack of resistance cited above suggests that they are 
unconcerned, but is this the case?  Do they feel overwhelmed and powerless, or 
are they ultimately content with the amount of privacy they have?  Do people 
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believe that to have more privacy would be to compromise their social 
relationships?  With this in mind, my research questions are as follows: 
 
• How much control do individuals feel they have over the information they 
share in their daily lives? 
• How do individuals feel about the amount of information they share with 
companies and online? 
• How do individuals negotiate the boundaries of internet privacy? 
• In what contexts is privacy important to individuals? 
 
These questions are designed to explore not only how individuals feel about the 
current pressure placed upon them in terms of sharing their information, but also 
to consider these issues at a more granular level.  As discussed in this literature 
review, considering context and how it relates to privacy has been considered 
previously, however, my project attempts to update this work by examining how 
people feel about different contexts, and which situations elicit greater concern 
than others.  By considering how individuals navigate the boundaries of internet 
privacy, I will highlight the considerations made to demonstrate that people do not 
simply consider their data privacy, but also take action to honour their boundaries 
when they deem it necessary. 




Chapter Two: Methods 
Introduction 
 
The introduction outlined the issues at stake when considering how individuals 
negotiate the boundaries of internet privacy, while the literature review examined 
the current knowledge and identified the gaps that exist.  This methods chapter 
will establish my methodological approach and how it answers the research 
questions.  This project employs a broadly qualitative approach comprising of 26 
qualitative interviews, which cover topics around sharing information online, how 
individuals attempt to maintain control over their data and how they feel about the 
types of information potentially being shared.  The interview analysis is used to 
inform 359 quantitative surveys which explore issues regarding sharing 
information online, the collection of data, control, trust and context. 
 
This chapter will be separated into six sections (plus a conclusion at the end) 
which discuss the methodological approaches taken in order to answer the 
research questions.  At each stage, justifications will be given for the decisions 
taken.  Following a reminder of my research questions, the overall research design 
will be discussed, specifically dealing with the use of intensive and extensive 
research methods and how despite appearing to follow a mixed methods approach, 
I define my research as broadly qualitative.  The second section of this chapter 
will become more focused on the methodological tools employed, specifying the 
sampling strategy before the third and fourth sections each detail the interview 
and survey designs.  In the penultimate (fifth) section, the research analysis will 
be explored, providing details of categorisations made and methods utilised.  In 
the sixth section, I reflect upon my role as researcher, paying particular attention 
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to any potential influence I may have had on participants while carrying out 
interviews.  Here, consideration will be given to the ‘emotional labour’ 
(Hochschild, 2003 p.ix) that I was required to engage in for the benefit of the 
project, in addition to the ethical implications of the research.  A conclusion will 
be drawn at the end, which will determine the success of this project, particularly 
in light of the methods I employ. 
 
As discussed in my literature review, while there is a wealth of knowledge in the 
area of data privacy, there are areas which would benefit from further exploration, 
particularly in terms of issues around the concept of context and data that is 
shared with online organisations as well as through social media.  Therefore, the 
intention of this research is to find out how participants perceive privacy when 
sharing information and discover when it is important to them (and when it is 
not).  With this in mind, the research questions are as follows: 
 
• How much control do individuals feel they have over the information they 
share in their daily lives? 
• How do individuals feel about the amount of information they share with 
companies and online? 
• How do individuals negotiate the boundaries of internet privacy? 







Intensive versus extensive methods 
Intensive and extensive methods are appropriate for different types of 
investigation with different kinds of research objectives.  Broadly speaking, 
intensive methods involve few cases, collecting in-depth data, aiming to 
understand specific cases.  Extensive methods, on the other hand, tend to consider 
a large number of cases, aiming to offer generalisable information.  Although they 
generate different types of data, it is possible, where appropriate, to combine 
intensive and extensive methods, so that stronger inferences can be made.  
Combining methods can also be useful, if done in such a way that the strengths of 
each method ameliorate the weaknesses of the other (Johnson & Turner, 2003 and 
Cresswell, 2014).  This means that while intensive methods offer more detailed 
information, which can provide explanations for social phenomena; extensive 
methods, can give an indication of how widespread opinions are (for example) 
amongst a particular group, thus adding robustness to the research.  It is also 
important to remember that some ‘social phenomena cannot be fully understood 
using either purely qualitative or quantitative techniques’ (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 
2003 p.16), therefore, it is sometimes necessary to employ both methods, which 
offer a more rounded research project than employing a single method.  This is 
the case with my project, which required both intensive and extensive methods to 
gain a fuller picture of the issues outlined by the research questions.  However, 
while I have employed traditionally qualitative and quantitative methods, my 
approach remains qualitative in nature, rather than mixed methods.  This approach 






Historically, qualitative (intensive) and quantitative (extensive) methods have 
been considered to be separate methods which are difficult to combine due to the 
fundamental differences that exist between them (Spicer, 2016).  In order to 
answer my research questions, I utilised both qualitative and quantitative methods 
sequentially, with each method offering different qualities.  Qualitative methods 
make sense in terms of learning more about how individuals feel about their level 
of control and the amount of data they share.  It is also useful to employ 
qualitative methods to uncover how people negotiate the boundaries of internet 
privacy.  Qualitative methods are useful here, as they allow participants to provide 
explanations for their views and beliefs, thus allowing the researcher to gain in-
depth knowledge.  The results from the qualitative phase support the design of the 
secondary phase of my project.   
 
Turning to my research questions it is clear that qualitative methods offer the most 
appropriate way to answer three of my research questions, however, for the final 
question (In what contexts is privacy important to individuals?) quantitative 
methods offer the most appropriate way of capturing data.  Due to the 
individualised nature of context, using qualitative methods to investigate context 
could generate a different response for each person, and to explore a list of 
situations and ask each participant which of the situations would cause them 
concern would be tedious for interviewees and may cause disengagement (and a 
poor experience for them).  However, by offering various combinations of 
information and audience within a quantitative method allows me to look for 
patterns in the data and to clearly see where there are areas of convergence or 
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divergence and to consider why this might be.  It also allows the overall 
importance of context to be gauged, as participants are able to rate their level of 
concern for the context questions.  Therefore, quantitative methods offer the most 
appropriate way of understanding the importance of context and when it is or is 
not important to participants.  However, it is also important to note that responses 
from the extensive phase will be helpful in supporting responses to the initial 
intensive phase, therefore the usefulness of this phase is not limited to the final 
research question. 
 
I begin with a qualitative method, which allows me to gain in-depth knowledge of 
participants’ views, this is then analysed and directs the design of the quantitative 
phase of the project.  The analysis of the intensive data allows the quantitative 
element to be moulded to ensure that it deals with issues that are important to 
participants, rather than what I assume to matter to them and ensures that the 
relevant variables are included in the quantitative phase of the research 
(Cresswell, 2014 and Spicer, 2016).  This is particularly relevant to the 
exploratory nature of the project, as it allows a research tool to be developed to 
measure the strength of opinion from participants, which can then be developed 
further for future research.  Therefore, the information provided by the 
participants in the first phase of my research is vital to the development of the 
second phase of research.  It is important to note that while the qualitative stage is 
utilised in the design of the quantitative stage, it sets the tone and topics to be 
explored further here, rather than the detail of how the topics are to be measured 
by the quantitative tool.  My project is sequential in nature, and broadly speaking, 
the design of each phase is not integrated and so each dataset maintains its 
original form and is analysed separately (further details of which will be provided 
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in the analysis section).  However, the results themselves were merged ‘at the 
point of inference’ (Greene, et al., 2012).  Therefore, although each phase of data 
collection is carried out separately, there is a link between the phases in that the 
qualitative phase directly impacts on the quantitative phase as the design topics 
are based on the initial analysis.  Also, when reporting on my findings, the results 
of each phase are discussed together, rather than in separate sections, thus 
integrating the different methods.  To the casual reader this may appear to suggest 
that I have utilised a mixed methods approach, however, this is not the case; my 
approach is broadly qualitative.  Although I have used quantitative methods, I 
have limited my analysis of these to descriptive statistics and bi-variate analysis.  
The way in which I have employed the results of this analysis is qualitative in 
nature, especially as I have merged it with the qualitative analysis when 
considering what my data is telling me.  Also, quantitative analysis tends to focus 
on creating models and predicting how groups of individuals will behave in 
particular situations, however, I have not done this, rather I have used all of the 
data that I  have collected to posit suggestions and lay a foundation upon which 
future research can be built, therefore my focus is qualitative.  Up to this point, I 
have offered general information regarding the types of research methodology 
employed, the next section will offer more detailed information regarding specific 
methods that I utilise in order to answer my research questions. 
 
My project 
As discussed above, this project employs a broadly qualitative approach which 
utilises tools traditionally defined as qualitative and quantitative, thus providing 
the most effective way of answering the research questions.  In this section I 
provide further details of the precise methods utilised. 
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My preference in terms of qualitative method is interviews, as they allow specific 
questions to be directed towards the topic of interest, ensuring that the data 
collected will offer an answer to the research questions.  They also offer the 
ability to capture participants’ views on specific topics, and even to allow them to 
highlight situations in which their behaviour may not align with their beliefs and 
offer an explanation for this.  It also allows the interviewer to probe responses 
given for additional information and/or clarification. 
 
As stated previously, I employ both qualitative and quantitative methods to 
answer the research questions and this allows a more rounded approach than 
either of these methods would offer on their own.  The use of interview analysis 
to inform the surveys was vital as it meant that I did not rely on my 
preconceptions and thus omit an issue that may be important to participants 
(Babbie, 1973).  As such the interviews steer the survey in the direction of 
participants’ concerns, rather than those they are assumed to have.  This larger 
survey allowed me to gain broader views regarding internet privacy, in particular 
considering the contextual responses given, which would have proved much more 
difficult to do in an interview scenario without becoming repetitive.  It also 
facilitated the collection of a wider range of views and allowed me to consider 
demographic differences in terms of gender and age group.  However, it is 
important to note that the surveys were not used to ‘test’ the interviews, rather the 
aim was that each research tool would complement each other and work as a 
means of what Mason describes as ‘mutual verification’ (2002 p.18), not only 
allowing the comparison of ‘different forms of data on the same subject’, but also 
to ‘generate theory’ (Mason, 2002 p.18).  As such, it provides a useful way of 
highlighting areas of convergence (as well as difference) between participants and 
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ensures that participants as a whole are less homogenous, thus removing some of 
the inherent issues with snowball sampling, as discussed below. 
 
It is important to note that the use of multiple data collection methods does not 
necessarily improve the quality of the research findings.  As such, it was 
important to ensure that both methods were integrated into the research, rather 
than being treated as separate entities, to ensure that there was value to utilising 
them both.  The survey depended on the analysis of the interviews, as this gave 
the survey its focus and highlighted which areas should be probed further and 
which did not require additional examination.  Without utilising the interviews in 
the survey design, the survey may have missed information of great significance 
to the research population and as such would be incomplete.  Therefore, 
employing both methods ensured that this did not happen.  By utilising both 
qualitative and quantitative methods, the intention was that each would mitigate 
any issues related to the other method, and as such they would provide a more 
rounded research project. 
 
Sampling strategy and saturation 
 
The sampling framework utilised for the interviews is a non-random, convenience 
sample in that there was a specific group that was of interest, due to their 
relevance to my research questions (Mason, 2002).  I wanted to speak to 
participants who are aged between 20 and 40, use social media and own a 
smartphone.  I chose this specific age range as much of the previous research has 
focused on teenagers (boyd, 2014; Marwick & boyd, 2014 and Pangrazio & 
Selwyn, 2017,), undergraduate students (Culnan, 1993; Spiekermann, et al., 2001; 
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Metzger, 2004; Acquisti & Gross, 2006; Tufecki, 2008; John, et al., 2011; 
Stutzman, et al., 2012; and Young & Quan-Haase, 2013), or, older participants 
(Braun, 2013 and Eleuze & Quan-Haase, 2018).  This means that those aged 20-
40 years old are rarely the sole focus of research, which led me to consider 
whether this age group represented something significant in terms of the way they 
think about their data privacy.  This age group was of particular interest as it 
encompasses those who have grown up with the internet and those who remember 
a time before the internet.  Also, recent data suggests that this age group is 
particularly active on social media, with the largest concentration of Facebook 
users in the 18-44 age group (Statista, 2019), suggesting that those in this age 
range are those that could be said to have the most at stake when we consider 
issues around data privacy and negotiating the boundaries of internet privacy.  
They are also of particular interest because as noted in the literature (boyd, 2014), 
it is often assumed that the sharing of data is a sign of an acceptance of a 
reduction in privacy, however, this project is exploring the complexities of this, 
particularly in light of the ‘tradeoff fallacy’ (Turow, et al., 2015).  Therefore, as 
the research questions are exploring attitudes towards data privacy, it is relevant 
to speak to those who share their data and given the nature of the vignettes, 
(which will be discussed in greater detail later) it was more likely that those 
within the 20-40 age range would have experience of using the services discussed. 
 
As well as the sampling framework, when determining the robustness of a piece 
of research, sample size is also considered.  Sample size is a contentious issue and 
broadly the small sample sizes characteristic of extensive interviews can lead to 
concerns regarding representativeness which can make it difficult to carry out 
enough in-depth interviews for the results to be generalisable.  However, it should 
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be noted that this project does not intend to be generalisable as it is exploratory in 
nature (Mason, 2010), and as such, the aim is for me to develop theories regarding 
individuals and their data privacy.  As discussed above, the themes emerging from 
the interview stage of the research were used to generate the topics for the larger 
survey (which will be discussed in further detail below) and so when analysing 
my results, the aim was to reach ‘theoretical saturation’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967 
p.65). 
 
Saturation offers an alternative measure to that of representativeness and occurs at 
‘the point at which no new information or themes are observed in the data’ (Guest 
et al., 2006 p.59).  There are various perspectives on the point at which saturation 
occurs but it is important to ensure that the sample size is not so small that 
theoretical saturation cannot be achieved, while, not so large that analysis is 
impossible due to an overwhelming amount of data being collected (Mason, 2002; 
Kvale, 2009 [2007] and Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007).  Given the type of 
sample that I utilised, I offer a suggestion of how things might be, when we 
consider how people negotiate the boundaries of internet privacy.  Therefore, I 
utilised saturation as a way of deciding when enough data had been collected, 
employing NVIVO to assist in the identification of themes.  The use of NVIVO 
was key in identifying when saturation had occurred, as it allowed me to identify 
the themes emerging from the data and recognise when new themes ceased to 
present themselves.  At this point, it was clear that saturation had been achieved.  
The identification of themes and coding of responses will be discussed in greater 




The same sampling framework was utilised for the survey, as for interviews and 
as such this limited participants to those who are aged between 20 and 40, use 
social media and own a smartphone.  This is because I want to explore whether 
the views uncovered during interviews could be said to be those of a wider group 
of people with similar characteristics.  Therefore, it would not make sense to 
choose a different group, as their concerns may differ from those originally 
interviewed by virtue of them being characteristically different.  However, having 
identified the pertinent themes in interviews, it is also important that the same 
participants did not complete the survey, as this would merely serve to duplicate 
the initial results and would have offered no new information and might 
‘introduce confounding factors into the study’ (Cresswell, 2014 p.226). 
 
Due to the nature of the sample, survey results are not generalisable and as such 
are only intended to be indicative of issues which may warrant further 
investigation.  The purpose is to examine the contemporary concerns of 
individuals in terms of their data privacy and how they negotiate the boundaries of 
their online privacy.  My particular interest in the contextual aspects of privacy 
mean that work of this nature has rarely been carried out previously and so 
generalisability is not a realistic outcome. The survey is cross-sectional in nature 
(Babbie, 1973) and so offers a snapshot of respondents’ views at a particular point 
in time, while also allowing patterns of association to be identified.  This is a 
potential limitation as it offers no information regarding how opinions and 
attitudes have changed, in response to the Cambridge Analytica scandal, for 
example.  However, this study has allowed me to develop preliminary theories in 






As discussed above, interviews were utilised initially for collecting data as they 
provide interviewees’ interpretations of the world, which can be extremely 
difficult to access in any other way (Lawler, 2002).  However, they do not come 
from the individual, rather, ‘culture provides a repertoire’ (Lawler, 2002 p.242) of 
acceptable narratives which individuals are able to choose from in order to tell 
their story.  The narratives offered by my participants tell me how they view the 
world and their place within it, and as such, this research is interpretivist, as it 
focuses on individuals’ interpretations of the world (Lawler, 2002).  Broadly, I 
approach this research from an ‘adaptive theory’ (Layder, 1998, p.viii) 
perspective, which offers an alternative to other, more well-established 
perspectives.  This approach allowed me to utilise the data from the initial stages 
of my research to shape the next phase of the research, while at the same time 
leaving the initial research open to adaptation should I uncover new perspectives 
in the latter stages of my data collection (Layder, 1998).  Therefore, the interviews 
provided provisional theoretical models, against which I was able to design my 
surveys, while still being able to feed the data from my surveys back into the 
analysis process, if necessary.  This means that I was able to consider pre-existing 
theory, and utilise my data to refine it, rather than ignoring prior concepts, as 
grounded theory requires (Layder, 1998).  By taking into account the existing 
theories, and merging them with my emerging data, I was able to generate new 
theory which bridges the gap between what has gone before and what I have 




Using my research questions as a guide, I carried out 26 structured interviews, 
whereby participants were asked the same set of questions, in the same order.  The 
majority of these interviews were face-to-face, although it was necessary to 
conduct four via FaceTime/Skype and one via telephone.  The face-to-face 
interviews tended to take place in public places such as libraries, cafés, and on the 
University of Kent campus, I generally tried to accommodate locations that were 
convenient for the participant.  All interviews were voice recorded utilising my 
iPhone, and lasted an average of 36 minutes, with the longest interview lasting 1 
hour and 15 minutes and the shortest being 19 minutes long.  Most of my 
interviewees were female (61.5%), the overall ages range from 23-40 years old, 
with a mean age of 31 years old; the majority of my participants were aged 
between 30 and 40 years old (57.7%).  Although I attempted to recruit participants 
using traditional methods such as displaying posters in public places and asking 
friends and family to display the recruitment poster at their workplaces, this led to 
the recruitment of a single participant.  Therefore, it became necessary to utilise 
other methods, such as social media (Facebook and Twitter) and word of mouth.  
As such, I asked friends and relatives to share the recruitment poster via their 
social media pages or to mention my research to any friends or family that they 
thought may be interested in taking part.  I also posted details of my research in 
various groups on Facebook including the University of Kent and British 
Sociological Society Post Graduate forum, in an attempt to reach a wide range of 
participants.  As an incentive, I offered participants the opportunity to be entered 
into a prize draw for a £25 iTunes (or similar) voucher.  I utilised snowball 
sampling to recruit additional participants by asking interviewees if they knew 
anyone who may be interested in participating.  Although there are potential 
issues with using snowball sampling, in terms of participants either knowing each 
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other and/or being a homogenous group (Mason 2002), I attempted to ameliorate 
this by also sharing my recruitment information amongst various groups on social 
media as well as asking those I knew to share it and as such did not rely solely on 
snowball sampling.  This also allowed for geographical diversity, as I was able to 
reach individuals who did not live or work locally, which should have increased 
diversity.  I am aware that given the self-selecting nature of my recruitment, there 
is also the potential for self-selection bias, in that only those who are particularly 
concerned about or interested in issues around internet privacy would have 
volunteered to take part, however, this was not necessarily the case.  A number of 
my participants spoke of their lack of concern regarding privacy and mentioned 
that they had not given the topic any more than a cursory consideration prior to 
the interview taking place.  It is also important to remember that there are a 
number of reasons why an individual may choose to participate in research, such 
as enjoying the process itself and the opportunity to ‘explore their own thoughts 
and feelings to an interested and respected other’ (Clark, 2010 p.406-407).  
Therefore, while participants may have had a particular interest in the topic, it is 
also possible that it was something they wanted to explore for themselves during 
the interview. 
 
The interviews follow a specific structure, with each participant being asked the 
same questions in the same order.  This was important because the addition of 
new questions could generate new themes, which would have hindered my ability 
to reach saturation.  The questions posed were narrow to begin with, so as not to 
overwhelm participants by asking a broad question that would be difficult to 
answer (the interview schedule is included as Appendix C), however, follow-up 
questions were asked, where needed, and this encouraged participants to provide 
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further details.  The interview schedule went through a number of iterations and 
was tested with a number of volunteers to ensure that the questions were 
appropriate and allowed me to gain useful insights into how people might 
interpret them.  When refining my interviews, I spoke to individuals with varying 
levels of expertise in terms of carrying out research, including fellow postgraduate 
students at the University of Kent, but also others who have not had any research 
methods training and were representative of my potential participants.  Following 
the standard interview questions, participants were asked to consider a number of 




Vignettes were initially suggested to me by my supervisors during one of our 
early meetings and were deemed to be a useful and interesting part of my data 
collection.  After I had completed my interviews, I discovered recent research that 
had utilised vignettes in order to explore concerns around sharing different types 
of data in different situations (Rainie & Madden, 2016).  This highlighted the 
importance of using vignettes in this area and provided confirmation that I was 
not alone in employing this research tool.  Following much deliberation, five 
vignettes were employed during the interviews to examine how participants feel 
about privacy when considering particular scenarios.  These were included as a 
way of making the potentially abstract topic of data privacy more tangible for 
participants by asking them to consider detailed, specific situations.  Vignettes 
were used because they include all of the complexities related to real-life 
situations and allow individuals to explore and talk about values as related to that 
situation (Lee, 1993; Barter & Renold, 1999 and Jenkins, et al., 2010), while 
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giving an insight into their normative values.  As such, they offer respondents the 
opportunity to consider a situation in a more reflective way than may be possible 
in their daily lives.  These vignettes offer a number of situations in which a piece 
of information was shared and varied in terms of whether the information had 
been illegally accessed or was being requested by a company through an app.  The 
vignettes will be included in the appendix with the interview schedule (Appendix 
C). 
 
The vignettes are based on real-life situations, which had either been reported on 
in the media or heard anecdotally; this is important because they will elicit a more 
realistic response if participants believe them (Hughes & Huby, 2004; Jenkins et 
al., 2010; Bradbury-Jones et al., 2012 and Jackson et al., 2015).  The scenarios 
remained the same for each interview, as with the preceding questions, this was 
partly to assist in the identification of the point at which saturation was reached, 
but also to allow comparisons to be made between participants’ responses to 
identical situations.  This allowed me to ‘highlight areas of commonality and 
disagreement within and between’ (Jackson, et al. 2015, p.1405 and Barter & 
Renold, 1999) participants.  For this reason, the vignettes were followed by a 
simple, open-ended question, asking participants in very broad terms, what they 
thought of the situation, this allowed individuals to discuss their views and 
feelings, without being directed in a particular direction by the interviewer.  
 
Following the discussion of the five vignettes, participants were asked to rank 
them in order from those they would be the most concerned about to those they 
would be least concerned about.  This highlights a contextual element when 
individuals consider their data privacy, because the vast majority of interviewees 
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had very little issue with ranking the types of information and offering 
explanations for their decision.  This also allowed me to compare how different 
individuals ranked different pieces of information which meant that it was 
possible to identify pieces of information where there was agreement in terms of 
their importance.  This is also useful because the vignettes illustrate to participants 
which pieces of data are available to others and so allow them to consider what 
may be known about them, while defining which pieces of data matter the most to 
them.  This was also interesting because even those who had given little thought 
to their privacy prior to the interview had little difficulty in ranking the vignettes, 
suggesting that while it is not necessarily something that is at the forefront of their 
minds, they do consider it on some level. 
 
The vignettes were based on a combination of anecdotes I had heard from friends 
and a number of real-life news stories which were amended so as not to be exactly 
the same as the original news story but would make sense to the participants.  As 
with the interview questions, these vignettes went through several iterations, with 
a pilot of the scenarios being carried out with a volunteer to check that they made 
sense to someone not involved in the research project.  Following this, a small 
focus group was conducted with fellow postgraduate students at the University of 
Kent, during this, both the interview schedule and vignettes were discussed.  This 
allowed the ordering and content of them to be considered to ensure that these 
research tools were appropriate to examine the issues outlined by my research 
questions.  This led to further consideration of what was meant by key phrases 
and the interview schedule and vignettes were much improved from doing this.  
Towards the end of the design phase, a final pilot interview was carried out with a 
volunteer, who was treated exactly as participants would be.  The only exception 
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here is that the interview was not audio-recorded, as the volunteer did not consent 
to this and it was not deemed necessary, as the research instrument itself was the 
focus of this exercise.  Both parties reflected on the interview immediately 
afterwards, and this led to an additional question being added.  This iterative 
approach to designing my research tool was vital to ensure that the interview 
experience was worthwhile for participants and myself.  As discussed previously, 
the interview responses supported and directed the design and development of my 




The themes identified during the analysis of the interviews were used when 
deciding on which topics my survey should cover.  When designing my survey, I 
also utilised previously carried out surveys, as these are instruments that have 
been tested and were relevant to the topics I was exploring.  Although some of 
these questions were taken from prior research verbatim, this was rarely the case, 
and I often utilised my own phrasing or used the question but supplied different 
response options.  The questions that were inspired by previous research included 
questions related to the measures individuals had taken online to protect their 
privacy, questions regarding the supplying of false information or refusing to 
supply information to companies.  I also utilised previous research when working 
on the questions regarding tradeoff decisions - sharing data to receive 
personalised recommendations, access free services or whether the participant 
would be willing to pay to share less information (Dommeyer & Gross, 2003; 
Madden, 2014; Shelton, Rainie & Madden, 2015 and Rainie & Duggan, 2016).  
Other questions were related to whether participants would like to have more 
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control, how they feel about their information being passed on to third-parties and 
the questions in the Trust section of the survey (Madden & Rainie, 2015 and 
Rainie & Duggan, 2016).  These questions offered a useful basis and gave me 
greater confidence when developing my own instruments, as I was able to utilise 
these questions to guide my survey design.  It is also important to note that 
responses from my interview participants were utilised when I was developing the 
response options to questions regarding issues previously experienced around 
privacy and measures that participants had taken in order to protect their privacy.  
The format for the context question was brand new as little work had been carried 
out in this area, in the same way that I was doing it, and as such there was no prior 
data collection instrument that could be used to form a basis for this. 
 
The design phase of the surveys also allowed me to utilise the skills I had gained 
while undertaking my Research Methods Certificate, particularly the Quantitative 
Methods unit.  This allowed me to consider the response options offered to 
participants and contemplate what I was attempting to measure and whether the 
options would offer a reliable tool with which to measure it.  While the vast 
majority of the questions did measure what I was attempting to, looking back at 
the survey questions I can see now that the first question (regarding how often the 
participant thinks about their online privacy) did not.  This question was 
attempting to measure the frequency with which participants consider their online 
privacy, however the options offered do not necessarily correlate with this and it 
is clear that it is possible that there are situations in which more than one of these 
responses could have been true, despite the survey allowing only one response to 




My survey was carried out online, hosted by Qualtrics.  It was launched on 1st 
December 2017 and closed on 28th February 2018, during this time, 373 
individuals took part, and after data cleaning, the number of participants was 
reduced to 359.  It is also important to note that none of the questions in the 
survey were compulsory, this was a decision I made to reduce the burden on 
participants who may decide not to complete the remaining questions in the 
survey if they were faced with a compulsory question that they did not feel 
comfortable answering.  I did however attempt to mitigate this by offering the 
‘Prefer not to say’ option, however, participants were still able to move on to the 
next question without selecting a response.  Given the issues I had with recruiting 
interview participants, I recruited survey participants via social networking sites, 
through a page I set up on the ‘Call for participants’ website and by asking friends 
and relatives to forward the link to my survey within their workplace, via email.  
The most successful method of recruitment was Twitter, which yielded 59.2% of 
my respondents, followed by those who were forwarded the link via email 
(19.5%).  The success of recruitment via Twitter was due to asking those I knew 
to re-tweet my link (as well as tweeting it myself),  In addition to this, I sought a 
number of Twitter users with a large number of followers to retweet the link to 
my survey, many of them did this, and so this increased my response rate.  As 
with my interviews, I offered participants the opportunity to be entered into a 
prize draw for a £25 iTunes (or similar) voucher, as an incentive.  The criteria for 
eligibility was the same as for the interviews, in that participants had to be aged 
20-40, own a smartphone and use social media.  As with the interviews, the 
majority of respondents were female (67.2%), 2% identified as non-binary and 
1.6% did not reveal their gender.  Interestingly, while the majority of interview 
participants were aged 30-40, the opposite is true for survey participants, with 
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54.7% being in the 20-29 age group, and 43.5% being in the older age group.  As 
participants were given age-bracket options for this question, it is not possible to 
calculate the mean age of survey participants.  It is also not possible to offer any 
information regarding where participants live or their nationality, as this was not 
something they were asked to reveal.  Also, given that the focus of my research is 
data privacy, it was important to me that participants remain anonymous, and so I 
did not enable Qualtrics to collect any information in the background that could 
have been used to infer nationality.  This is something that in hindsight could have 
been interesting and useful to collect, particularly given the different concerns 
regarding privacy in different countries (Costa, 2018), depending upon the overall 
context nationally and the level of privacy individuals expect.  However, as my 
survey was in English, I would assume that my participants were largely from the 
UK, and if not, certainly English-speaking countries; it is clear from the free-text 
responses that everyone who typed in comments understood English well enough 
to complete the survey.  Therefore, it could be argued that my research serves to 
increase the volume of data that exists regarding Western conceptions of privacy 
and as such fails to take account other, more diverse uses and conceptions (Costa, 
2018).  Due to the use of social media as a recruitment method, it is impossible to 
calculate the response rate for my surveys, as I am unable to measure how many 
people saw my survey and thus how many people chose to participate or not.  
However, where response rate appears to be an issue for specific questions, this 
will be dealt with in the discussion around that question. 
 
The survey took the form of an online self-completion questionnaire, which 
offered various advantages, particularly in terms of reducing social desirability 
bias, as there is no interviewer present and so the participant may be less inhibited 
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in their responses.  It also offered greater convenience for the respondent as they 
could choose when to complete the survey, rather than having to agree on a 
designated time and place with an interviewer.  There are, however, issues with 
this method, in that due to the absence of an interviewer, no assistance could be 
offered if the respondent was unclear regarding what a particular question meant.  
However, as discussed previously, as my interviews informed my survey design, 
there should have been less need for clarification, given that any initial confusion 
would have been dealt with during the interviews.  The absence of an interviewer 
meant that consideration needed to be given to the types of questions posed during 
the survey.  Therefore, it was important that restraint was exercised when posing 
open questions, to ensure that this did not place undue burden on the respondent, 
therefore, many of the questions used a 4-point Likert scale.  This type of question 
was chosen due to their ability to capture individuals’ attitudes; they also allowed 
for strength of feeling to be measured, which can be particularly useful when 
dealing with a nuanced concept such as that of privacy.  The scales used ranged 
from 1-4 for many of the questions; the absence of a central option meant that 
participants were compelled to offer a definite view when answering these 
questions.   
 
Other survey questions were a combination of specific options and free-text 
responses, although as stated previously, these were used sparingly.  The 
contextual section of the survey was used as an alternative to the vignettes 
because even though the vignettes worked well during interviews, I believed that 
given the large amount of text and detail required for these to really ‘set the scene’ 
for participants, this may discourage participants from offering responses or even 
reading the entire vignette and so sought an alternative.  The design of the 
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contextual section of my survey was the most challenging, as it required various 
views from participants regarding how concerned they would be about various 
types of information being seen by different groups, such as friends, neighbours 
and the government.  It was important to ensure that I was able to access the 
relevant information, without making the questions too repetitive or complex; this 
was a difficult balance to strike.  To assist the design, I spoke to various 
colleagues within my department, in addition to sending the proposed format of 
the questions to various volunteers to ensure that the question would be something 
that participants could answer without difficulty.  While it was invaluable to 
obtain support from colleagues, it was also vital that the questions were tested by 
those unfamiliar with carrying out research to ensure that it would be meaningful 
to the eventual research participants.  Again, for these contextual questions, I 
employed Likert scales, however, this time I utilised a 5-point scale.  The 
questions in this section asked participants to consider a specific piece of 
information (such as their medical data) and rate how concerned they would be 
about that piece of information being revealed to a number of groups; the scale 
ranged from 1- not at all concerned to 5- extremely concerned.  As these questions 
were considering the contextual nature of privacy, a 5-point Likert scale was used 
to allow a more nuanced response from participants.  For these questions, it was 
less important for responses to be as definite as the questions described 
previously, therefore, the middle option was offered to participants, as a way of 
measuring the level of concern around a particular piece of information and the 








While completing my interviews, I began to consider the emerging themes, 
through the use of NVIVO software, which allowed me to retain a full copy of the 
transcript of each interview and highlight areas which appeared to be useful 
themes.  I did this by going through each interview and highlighting potential 
themes, where new ones emerged, I employed an iterative process to reconsider 
previous interviews in light of the new themes.  A number of strong, clear themes 
appeared, which were prevalent in a number of interviews, however, as the 
number of interviews increased, the incidence of new themes was reduced until it 
became clear that I had reached the point of saturation.  At this point, I went over 
the themes in NVIVO to consider them in relation to my research questions and 
discern how well the data provided was answering them.  Once I was satisfied that 
the data generated from the interviews was relevant to my research questions, I 
embarked on the design of my surveys, as detailed previously. 
 
I carried out the analysis for my surveys using SPSS Statistics, which allowed me 
to run the relevant statistical tests for my data.  As my sample is not 
representative, I did not consider it necessary to carry out the calculation of 
confidence intervals, as these are most appropriate when results are based on a 
representative sample.  Once I had cleaned the data to ensure spurious results 
were removed, I generated descriptive statistics for each question; this provided 
me with a starting point to identify where the particularly interesting and counter-
intuitive responses were.  I also categorised any free-text responses utilising 
NVIVO software, to generate themes, until a set of categories became obvious 
which I then generated descriptive statistics for, to aid with analysis.  At this 
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point, I referred to the analysis generated by my interviews, to identify any points 
of convergence or divergence between interview and survey respondents, this 
allowed me to consider potential patterns and areas for further investigation.   
 
I performed a chi-square test for one of my context questions with gender and 
then did the same for age, however, the values produced were very high (46.7% 
for gender, and 73.2% for age), suggesting that there is a high probability that any 
differences are due to chance, and therefore it was not necessary to continue to 
perform further tests on the remaining context questions.  The majority of my 
analysis for the contextual questions was carried out through ordinary least 
squared regressions in terms of gender and age.  This allowed me to look at the 
relationship between each of these independent variables and the dependent 
variable, which was the type of information and audience.  This permitted me to 
calculate the co-efficient, which shows how much the dependent variable 
increases when the independent variable does the same.  For the majority of my 
survey results, I calculated the p-values to identify where results showed signs of 
statistical significance and the r-square value to calculate what proportion of the 
result is likely to be predicted by the independent variable.  For the context 
questions I also used a paired sample t-test to compare the means regarding 
concern levels for different audiences.  The statistics offered by this research are 






My role as researcher 
 
Since completing my fieldwork, I have had the opportunity to reflect on my role 
as a researcher, particularly in relation to carrying out the interview phase of this 
project.  While it is often assumed that the interviewer and interviewee will not 
know each other, there were some participants that were known personally to the 
me, but only as an acquaintance.  Although a number of friends volunteered to 
participate, I did not consider this to be appropriate as they would know my 
feelings regarding internet privacy, and as such may have felt that they were only 
able to respond to questions in a particular way. However, I did not have this 
concern when considering acquaintances as research participants and deemed our 
pre-existing familiarity to be a benefit in terms of building rapport and ensuring 
they felt comfortable in the interview situation.  However, not all of my 
interviewees were known to me and so it was important that I consider the impact 
I might have upon their experience.  As such, I tended to dress in a relatively 
smart-casual manner when interviewing, as I wanted to strike the balance between 
putting them at ease, while also expressing that the interview was to be taken 
seriously.  It was important to get this right as I did not want to make interviewees 
nervous and thus reluctant to speak at length.  Nevertheless, there is a power 
dynamic involved in conducting interviews, as I am clearly ‘in charge’ in that I 
develop the interview questions and decide which responses to probe and clarify.  
To attempt to offset this, I gave participants ample opportunities to clarify their 
responses or to ask questions if they were unsure of anything.  We also met in a 
mutually convenient location that was suitable for carrying out an interview, 




A number of my interviewees seemed nervous at the outset, intimating afterwards 
that they had been a little concerned regarding what I was going to ask them; 
however, many seemed to become more comfortable and relaxed as the interview 
progressed.  An interesting and surprising phenomenon occurred during a number 
of interviews, whereby the participant appeared to realise for the first time, the 
amount of information they share on a daily basis.  This was an unexpected 
‘process’ to witness and in some ways demonstrated in a tangible way the lack of 
consideration people often afford their privacy and suggests that this may not 
happen until individuals are confronted with it.  Participants stated that the 
interview itself was encouraging them to reflect on privacy issues that they 
usually put to the back of their mind.  This occurred for a number of interviewees, 
who appeared to be processing this ‘new’ information and re-evaluating their 
privacy in the moment, as the interview was taking place.  Interestingly, this only 
occurred with participants who I knew to be undertaking a PhD at the time, and 
this has led me to wonder whether this ‘realisation process’ was due to the 
reflective nature of university study in general, and PhD candidates in particular.  
There is often a great emphasis placed upon being reflective and thinking 
critically during the process of obtaining a doctorate degree and so it is possible 
that this ‘live’ realisation is indicative of this.  It is possible that as the discussion 
progressed, these participants began reflecting upon what we had already 
discussed as well as their practices and started to draw upon their critical skills to 
re-consider their privacy-related behaviour while we were discussing it.  This is 
something that may be worthy of further research in the future, as there may be 
other explanations for this, which relate to other factors, that I was unaware of.  
This realisation often occurred with those who had begun the interview with an 
unconcerned attitude towards their privacy; they spoke of not worrying about their 
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privacy and being relatively happy with how much information they share.  
However, as the interview progressed, they began to realise what was at stake, 
with one participant stating: 
 
“I'm completely oblivious of it, day to day life, not aware of it whatsoever, 
bringing it to discussion now, I'm overly aware, I want to hide under a 
rock!  Erm, my anxieties about it are only when I'm aware, [HEF: Mmhm, 
yeah] I go on day to day blissfully unaware of the, the amount of things 
that are being watched, and monitored, and, until it causes a problem, I 
guess I'd never know it was a problem.”  (MJ, female, 25) 
 
This suggests that privacy is not at the forefront of individuals’ minds on a daily 
basis and often only becomes a concern when we are confronted with it.  This 
highlights the complex nature of privacy, when considering what is and is not 
shared on a daily basis and demonstrates how some participants had not 
necessarily agreed to participate because they had a particular interest in privacy. 
 
Although it was a structured interview in that I had a specific set of questions that 
I asked each interviewee (in a specific order), I allowed participants to discuss 
topics that were less relevant to my area of interest.  This was a decision I made at 
the outset, as I was concerned that it may make them less willing to provide 
lengthy answers if I interrupted them to steer them back to the topic.  This 
appeared to have the desired effect and one of my participants (who spoke at 
length about various unrelated topics), admitted to enjoying the opportunity to 
speak uninterrupted about subjects that interested him.  While some participants 
spoke in great detail, others, (often those with very definite views) offered shorter, 
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much more decisive answers, with less explanation.  Other participants who had 
little to say were less definite in their beliefs and appeared quite nervous initially, 
however the vignettes offered them something specific to focus on and have an 
opinion about, even if they had appeared unsure of what to say earlier in the 
interview.  The vignettes also offered tangible situations, which were less abstract 
in nature than the issue of privacy more broadly.  This was beneficial in terms of 
providing participants with the opportunity to say more and feel more confident in 
their responses. 
 
As discussed above, it is also important to recognise my place and the impact I 
could have on interviewees especially as I have a particular set of views around 
the subject of internet privacy and as such there were times when I found myself 
in complete disagreement with the views being expressed by my participant.  This 
required a certain level of ‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild, 2003 p.ix)  on my part 
to mask how I actually felt, so that participants did not feel that the answers they 
were giving were ‘incorrect’ or attempt to censor themselves to avoid disapproval 
or judgement from me.  This appeared to work well, and at no point did it seem 
that interviewees were editing themselves.  I broadly tried to remain neutral, so as 
not to reveal my personal opinions.  However, this can be a barrier to building 
rapport and so at times it was necessary for me to appear to agree with their 
responses, even though this was not the case.  Again, this is part of the emotional 
labour often required to ensure the success of qualitative research.  Although this 
led to feelings of dishonesty and concerns regarding whether this was an ethical 
way to behave, my agreement tended to be tacit, in that I nodded in agreement 





There are additional ethical implications to consider whenever carrying out 
research of this kind.  First and foremost, it is vital that participants give informed 
consent to participating and this can only happen if they receive clear and 
accessible information prior to agreeing to take part.  To ensure that this 
happened, I created an information sheet (Appendix A), which was approved by 
the ethics panel at the university but was also tested with a number of volunteers 
before being utilised.  I also allowed my participants a period of reflection 
between their initial recruitment, and the interview taking place to ensure that they 
did not feel undue pressure to take part once they had agreed to. 
 
The main risk with the type of interview that I was conducting is participant 
embarrassment, in terms of being asked to reveal something that they find 
embarrassing.  Therefore, I made it clear to participants that they did not have to 
answer any questions that they were uncomfortable with, I also emphasised that 
they could withdraw their participation at any time without having to offer an 
explanation.  This was also important for those completing the survey, although 
they may have felt less pressure to answer questions they were uncomfortable 
with, nevertheless each question gave participants the ability to select a ‘prefer not 
to say’ option.  I also ensured that all participants (regardless of whether they 
were taking part in the interviews or surveys) had my contact details in case of 
any queries or concerns emerging following their participation. 
 
Finally, it was important that I respect the privacy of my participants, especially 
as this is the area that I am researching.  Therefore, I allocated random initials to 
my participants when transcribing their interviews and redacted the names of any 
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friends or relatives mentioned during the interview, replacing it with their 
relationship to the participant.  This was not necessary for the surveys, as they 
were completed anonymously and so I did not know who my participants were.  
All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim.  It was important to 
check these details with interviewees to ensure that participants’ voices were 
heard and that I was representing their words and opinions in a way that reflected 
how they felt.  As part of the consent forms (Appendix B), participants were 
offered the opportunity to receive a copy of their transcript and although 16 
initially requested this, when I contacted them following completion of 
transcription, many no longer wanted a copy, as such, seven were sent to 
interviewees as encrypted files, with the password sent separately.  When I sent 
the transcripts to participants, I reminded them that they could request changes, if 





The employment of a number of research tools has led to a rounded research 
project, which has yielded a number of interesting and at times, surprising results, 
suggesting that this is an area in which investigation was required.  By utilising 
both qualitative and quantitative methods, I have been able to avoid a number of 
pitfalls which can lead to issues when utilising a single method.  The exploratory 
nature of my research suggests areas which would benefit from further 
investigation while offering initial theories in terms of how individuals negotiate 




This project has generated new knowledge regarding how individuals negotiate 
the boundaries of internet privacy and offers some new insights into how people 
feel about this.  Had I chosen to employ only qualitative methods, I would have 
generated a large amount of intensive data, without knowing whether the views 
held were limited to my interviewees or could be said to be held more widely.  
However, if I had limited my research to quantitative methods only, I would have 
been able to identify trends and areas of convergence but may have directed my 
research instrument at the wrong issues, as I would not have had the interview 
analysis to direct the design.  I would also have had a wealth of extensive data but 
would not necessarily understand the thought processes behind the responses 
given, which may have been detrimental to the knowledge I generated.  Therefore, 
by employing adaptive theory (Layder, 1998), I have been able to develop and 
carry out a well-rounded research project which offers potential avenues to be 
explored while adding to the existing knowledge in this area. 
 
This chapter has considered the methods I utilise in completing my project, with 
particular focus on the reasons for specific choices being made, as well as an 
examination of specific issues with the methods chosen.  The preceding sections 
have examined my use of interviews, in terms of how they capture the narratives 
that individuals use to describe their feelings on the subject of internet privacy.  
This discussion also included an examination of issues around sampling and 
saturation and how these tests of robustness can be employed when carrying out 
qualitative research.  This section was followed by a detailed evaluation of my 
surveys and how they complement the interviews, it also highlighted the 
exploratory nature of my study.  Finally, I considered my role as researcher, 
particularly in relation to my interviews.  Here, I examined issues of emotional 
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labour, as well as the ethical implications of carrying out the interviews.  
Therefore, this chapter has offered a comprehensive examination of the methods I 
utilised in my research, offering a rationale for the choices made, we will now 






Chapter Three: Standing in the way of control 
Introduction 
 
Control is a contentious issue when people are attempting to negotiate the 
boundaries of internet privacy and often leads to concerns around trust in 
companies, and the barriers that exist that reduce the level of control available to 
individuals.  Trust plays a central role here, particularly in terms of shaping 
people’s privacy choices, as their decisions regarding whether to share 
information with a company very much depend upon how trustworthy they 
believe the company to be (Rainie & Duggan, 2015).  In order to feel comfortable 
with a decision to share information (thus reducing their level of privacy), it is 
vital that the person making the choice feels able to trust the company they are 
sharing information with (to a certain extent).  It is important to note that no 
organisation is completely trustworthy, and so individuals should trust with 
caution, recognising that trusting an organisation does not mean that it will 
definitely behave in the desired way (O’Neill, 2002).  If an individual is asked to 
share information with a company that they feel unable to trust, this will make 
them averse to doing so, as they would be giving up control of their 
privacy/information without any faith that it will be treated in the way they 
approve of.  However, if the person trusts the company, they will be less 
concerned in terms of sharing their information as they will believe that though 
they are relinquishing control of that information, it will be treated in the way they 
expect.  In order for individuals to feel comfortable in sharing information with a 
company, they need to believe they can trust that company to treat their 




In order to examine these concerns around control, this chapter answers the 
following questions: 
 
• Do people feel that they have enough control over their information? 
• Would they like to have more control? 
• What barriers exist that reduce individuals’ abilities to have greater 
control? 
• How can people have more control? 
 
To answer these questions, I consider third-party sharing by companies and the 
mistrust this often engenders.  This is particularly problematic to participants who 
feel that they trust companies with their information, only to discover later that 
their information has been shared with other organisations.  This leads to a lack of 
trust in companies, with concerns centring around how companies deal with 
individuals’ data once it has been shared.  This reduction in trust offers an update 
to Starr’s work regarding the concept of ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ (1969 
p.1233) tasks and allows a different perspective regarding individuals sharing 
their data with companies. 
 
To deal with the issue of control more fully, I examine the level of control 
individuals believe they have over their information.  There are a number of issues 
around the theme of control, in particular the belief (shared by many participants) 
that they are unable to access the level of control they desire as companies make 
terms and conditions purposely difficult to understand in a bid to encourage 
individuals to agree to them without paying too much attention.  Broadly, people 
feel that companies do not give them enough information to allow them to make 
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an informed decision regarding sharing data.  People want to know more about 
what will happen to their information, but companies are reticent to do this in case 
it leads to less sharing, however, this is not necessarily the case (Benson, et al., 
2015 and Martin, et al., 2018). 
 
I also examine the role we can play in terms of taking greater responsibility for 
sharing our information, while considering a lack of time and/or knowledge as 
another barrier.  I make the case that given how busy everyone is, with various 
apps and companies vying for our time and attention, it is difficult for anyone to 
truly consider the full implications of sharing information with a company.  Aside 
from this, a number of participants have a false sense of security fostered by the 
fact that they have yet to suffer from any kind of issue regarding their data, 
therefore, they believe the measures they have in place are sufficient to protect 
them. 
 
Finally, I discuss the often-suggested solution of opting out of using social media 
as a way of protecting one’s privacy.  This is not necessarily a straightforward 
option and I offer an opposing view to the privacy paradox which was outlined in 
the literature review.  Instead, I argue that behaviour is not a reliable indicator of 
values when there is no alternative available (O’Neill, 2002), as is the case here 
with social networking sites.  It is also important to remember that privacy is not 
necessarily a case of complete withdrawal, individuals want to have control so 





Is it possible to trust companies? 
 
The issue of trust is fundamental to the relationship between individuals and the 
companies they share their information with.  In this context, issues are generally 
around what companies do with information once it has been given to them, with 
the main concern being third-party sharing.  This is particularly problematic for 
participants, who regard companies with suspicion even at the initial point when 
data is being requested: 
 
“…you know a lot of the time they ask you for information that seems 
superfluous, obviously for marketing”   (GM, female, 37) 
 
“But it's when they start asking your gender, how old you are, and it's like, 
'Do you really need to know this?', but you know why they're doing it, it's 
so they can send you an e-mail, with the products in your sort of, sort of 
range”        (VR, female, 28) 
 
“This is the problem, I think a lot of it is because they’re obviously, they're 
very sneaky and they want to be able to sell your details and they want to 
you know….create a better erm, thing for us like create a better 
experience”       (SM, female, 36) 
 
Individuals are aware of the reasons they believe companies are asking for 
additional information, and as highlighted in the above quotes do not like it.  This 
leads to a lack of trust in the companies that they are engaging with, because they 
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expect their information to be shared with third-parties (as this is common 
practice for many businesses).   
 
The reason that many are unhappy with this situation is not only that they do not 
want their information to be passed on to third-parties, but also, they do not know 
who these third-parties are, and this is a source of uneasiness for them: 
 
“Who the hell are they [third-parties]?  You know…you don't, you've got 
no idea who they are”      (CB, male, 37) 
 
“Yeah, cos it's Facebook, yeah, it's the third-party companies, you don't 
know who they are, because it never states who they are, no matter what 
you go on, it just says, 'third-party companies', you, you don't know who it 
is!”        (VR, female, 28) 
 
“Oh, I don't know to be honest, because I don't know exactly how much 
information would be shared.  I think that they, I'd be happier if I knew 
exactly, like how and what cos it all seems a bit mysterious sometimes as 
well and you think 'Oh yeah, companies sharing information, that's bad', 
but you don't really know that much about it”  (ES, female, 36) 
 
“Also not knowing about the company that has my data, I find it more 
unsettling that a company knows about me but I am unaware of who that 
company is, or what it’s intention is.  I would not mind so much if I was 




Therefore, concerns regarding control over their data (when sharing information 
with companies) are around how widely their information will be shared once 
they have relinquished control of it.  Of particular note are the final two quotes 
above, in which the participants suggest that if they knew more, they might not be 
so concerned; for them, the issue is around the unknown element of what happens 
to their data.   
 
This mirrors Benson, et al.’s study of social networking sites (2015).  They find 
that where users ‘have better knowledge about the use of personal information, 
they are more likely to disclose personal information’ (p.431).  A similar finding 
is also put forth by Martin, et al., (2018) who suggest that it is important for 
businesses to be transparent and tell customers what information they are 
collecting and what they will do with it.  They argue that in offering customers 
greater control (as well as being transparent), they would empower customers, 
who are then more likely to share data with them.  This would certainly go a long 
way to allaying some of the concerns highlighted by my participants, who are 
uncertain about what happens to their data, and often simply want more 
information: 
 
“I think like when you’re filling out something you should, it should be 
quite obvious with who they’re sharing the information with, like it does 
say things like, ‘do you mind sharing with our partner companies’, well 
who are those companies? What do they do? that kind of thing.”  




“I think sometimes, some things should be more obvious.  So, when 
they're asking you about, 'can you do this or can you do that?’  Or ‘do you 
wanna receive information from other people, or this, that and the other'.”  
(CB, male, 37) 
 
The issue of unknown companies is particularly problematic for participants, as 
they cannot gauge whether that company is trustworthy, and therefore whether 
they are happy to cede control of their data to that company.  This is especially 
problematic as it could mean that data is being shared with companies that an 
individual would not choose to engage with: 
 
“What this data will be used for and what the third-parties are, as I may 
not agree with their ethical standards”  (survey respondent, female, 
20-24) 
 
“it being sold to a company that doesn’t align with my personal 
views/values”     (survey respondent, female, 30-34) 
 
This highlights the issue of trust as being more than simply a lack of control or 
consent; individuals are concerned that they may be aligned with companies that 
do not represent their beliefs (or worse, are in opposition to them).  These are 
companies that an individual may not choose to engage with if they were given a 
choice.  However, when information is passed on via another company, choice is 
removed and the individual knows very little about this additional sharing unless 
they are contacted by the third-party.  Broadly, this can lead to feelings of surprise 
and confusion, especially (as is often the case) if it is not clear where the third-
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party obtained their details from.  However, in a situation where the third-party’s 
ethos does not align with the individual’s values, this can be compounded (as 
highlighted in the above quotes).  This is problematic as the person concerned 
may want to remove any link with that third-party but given the lack of 
information regarding where they obtained the information from, it is an 
impossible task.  In some cases, inferences are made, based on other available 
information.  For example, using Facebook ‘Likes’, it is possible for advertisers to 
infer that individuals will like their brand and so suggest to their friends that they 
do (Ward, 2017; Hern, 2017 and Nurse, 2019).  The person concerned remains 
unaware of this, unless one of their friends chooses to ask them about it.  This 
‘hidden’ sharing of information may lead to negative feelings towards the initial 
company as the person feels that they have been misrepresented to the third-party.  
These concerns were echoed in the responses given by those taking part in the 
online survey, who were asked the following question: 
 
Are you worried about your information being passed on or sold to third-parties 
without your knowledge? (Rainie & Duggan, 2016) 
 
The overwhelming majority (85.1%) say that they are worried; this rises to 90.0% 
for males and is just under 85% for females, suggesting that this is a concern that 
many face.  When this is probed further and participants are asked to specify what 
particularly concerns them, almost a third (31.8%) are categorised as ‘Uncertainty 
(lack of control/consent)’.  This is followed by responses which come into the 
‘Spam/cold callers’ category (26.8%).  This confirms the widespread concern 
discussed by interview participants, and again, demonstrates that it is that lack of 
certainty around third-party sharing which is the greatest concern for participants.  
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While the categorisation of ‘Uncertainty’ may appear vague, the comments from 
participants are not: 
 
“Don’t know what the info will be used for.”  
(survey respondent, demographic information not supplied) 
 
“I don’t know who they [third-parties] are and what they will do with my 
data.”      (survey respondent, female, 30-34) 
 
“I don’t know who will access and for what purpose”  
(survey respondent, female, 20-24) 
 
The issue with a lack of information is that it is difficult to trust in situations 
where there is very little information available, because it makes assessing the 
level of risk that we are potentially open to virtually impossible.  In fact, Metzger 
argues that, “Trust is critical to this process [sharing data] because it is believed to 
reduce the perceived costs of such transactions” (2004).  This is important 
because, as O’Neill (2002) argues, we need as much information as possible in 
order to be able to make judgements regarding when to (and when not to) trust 
others.  Therefore, in situations where we are unable to obtain the necessary 
information regarding what a company will do with our information once shared, 
it is impossible to know whether to trust that company or not.  It is important to 
note here that complete trust is not possible; it tends to be conditional, however, it 
is in the interests of companies to increase their trustworthiness (O’Neill, 2002) 




To explore feelings of trust in a more detailed way, survey respondents are asked 
three questions regarding how they feel about the way in which companies deal 
with their information.  The first question asks: 
 
Overall, do you believe that online companies and organisations will keep your 
information secure? (Rainie & Duggan, 2016) 
 
Participants were asked to select one of the following responses: 
 
Yes – all of the time 
Yes – most of the time 
Some of the time 
No - never 
 
In response to this question, over two-thirds of participants say that they only 
believe this to be the case either ‘some of the time’, or ‘never’, with the majority 
selecting ‘some of the time’.  While this overall percentage is mirrored when 
responses are separated by gender, there is less parity when comparing the 
proportions selecting each of the separate options available.  12.9% of females say 
that they ‘never’ believe that organisations will keep their information secure, 
while 19.8% of males agree.  This suggests that males are less trusting of 
companies than females when considering data security, and it is also worth 
noting, that for this question (as well as the two that follow), none of the male 




The above difference between females and males is particularly striking because 
previous research into gender and trust tends to find that either females are less 
trusting than males (Sheehan 1999; Van Slyke, et al., 2002; Rodgers & Harris 
2003 and Fogel & Mehmad 2009), or that there are no real differences in levels of 
trust when considering gender (Kolsaker & Payne, 2002; Sebastianelli, et al., 
2008 and Hernández, et al., 2011).  However, my findings suggest that it is males 
who are less trusting, particularly when considering data being shared with online 
companies and organisations.  There are a number of potential explanations for 
this.   
 
Firstly, many of the previous studies took place when online shopping was in its 
infancy, and at that point in time, the majority of internet users are men.  This 
increased knowledge and use of the internet by men, may lead to them having 
greater trust than women, who are less familiar with this practice.  It is therefore 
possible, that as online shopping has become more commonplace for everyone, 
women are increasingly completing online purchases.  In fact, a recent US survey 
finds that women are making more purchases online than men (First Insight, 
2019).  This increased use of online shopping can lead to increased familiarity and 
experience and therefore potentially increased trust for women, while men may be 
making fewer purchases online due to a lack of trust. 
 
Further, Gong, et al.’s, 2018 study of users (in China) of the popular WeChat 
messaging app, finds that in terms of trust, there is a gender difference in terms of 
the value placed upon different aspects of the relationship with commercial 
technology.  As such, females are more concerned about there being legal and 
technological protection for the user (items such as encryption are important).  
127 
	
However, for males, the reputation of the site and the existing social ties that the 
user has are more important. Therefore, levels of trust are impacted by different 
factors for each gender and this offers an explanation for my finding regarding the 
trust levels of females versus males.  If females are more concerned about legal 
protection, they may be more trusting as they believe that the law offers sufficient 
protection for users.  However, if males are more concerned about the reputation 
of the site, negative media stories regarding social media (for example, 
Greenberg, 2017; Kelion, 2017 and Glance 2018) are likely to have a far greater 
impact upon them and their levels of trust.   
 
An important caveat here is that both of the above studies were carried out in 
Asia, and so may not be generalisable to gender differences in the UK.  Also, my 
survey questions are asking participants about online organisations and 
companies, which can include social networking sites, but also encompasses any 
organisation that individuals deal with online.  Therefore, my participants will not 
necessarily have been thinking solely about social media when answering these 
questions, making comparisons problematic. 
 
Following the initial question regarding trust, survey questions deal with 
information sharing and third-parties explicitly: 
 
Do you trust online companies and organisations that you share your information 




Do you trust online companies and organisations that you share your information 
with not to pass it on to third-parties (unless you have authorised them to do so)? 
(Rainie & Duggan, 2016) 
 
These questions are intended to access greater detail in terms of how participants 
feel when they are considering their own data.  This is in response to many of my 
interview participants who mention the difficulty they feel in worrying about 
privacy if they have not suffered an issue personally, as the below quotes 
demonstrate: 
 
“Erm, but at the moment it's probably OK, cos I haven't experienced 
anything bad I suppose, so I'm not really that cautious of...Probably not, I 
probably wouldn’t think about it.  Unless it's right in your face”  
(CY, female, 24) 
 
“Erm, my anxieties about it are only when I'm aware…I go on day to day 
blissfully unaware of the, the amount of things that are being watched, and 
monitored, and, until it causes a problem, I guess I'd never know it was a 
problem”       (MJ, female, 25) 
 
“Yeah, it's one of those things where yeah, if it's not close to home, then 
it's not close to home and it's something you put to the back of your mind.”  
(TJ, female, 23) 
 
As noted above, interview participants indicated that their data and the privacy of 
it was not necessarily at the forefront of their minds, and so I wanted to ensure 
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that when asking survey respondents about trust, it was not an abstract notion that 
they were considering.  This is why the wording of the trust questions specifically 
asked them to think about the companies and organisations that they share their 
data with.  It was important to ensure (as far as possible) that participants were 
placing themselves and their information at the centre of any questions or 
situations that they were being asked to consider.  The responses received are 
shown in the table below: 
 
Do you trust online companies and organisations that you share your information 
with to only use it for the purpose it was collected? (Rainie & Duggan, 2016) 
 
 
% All (n) % Female (n) % Male (n) 
Don't know/Prefer not to say 2.74 (8) 2.69 (5) 0.00 (0) 
Yes - all of the time 1.71 (5) 2.15 (4) 0.00 (0) 
Yes - most of the time 24.66 (72) 27.42 (51) 20.99 (17) 
Some of the time 48.63 (142) 48.92 (91) 49.38 (40) 
No - never 22.26 (65) 18.82 (35) 29.63 (24) 
Some of the time/never 70.89 (207) 67.74 (126) 79.01 (64) 
Total 1 100.00 (292) 100.00 (186) 100.00 (81) 
(r-square: 0.027, p-value: 0.006) 
 
As with the previous question, what is striking here, is the difference in the levels 
of trust amongst women and men.  When considering how much they trust 
companies to only use their data for the collected purpose, a much larger 
 
1 Please note, this question was not compulsory and so participants were able to move on to the 
next question without providing a response. 
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proportion of men select ‘some of the time’ or ‘never’ than women (79.0% versus 
67.7%).  Again, this highlights a potential gendered perspective when it comes to 
trust, which is, thus far, unexplained in the existing literature.  A potential 
explanation for gender disparity is offered by the discussion above, which 
considers the different factors that play a role in women and men’s trust in social 
networking sites.  As noted, Gong, et al., (2018) find that the reputation of a site is 
more important to men’s level of trust than women’s, therefore it would not be 
unreasonable to suggest that the more the media reports on misuse of customer 
data by large companies, the less trust men are likely to have, while women may 
be less concerned as they believe that the legal protections that exist will continue 
to protect their data. 
 
The final question in the trust section of the survey, asks participants: 
Do you trust online companies and organisations that you share your information 
with not to pass it on to third-parties (unless you have authorised them to do 
so)? (Rainie & Duggan, 2016) 
 
% All (n) % Female (n) % Male (n) 
Don't know/Prefer not to say 3.09 (9) 2.15 (4) 3.70 (3) 
Yes - all of the time 2.75 (8) 4.30 (8) 0.00 (0) 
Yes - most of the time 25.43 (74) 27.42 (51) 22.22 (18) 
Some of the time 42.27 (123) 44.62 (83) 38.27 (31) 
No - never 26.46 (77) 21.51 (40) 35.80 (29) 
Some of the time/never 68.73 (200) 66.13 (123) 74.07 (60) 
Total 2 100.00 (291) 100.00 (186) 100.00 (81) 
Please note, percentages may not add up to 100 exactly, due to rounding              
(r-square: 0.009, p-value: 0.063) 
 
2	Please note, this question was not compulsory and so participants were able to move on to the 




As shown in the above table, the proportion of females answering ‘some of the 
time’ or ‘never’ is broadly in line with the overall proportion of all participants 
selecting one of these responses (66.1% for women, 68.7% of all participants), 
however, for males this is much higher at 74.1%.  As with the previous two 
questions, this suggests that males are less trusting than females when considering 
how companies deal with their data.  As discussed throughout this section, it is 
hard to know exactly why there is a lack of trust when considering males, 
especially as this has not been found in previous studies, however, I offer a 
number of potential explanations for this. 
 
This lack of trust is also seen in interviewee responses and suggests that many 
occupy a position of distrust and it is through this lens that considerations of 
companies are made when information is requested.  A number of interviewees 
express a lack of surprise when discussing companies potentially sharing their 
data with third-parties: 
 
“Erm, yeah, that, I dunno it just kind of pisses me off, like erm, that's, 
that's the thing, it's more like, it's not so much like a I'm really worried 
about what they're gonna do with it, because I'm like well are you gonna 
advertise to me, like neee, I don't really care, but it just irritates me that 
they have that information and like erm it really winds me up erm, like 
cynical kind of targeted marketing, when stuff pops up on your Facebook 
feed and on like YouTube, where it's like erm where it's targeted, stuff that 




“I feel that the amount I share with companies, is perfectly legitimate.  I 
think the amount they share with other companies is not! [HEF: I see, 
yeah] Err, I always look for the box that says, 'Do you want us to share 
with third-parties?' and also the trick question they put on there, is 'Tick 
this box if you want us to share with third-parties'. [HEF: Yeah] or 'Tick 
this box if you don't' and they change it around, or they'll ask the same 
question in two different ways [HEF: Yes] and that's, that I think's really 
naughty.”       (DC, male, 36) 
 
As illustrated in the above quotes, participants often express a dislike for it, but 
are ultimately not surprised by the possibility that companies might share their 
data with unknown third-parties.  They are aware of the potential ‘tricks’ being 
used by companies, particularly in terms of the opt-out boxes.  This coupled with 
the survey responses discussed previously suggests that individuals may be 
entering into relationships and interactions with companies from a base of 
mistrust and only beginning to trust them if and when they demonstrate that they 
are worthy of that trust. 
 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, trust is a key factor in the 
relationship between customers and companies.  However, the results of my study 
suggest that although trust is somewhat lacking, individuals are still sharing their 
information with companies.  This hints at feelings of resignation amongst 
individuals and highlights how sharing data has become a part of our everyday 
lives (this will be discussed fully later in this chapter).  Therefore, to opt out of 
sharing information has the potential to make our lives less convenient and could 
potentially lead to us missing out on certain things.  As such, it is often with an air 
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of resignation and frustration that individuals share information with companies; 
we now turn to Chauncey Starr’s work (1969) around the acceptability of risk to 
examine the potential explanation for this frustration.  At the time of Starr’s 
writing, this tended to relate to the government or official bodies, however, I 
suggest that this is relevant to the sharing of information with companies, 
especially third-parties. 
 
Starr’s concept of voluntary and involuntary activities offers an explanation as to 
why individuals are frustrated with the further sharing of their data.  In their eyes, 
they have decided to share their data, based on the information available and 
whether they believe the level of risk involved in sharing that information is 
acceptable.  Current data sharing practices, I suggest, offer a contemporary 
example of Starr’s voluntary activity, in that the decision-maker (the individual) 
has the information required to make the decision and is choosing the course of 
action that they subsequently take.  However, the dynamics of the situation 
change when companies go on to share customer data with third-parties; this is 
when it becomes problematic.  When companies share data beyond their original 
request (generally with third-parties), they become the decision-maker and the 
individual loses control over their information.  When this situation arises, it 
becomes an involuntary activity for those who initially shared their data.  If the 
data is being shared without their consent, the individual concerned is excluded 
from the decision-making process, but not from the consequences of that decision.  
This is important because Starr suggests that assessing risk is a key part of this.  
Therefore, a company sharing an individual’s data is likely to perceive very 
different risks and benefits to doing so than the individual themselves and so in 
this case, makes a different decision.  A final point raised by Starr which is 
134 
	
relevant here is that, ‘we are loathe to let others do unto us what we happily do to 
ourselves’ (1969 p.1235), suggesting that it is the loss of control which is the 
issue for those involved, and reinforcing the point made earlier, that if individuals 
knew more, they may agree to share more information.  Therefore the frustration 
felt by individuals is not that the information has been shared, for they may have 
chosen to share it themselves, but that they are not able to make the decision at the 
outset; someone else makes it for them and this removes their control and leads to 
feelings of mis-trust. 
 
There are, however, issues with Starr’s dichotomy of voluntary and involuntary 
action and Douglas and Wildavsky’s examination of risk (1983) offers a useful 
counter point here.  They argue that this distinction assumes that risks can be 
easily categorised as voluntary (and therefore acceptable) or involuntary 
(unacceptable).  This could lead to moral judgements around who is to blame 
when risks are taken, depending upon which side of the boundary the activity 
falls.  They argue that carrying this through to its logical conclusion, it is possible 
that all risks would be deemed to be involuntary, with all of those affected seeking 
compensation through the law.   
 
While the point regarding the categorisation of risks as voluntary or involuntary is 
valid, and offers an interesting perspective, the suggestion that we are moving 
towards a situation whereby everything is deemed to be an involuntary risk has 
not come to pass.  It is also worth noting that my participants are aware of where 
the boundary is for them, in terms of when they were making choices and when 




“I feel that the amount I share with companies, is perfectly legitimate.  I 
think the amount they share with other companies is not!” (DC, male, 36) 
 
When this participant decides what information to share with a company 
(voluntary activity), he is in control, however, he loses control when that company 
goes on to share the information with a third-party (involuntary activity).  This 
moment, when a situation goes from acceptable to problematic is clearly defined 
by this participant. 
 
Another important point is that Starr suggested that when making risk-related 
decisions, everyone has their own personal criteria.  Therefore, while many 
participants articulated the idea that there is a line for them, what counts as being 
‘over the line’ very much depends upon the individual.  Participants discuss when 
sharing data becomes an issue for them: 
 
“Err, with a company I've sign-….I usually think, err, that there's a line 
err, abou-….about the amount of information I should give them, erm, in, 
dependent upon, depending upon the nature of the transaction erm, or the 
nature of my relationship with them.”   (PW, male, 37) 
 
“So, it feels kind of like it's crossed a line for you?” (HEF) 
“Yeah, yeah but it's a line that you can't control, well that's what it feels 
like, see I've put it into something that's been passed on, but I can't, when I 
can't recall where that's been, or where that's stemmed from, that's an 




I argue that this demonstrates how participants are aware of there being voluntary 
and involuntary activities, when considering sharing data with companies, even 
though they would not use those words to articulate it.  There is a feeling that they 
have control and the ability to make decisions up to a certain point, but once they 
are past that point (usually once they have shared information), it is out of their 
control and there is nothing they can do.  I suggest that this line represents the 
boundary between voluntary and involuntary activities, which suggests an accord 
with Douglas and Wildavsky’s suggestion that the boundary between voluntary 
and involuntary risks is not fixed.  Issues of control will be dealt with more fully 
in the following section. 
 
Another key factor in terms of trust is reputation.  As noted above, previous 
research suggests that when making trust-related decisions, reputation is more 
likely to impact men than it is women.  Broadly speaking, where a company has a 
good reputation it is likely to be thought of as reliable, and therefore trustworthy, 
while for those with a poor reputation, the opposite is true (Swaminathan, et al., 
1999; Jarvenpaa, et al., 1999 and Metzger 2004).  Previous experience with a 
company also plays a role and, in this way, when discussing the type of company, 
some interviewees feel that large well-known brands are more trustworthy than 
smaller companies, or individuals. 
 
“Yeah, it's just not worth, you know, cos the thing is, is most apps are 
made by people, not, not all of them are made by companies, so I tend to 
be a bit more careful of the ones that are just done by people, do not know 
why, cos companies are probably the worst for taking your 
information.  You know, you always know it, but for some reason, 
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because it's a company you feel more trusted to the company, when it's 
probably, you're more trusted to the person, cos one, you know, Joe on his 
own in the corner, on his computer, trying to make an app, or you got like, 
you know, Atari, a big, massive company going, [sings] 'we're gonna steal 
all your data'.”      (VR, female, 28) 
 
“Erm, I feel, yeah, I feel pretty comfortable but err when I know and you 
know it sounds kind of really middle-aged or something but big British 
brands, you know, I, I feel like they wouldn't do anything, which is really 
naive, you know, wouldn’t be sharing anything, or they wouldn’t have any 
problems, which is obviously not true, cos you hear about it all the time, 
leaks and you know, people getting hold of things.  But I feel more secure 
doing that, I think it's the co-, the, the companies where it's quite new or 
erm from overseas, or you've just not heard of them before and you think, 
'I’m not really sure, erm what their policies would be or, what the deal is' 
and that, erm is when I would feel less inclined to share information with 
them.”       (ES, female, 36) 
 
Interestingly, participants discuss these feelings of trust towards established, well-
known companies, but at the same time recognise their naiveté, because these are 
the very companies that have the most to gain from collecting and selling 
customer data.  This often makes people laugh at the ‘trap’ they have fallen into in 
trusting these companies, despite them being much more likely to sell customer 
data.  This does not necessarily cause a great amount of concern, as this is realised 
‘in the moment’ of the interview, and more often than not, the interviewee in 
question simply shrugs this realisation off, as if to say, ‘but what can you do?’.  
This also highlights the role that reputation can play in generating feelings of 
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trust, with both women and men, even when individuals realise that those they 
trust are potentially the least deserving of it. 
 
Just as trust is key to decisions regarding which companies to engage and share 
data with, so too is the level of control an individual feels they have in a particular 
situation, as hinted at above.  Often individuals do not feel that they have enough 
control over what happens to their data and want more.  The next section will deal 
with the issue of control. 
 
How do issues of control manifest themselves? 
 
As discussed previously, there is a feeling amongst my participants that they do 
not have enough control over what happens to their data once they have shared it 
with a company.  Many recognise that we can only ever be as in control of our 
data as companies allow us to be.  Raynes-Goldie (2012) discusses Facebook’s 
privacy settings and the lack of control offered to users of the site.  She argues 
that ‘The design of social media does not make the data collection obvious, nor 
does it provide any method to opt out.’ (p.70-71).  Interestingly, when research 
offers recommendations to companies, it puts forth that customers are likely to 
share more information when they perceive a company as transparent and 
allowing them greater levels of control (Benson, et al., 2015 and Martin, et al., 
2018).  This advice has yet to be heeded though, as individuals still feel that 
companies work hard to maintain control over data, particularly in terms of 





There is a general belief that companies purposely make terms and conditions 
documents difficult to understand or utilise other strategies to make the task of 
opting out a more onerous one.  Indeed, Raynes-Goldie (2012) highlights this 
issue in her work, putting forth that privacy settings on Facebook are confusing to 
users, making them so difficult to understand that users are not sure what they are 
agreeing to when they join the site.  This hints at the trust issues discussed above, 
as individuals have little faith in companies to act in their best interests, 
particularly as there is so much money to be made from selling customer data.  
Given the difficulty in understanding terms and conditions and so on, many 
participants speak of how it is much easier to agree without reading or 
understanding them: 
 
“Yeah, I think if maybe they just like kind of like really like concisely like 
summarised the key points, rather than like all the jargon, then like, yeah 
that would make it easier and you would know what you’re accepting but I 
think because you don’t want to read through all of it and sometimes you 
don’t understand it, you just press accept. Erm, so I think, yeah, like in in 
that sense like maybe it could be a bit clearer and a bit easier language.”  
(SA, female, 23) 
 
“Yeah, well the thing is, you give your information to, to their 
organisation because you agree to their terms and contracts, and there we 
go, the most, the, the biggest lie on the internet is have you read and 
agreed with the terms and conditions?  Because who is actually going to 
actually read if you put it in a Word document like six pages of terms and 




For my participants, there is no expectation that anyone reads the terms and 
conditions, although they are not alone in this.  Raynes-Goldie (2012) cites Scott 
Buchanan (an intellectual property lawyer) and his suggestion that it is 
unreasonable for Facebook to expect that users read their Terms of Service, given 
their length and complexity.  Therefore, when dealing with companies, 
convenience plays a role, as per the quotes above, it is often too difficult or 
bothersome to make sense of the terms and conditions.  Again, this is felt to be no 
accident, in that businesses make it much more difficult for customers to fully 
appreciate what happens to their data once they have shared it. 
 
In terms of third-party sharing, it is impossible for individuals to either know who 
holds data about them or to make amendments to incorrect data.  This is 
problematic because when considering data control, the onus is usually placed 
upon individuals to take the first step when there is a problem (Gadzheva, 2008).  
However, it is impossible for individuals to begin to address this problem if they 
do not know who the source of the incorrect data is.  This is particularly troubling 
as individuals have a right to ensure that data held about them is correct (Data 
Protection Act 2018) but are prevented from exercising this right.  This can lead 
to a power imbalance between those collecting and storing the data and those to 
whom the data actually relates, whereby the data collectors have much more 
knowledge and control over what happens to the data (Coll, 2014).  This power 
imbalance will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter. 
 
As discussed above, there is a suspicion amongst interviewees that companies are 
attempting to collect superfluous information from them in order to sell it to third-
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parties, therefore, survey respondents are asked how they feel about the amount of 
information that companies collect from them.  73.3% of participants believe that 
the amount being collected is unreasonable, and of those who believed that it is 
reasonable, 83.7% would not want to share further information.  There is an air of 
frustration when I ask interviewees how they feel about the amount of information 
that they share with companies. 
 
“I'm in control as much as I feel I can be.”    (DC, male, 36) 
 
“Erm, I should decide who gets to see kind of what.  Erm despite me being 
very open about everything, I still, it's me who decides to, to be like that 
and, and to, to share whatever I want to share…”  (DM, female, 31) 
 
As reflected in these, quotes, there is broadly a feeling that we should be able to 
decide what we want to share with companies and refuse to share anything that we 
are not comfortable sharing.  Many of my interview participants feel that they 
share too much with companies but are unable to take action which would change 
this.  This was one of many barriers described by my participants, which hinder 
them in being able to have the level of control that they desire. 
 
Despite the erosion of control, it is of central importance to individuals’ 
perceptions of privacy (Culnan 1993; Nippert-Eng 2010 and Sujon & Johnston 
2017), particularly as they want to be able to manage their privacy in a 
meaningful way; it is vital that we are able to control who has access to us in our 
daily lives.  When our privacy is invaded (in the case of cold callers, for example), 
we are reminded that we are only afforded privacy when someone else allows us 
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to have it.  It is not enough for us to simply decide that we want to be left alone 
and we are often reminded that we lack control or power over our own privacy.  
This is why there is such an issue around third-parties being sold our data, 
because it allows unknown organisations not only to know things about us, but to 
then invade our privacy by interrupting us at times when we would like to be left 
alone (Nippert-Eng, 2010).  It also hints at the power imbalance between the 
person whose privacy is being invaded and whoever is invading it; in this 
situation, those being interrupted have low privacy and thus, low power as they 
are unable to control their own accessibility.  This is becoming more important as 
we no longer need to occupy the same space to be able to interact with each other 
and therefore, it is much easier to be interrupted in our daily lives (regardless of 
whether we welcome this or not).  It also serves to remind us that while we have 
acted in good faith, in trusting a company with our information (thus ceding 
control over it), this trust has not been repaid. 
 
This issue of access relates to more than simply others being able to access us and 
our attention when we do not want to be disturbed, it also relates to who has 
access to our data, which again, is why third-party access to our data is so 
troublesome to many.  It speaks to the reduction in privacy that we are facing, in 
that more and more is known about us by a greater number of individuals and 
groups; the issue here is that we lack knowledge of those groups and so cannot 
decide whether we want them to access our data (Nissenbaum, 2010 and Proferes, 





To explore this concept, survey respondents are asked the following: Do you think 
online companies and organisations currently provide you with enough 
information about what happens to the data you share with them?  (Rainie & 
Duggan, 2016, p.7) 




(r-square: 0.043, p-values: 0.002-0.044) 
 
It is clear that the overwhelming majority (82.9%) say that they do not, this is 
especially pertinent, when considering the responses given by different age 
groups.  As indicated on the graph, the proportion of participants selecting ‘No’ 
increases with each age group, peaking with those aged 30-34 (90.9%).  While 
there is a dip in the proportion of participants saying that they do not think 
companies give them enough information in the oldest age group, it is a relatively 
 
3 Please note, percentages do not add up to 100 as those responding ‘Don’t know’ or ‘Prefer not to 
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small reduction (1.52%), and so not enough to suggest radically different opinions 
in those aged 35-40.  The overall results are mirrored in a commercial study 
carried out by Groopman and Etlinger (2015) in which many of those taking part 
express a wish to know more about what companies do with their data.  This is 
echoed in comments from interview participants, who feel that companies could 
do more: 
 
“I think sometimes, some things should be more obvious.  So, when 
they're asking you about, 'can you do this or can you do that?’  Or ’Do you 
wanna receive information from other people, or this, that and the 
other'.  That, rather than that stupid little micro-font at the bottom with that 
little tick-box, erm that should be more obvious, as maybe a pop-up box or 
something like that.”       (CB, male, 37) 
 
This links with the work of Phelps, et al. (2000), whose study of attitudes towards 
mail order companies with regard to privacy finds that many participants want 
more information about how to have their details removed from mailing lists.  At 
this time, the idea of companies sharing their mailing lists with other companies 
was unacceptable to many of those taking part.  Phelps, et al. found that 
consumers’ level of control over further dissemination of their data is one of the 
main concerns and in the context of this study, it is linked to consumers believing 
that they receive more advertising mail. 
 
When my survey respondents were asked: Do you feel that you are in control of 
your data and what it is used for? (Madden, 2014). 85.7% say that they feel in 
control only ‘sometimes’, ‘rarely’ or ‘never’, with 10.0% of participants saying 
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that they ‘never’ feel in control of their data.  This is comparable with the results 
of research carried out by the Pew Research Centre (Madden & Rainie, 2015), 
who find that 88% of Americans feel they had ‘some’, ‘not much’ or ‘no control 
at all’, with 13% believing they have ‘no control at all’.  Although the response 
categories are not exactly the same as those utilised in my survey, this suggests 
that feelings of having little control are potentially widespread. 
 
To gauge feelings around control, participants were asked whether they would 
like to have more control over their information and who has access to it, again, 
the majority said that they would like to have more control (86.5% of all 
participants).  While this was broadly mirrored when breaking down the responses 
by gender, it is worth noting that there was an interesting trend when separating 
the responses by age group, as shown below: 
 
4 
(r-square: 0.02, p-values: 0.000-0.997) 
 
 
4 Please note, percentages do not add up to 100 as those responding ‘Don’t know’ or ‘Prefer not to 



























When examining those selecting the ‘Yes, I would like more control’ option, there 
is an increase of 11% from those aged 25-29 to those aged 35-40, suggesting that 
as individuals get older (from their mid-twenties onwards) they want more control 
over their data.  However, this increase does not appear to be mirrored in 
responses to the previous question, which asked whether individuals feel in 
control of their data and who they share it with.  For that question, it was those 
aged 25-29 who were the most doubtful about when they have control (in terms of 
those selecting ‘sometimes’, ‘rarely’ or ‘never’).  This is surprising, given the 





(r-square: 0.01, p-values: 0.211-0.779) 
 
Those aged 25-29 are the only group where the proportion of those saying that 
they ‘rarely’ feel in control of their data is higher than those saying that they 
‘sometimes’ feel in control.  This is counter-intuitive, as this age group has the 
 
5 Please note, percentages do not add up to 100 as those responding ‘Don’t know’ or ‘Prefer not to 



























lowest proportion saying that they would like more control over their data and it 
would be expected that those who feel the least in control would also want more 
control.  However, it may be that while participants recognise that they have little 
control, they are resigned to this, accepting (to a certain degree) that to have more 
control may lead to less convenience.  It is also possible that although individuals 
feel that they are lacking in control, they have little choice but to trust these 
companies and supply the requested information, because there is no practical 
way of avoiding doing so (O’Neill, 2002).  The belief that being more concerned 
about privacy could lead to missing out on some parts of everyday life will be 
examined in the next section. 
It is also important to consider that while issues around third-parties cause 
concern for individuals, it tends to be at the level of annoyance or frustration, 
rather than being something which demands a change in participants’ behaviour.  
However, this may have more to do with feelings of resignation, rather than a lack 
of concern.  This could be a sign of pragmatism, in that individuals believe that 
there is little to be gained from worrying about how little control they have, given 
that there is little that they can do to change that. 
 
When we discuss control, interviewees tend to focus on social media, while the 
subject of sharing information with companies does not seem to be something that 
they think of until prompted.  This is potentially because individuals feel they are 
able to control the information that they post on social media and so this is more 
at the forefront of their mind, whereas they are less able to control the information 
they share with companies.  It is also possible that the effects of losing control of 
data on social media sites would be more readily felt, and this is often what gains 
attention in the media, therefore this is at the forefront of individuals’ minds when 
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considering this issue.  In line with this, the next section will focus on the various 
barriers that individuals face when attempting to have more control over their 
data.  
 
Which barriers restrict control? 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the majority of my participants feel they 
have lost control over what happens to their data and would like to regain some.  
In an attempt to unpack this, survey respondents were asked what they believe 
stops them from having more control and provided a free-text response which 
were then categorised as follows:  
  % All (n) 
Companies don't allow control 44.00 (33) 
Lack of awareness/transparency 17.33 (13) 
Impossible to participate in digital culture without sharing info 14.67 (11) 
Misc. 13.33 (10) 
Legal issues 10.67 (8) 
Total responses 6 100.00 (75) 
 
Typical responses from participants were: 
 
“…because the business model of online companies is set up to limit the 
amount of control”    (survey respondent, female, 30-34) 
 
  “Companies don’t give me control”  (survey respondent, male, 35-40) 
 





 “It [control] is not offered, not possible or accessible”  
(survey respondent, male, 25-29) 
“It is simply not a possible option.  Everything that is digitized, automated, 
and leaves a digital trail will ultimately risk being out of my control”  
(survey respondent, female, 25-29) 
 
“…you know, you’re clearly not in control, it’s, it’s a false sense, it, kind 
of gives you the sense of being in control and in reality you’re not, in 
reality they [companies] are in control”   (TP, female, 40) 
 
This suggests that there is an issue in terms of the company-customer relationship, 
particularly in terms of not only the level of control that individuals believe they 
have, but whether it is possible for them to access greater levels of control, should 
they wish to.  As discussed previously, the advice to companies to tell customers 
more about what happens to their data (thus allowing them greater control) is not 
being heeded.  This is because companies fear that if they offer customers the 
ability to opt out of sharing data, they may do just that and the company will lose 
revenue (Turow et al., 2015).  Instead, where companies offer a mechanism for 
customers to opt out, it is often very difficult to find out what action is required to 
do so and as such, individuals are essentially required to make a conscious effort 
to achieve the level of control (and therefore privacy) that they desire (Nippert-
Eng, 2010).   
 
As examined previously, individuals feel that companies do as much as possible 
to make it difficult for them to opt out of sharing data and want companies to 
make opting out much more obvious and explicit.  This lack of information from 
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companies, is highlighted in responses to the following question: Do you feel that 
you know enough to be able to fully agree to what happens to your data after you 
give it to an online company or organisation? 75.9% said they do not, and when 
this group were asked why not, the free-text responses given were categorised as 
follows:  
  % All (n) 
Lack of transparency (them) 43.30 (83) 
Lack of knowledge (me) 42.27 (79) 
Hacks/no guarantee of privacy/security 10.31 (20) 
Misc. 4.12 (9) 
Total responses7 
 
 100.00 (191) 
 
Many believe the issue lies with companies simply not giving them enough 
information to allow them to make an informed decision when sharing their data. 
This suggests that not only are individuals making decisions with incomplete 
knowledge, but they are aware that this is the case.  In essence, they are not really 
choices, as those tasked with making a decision are not able to do so as they do 
not have the necessary information to make a fully informed decision.  Again, this 
could lead to feelings of resignation for individuals who feel that despite their best 
efforts, they are unable to make a meaningful decision. 
 
Related to this, another area in which it is felt that companies could do more in 
terms of clarity is the terms and conditions that potential customers must agree to 
before they can fully engage with a company.  Numerous participants describe the 
 




complexity and length of these statements as being off-putting to them.  In fact, 
when survey participants were asked whether they have read terms and conditions 
before joining social media sites in the past, a mere 5.8% said that they had.  
There is no expectation that anyone reads these documents; they are seen as being 
overly long and complicated (which is deemed a purposeful strategy of the 
company, rather than an unintended consequence).  While discussing the topic of 
trust, O’Neill (2002) points out that although it is important that individuals have 
access to information in order to make an informed decision regarding whether to 
trust an organisation, it must be relevant.  If companies merely supply a large 
volume of additional information, in a bid to be transparent, this could become 
noise which is just as unhelpful in the decision-making process as too little 
information.  Therefore, in situations where there is a flood of information, it 
becomes too onerous on the individual involved to wade through the entirety of it 
in order to make a sound judgement.  The following quotes are indicative of the 
general comments being made by participants: 
 
 “It’s so confusing!  This is the problem, I think a lot of it is because 
they’re obviously, they’re very sneaky and they want to be able to sell 
your details…I think they need to make it a lot clearer as to what you’re 
agreeing to and who can see your details.”   (SM, female, 36) 
 
“losing control is part of the t&cs”  (Survey respondent, female, 20-24) 
 
“We are not given the option of control.  Design limits our agency”  




However, it would be unfair to suggest that the blame should be placed with 
companies alone, and other barriers have been identified by those taking part in 
both the survey and interviews.  Participants are aware of their own role in terms 
of increasing the level of control they have.  This is clear if we consider the 
responses to the survey question: ‘Do you feel that you know enough to be able to 
fully agree to what happens to your data after you give it to an online company or 
organisation?’  While many respondents (selecting ‘No’) say that the issue is due 
to companies not being transparent enough (43.3%), almost as many recognised 
that they could do more (42.3 %).  Typical comments from participants include 
the following: 
 
“I don’t keep up with technology”  (survey respondent, female, 35-40) 
 
“I don’t know enough to understand terms of service fully”  
(survey respondent, demographic information not supplied) 
 
“It all feels too complex to understand” (survey respondent, female, 30-34) 
 
“I’m not as much of an expert in privacy and data sharing/collection as I 
could be”     (survey respondent, female, 25-29) 
 
This view is not unique amongst those completing the survey, and my interview 
participants share these sentiments: 
 
“I just don't really understand it and it just changes a lot and you see a lot 
of the stories about, you know check, they've changed it, they've updated 
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the app so, make sure that you're doing this, or turn this off, and it kind of 
baffles me a little bit.”     (ES, female, 36) 
 
“Yeah, I think if maybe they just…really like concisely…summarised the 
key points, rather than like all the jargon, then…that would make it easier 
and you would know what you’re accepting but I think because you don’t 
want to read through all of it and sometimes you don’t understand it, you 
just press accept.”      (SA, female, 23) 
 
As previously discussed, it has almost become a social norm not to read the terms 
and conditions, and many state that they do not read them, either because they do 
not understand them, or they do not have the time required: 
 
“It’s in the T&C’s but I never read it” (Survey respondent, female, 20-24) 
 
 “Not having the time to read the T&Cs all the time”  
(Survey respondent, male, 30-34) 
 
“Most of the time, right, even in life, anyone, most of the time you’re in a 
rush, you're never just sat down doing something, you're in a rush to, I 
don't know, you're late for work…and you're just doing it [HEF: yeah], 
just err, and you're not even thinking about it, like, paying bills.”  
(VR, female, 28) 
 
Individuals’ admission that they do not read terms and conditions suggests that 
they do not care about their privacy, however, the situation is more complicated 
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than it seems.  These responses suggest that rather than people not wanting to 
make the effort to read terms and conditions, it is more a case of them feeling 
constrained by their lack of knowledge or time.  The last of the above quotes in 
particular, draws attention to a feeling of being overloaded that many people have.  
There are many different things competing for an individual’s attention, that 
signing up to a new online service (and agreeing to terms and conditions) happens 
while they are engaged in another task.  This raises questions regarding the issue 
of agreeing to terms and conditions when not giving it our full attention.  In the 
moment of attempting to access a website for a particular purpose (to pay a bill or 
access a game, for example), does the immediate task of accessing the website 
become more important than the principles of wanting greater control over one’s 
information and thus privacy?  It is also important to remember that when there 
are few alternatives (if any), we may behave in ways that appear to be in direct 
opposition to our values (O’Neill, 2002), however, we can only act on our values, 
when those options are open to us.  This links with Bourdieu’s notion of the 
‘choice of the necessary’ (1984 p.372), in which he describes how conditions of 
necessity undermine other concerns, therefore in this case, the individual 
concerned is valuing the necessity of paying a bill (for example) more than their 
underlying privacy concerns.  In this situation (and many other similar ones), the 
person involved is adapting to what is possible, and so the level of privacy they 
require is not possible, but the ability to deal with household administration 
without needing to physically go to the bank is possible (and broadly, preferable).  
As such, terms and conditions are not something that tend to draw our attention 
away from other items and so they are more likely to be agreed on in the 




“Terms and conditions are often very lengthy and, even with the best will 
in the world, it can feel time consuming to read fully.  I admit this is my 
failure!”     (Survey respondent, female, 35-40) 
 
“Terms and conditions are very long and wordy.  Often in legal language I 
don’t understand or don’t have the time to understand.”  
(Survey respondent, female, 25-29) 
 
“Things are typically buried very deep in privacy notices.  Whilst I am 
confident enough to find my way around one, it’s typically too much effort 
to go looking when I just need to get a task done.”  
(Survey respondent, male, 30-34) 
 
Individuals recognise that they could do more in order to protect their privacy but 
are hampered because they do not have the knowledge or time required to be able 
to protect their privacy in a meaningful way.  This has been noted in previous 
studies, whereby when individuals are given Privacy Policies or Terms of Service 
to read in an experimental setting, they either skip reading them altogether, or 
where they do open them on their screen, it is for such a brief period of time, that 
they could not possibly have read them (Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018).  The 
researchers state that: 
 
‘…information overload [is]…a significant negative predictor of reading 
TOS [Terms of Service] upon sign-up, when TOS changes and when PP 
[Privacy Policy] changes.  Qualitative findings suggest that participants 
view policies as a nuisance, ignoring them to pursue the ends of digital 
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production without being inhibited by the means’ (Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch, 
2018 p.1) 
 
In other words, terms and conditions are seen as an obstacle that individuals want 
to get past, in order to carry out a particular task on the site.  They do not want to 
have to stop part-way through the process of accessing a site of interest, to 
consider the implications of doing so.  This is particularly problematic when the 
site being accessed is related something enjoyable, such as a social media site, or 
an entertainment website.  On these occasions, people are accessing the site for 
entertainment purposes, and so do not want to have to consider any potentially 
serious implications for something that does not feel serious.   
 
In fact, it has been theorised that it is actually impossible for individuals to engage 
in the self-management of their privacy in the way they are told that they should 
(Turow, 2003; Jensen & Potts, 2004; McDonald & Cranor, 2008; Vitak, 2012 and 
Hoofnagle & Urban, 2014;).  The burden placed on individuals to be responsible 
managers of their own data privacy are deemed to be unrealistic for anyone with 
responsibilities outside of this (which is everyone).  Obar, having read various 
recommendations for how individuals should be responsible data privacy 
managers in the USA stated, ‘I do not see how anyone can escape the conclusion 
that the digital citizen must have the appetite of a data miner and infinite time at 
their disposal.’  (2015 p.12). 
 
This suggests that the bar is set so high, that it is impossible for individuals to 
reach it, which in itself could become a self-fulfilling prophecy as people become 
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disheartened with their efforts to maintain the level of privacy that they would 
like.  This is highlighted in the below quotes from interview participants: 
 
“I'm not really sure…but yeah, maybe if I knew how to work better with 
my privacy.  If I knew how to manage it, I probably would.  If I knew, 
yeah, if I knew there was ways I could stop people, and it was simple, 
[both laugh] - not that, not that technically, you know, not gonna start 
coding everything that I write to the internet!  But if it was a simple, way 
of managing my privacy that I was made aware of, I probably would for 
no reason other than it was a way of managing my privacy, not because 
I'm, I feel like I'm being targeted for something, but just because I could, I 
probably would.”      (MJ, female, 25) 
 
 “Are you generally concerned about who has access to or knowledge of 
your activity on the internet and social media?” (HEF) 
“Yeah, I am, I mean I s'pose it's, it's one of those things where I, I don't 
really understand exactly how the privacy settings work, and I don't know 
whether I've actually done it properly, or not”   (SG, male, 31) 
 
These quotes highlight the difficulty for individuals to really understand whether 
the efforts they are making are having an impact at all, it seems to be too 
complicated to enact the level of privacy they would like, but even if they do 
manage to do so, they are never sure whether what they have done is enough.  The 
first participant makes several mentions of the process being simple, she talks 
about wanting to manage her privacy, but only if it is something that is not 
beyond her capabilities and does not require her to learn new skills.  This issue is 
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highlighted in work carried out by the Pew Research Centre (Shelton, et al., 
2015), who find that overall 22% of all adults surveyed had changed their 
behaviour to protect their privacy following Edward Snowden’s revelations 
regarding government surveillance programs.  When they queried why individuals 
had not done so, 54% say that it is because they believe that it would be 
‘somewhat’ or ‘very difficult’ to find tools or strategies that they could use to 
increase their privacy either online or on their mobile phones (p 5).  This suggests 
that MJ is not alone in her concerns regarding the skills required for an individual 
to increase their privacy. 
 
Aside from lacking the necessary time to protect their privacy, another barrier 
here is that individuals may develop a false sense of security if they have not 
suffered an issue with regard to their privacy.  This can lead them to believe that 
they are not at risk, and that they do not need to take any additional measures.  
This is something my interview participants are aware of: 
 
“That's it, it's yeah, it's saying, ' Oh, that's never gonna happen to me, I've 
been fine for 23 years so far, why's it ever gonna happen now?  I'm not 
gonna do anything different, I'm not gonna change my behaviour, so I'm 
not at risk.'  That's, that's such a ignorant perspective, but it's true and I 
think that's what a lot of people do, it's just yeah.  We just don't stop and 
think.  And also, busy schedules as well, you don't, do you?”  




“Err, no I’ve never had any like credit card hacked or anything like that 
either, so I guess, maybe again, if that happened to me, it may make me 
feel a bit more nervous about it”    (TS, female, 37) 
 
Both of the above quotes suggest that these participants feel that the measures 
they have taken must be working to a certain extent, as they have yet to suffer an 
issue, this can lead to individuals feeling that they do not need to take any further 
action to protect their privacy.  In fact, the second quote suggests that if an issue 
occurred, it may be enough to encourage this participant to take further action, but 
until that happens, she is happy enough to continue with the measures she has in 
place.  This is a common theme amongst interviewees, who (as discussed above), 
do not want to be burdened with worry about their privacy, especially as there are 
few options available to them if they want more privacy. 
 
When discussing potential actions that could be taken to increase privacy a 
number of participants spoke of the only real option being to close down social 
media accounts, or make other similar ‘drastic’ changes, but these are felt to be 
unrealistic, particularly because the use of these sites has become a part of 
everyday life.  This is interesting, because this is often purported to be the 
solution when individuals complain about losing control over their privacy; critics 
suggest that rather than complaining, they should simply delete their account.  
However, this is not the straightforward option it appears to be, particularly as 
these sites have seamlessly become part of the fabric of my participants’ daily 
lives, and so to suggest that they simply do not engage with them anymore is to 
suggest that they make their lives unnecessarily inconvenient (Nissenbaum, 2010; 
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Vertesi, 2015; Hargittai & Marwick, 2016 and Anthony & Stark 2018).  
Interviewees recognise this: 
 
“I do feel like modern living basically, is not conducive to erm caring or 
doing anything above the minimum [about my privacy]” (GM, female, 37) 
“Yeah, I think, I think it’s just one of those things, because we, we're fed 
so much information, and I think where technology has become such an 
integral part of our lives, it's almost hard to look at it as something that 
might be sort of dangerous or problematic to privacy and things like 
that.  I mean, privacy is one of many other issues that you could face 
[HEF: Of course, yeah].  But I think because it's such a integral part of, 
particularly, well of my life, like I said, I wake up and look at, the first 
thing I do is look at social media sites, which is sad.  [HE laughs].  Erm, 
that it’s hard to then take a step back and go, 'oh, actually I should think 
about this, this this' because it's become so normalised” (TJ, female, 23) 
 
As these quotes suggest, my participants find that using technology has become a 
part of their lives that they are unwilling to manage without; they enjoy the 
benefits of using social media, and so do not necessarily want to give up using it.  
Facebook, for example offers various ‘social benefits’ (Raynes-Goldie, 2012 
p.213) and as such some participants speak of people being considered weird if 
they were not on Facebook.  This is also highlighted by Vertesi (2015) when she 
attempted to hide her forthcoming pregnancy from social media sites and found 
that, while it is possible, it is very inconvenient, and at times aroused suspicion 
from others.  She states, ‘Thus, avoiding data capture…can appear antisocial, 
immoral or criminal.  There is no evasion without repercussion’ (n.p.).  Therefore, 
161 
	
eschewing technology can have an impact in terms of an individual becoming 
stigmatised as others wonder what they are attempting to hide (Acquisti & 
Grossklags, 2003).  
 
Refusing to engage in social media is not only inconvenient to the individual 
themselves, but their friends and family.  Participants complain about the 
difficulties involved in having friends who are not on social media, and some 
even admit that they do not keep in touch with these friends due to the additional 
effort required: 
 
“Erm, but yeah, I guess someone, maybe I shouldn’t be like I don't, I guess 
it's kind of bad, but like why, why would you not be on Facebook?  [both 
laugh] It sounds terrible, but like honestly, cos like you get, it's really 
annoying then when you're trying to organise something and stuff cos then 
you've got those like two friends that you have to, you just create a 
Facebook event and you're like, 'right, that's sorted' and then you go, 'oh, 
I've gotta e-mail Steve because he's...' you know?  And then it changes and 
you've got to remember to e-mail Steve and then, then those people get 
annoyed about not being invited to things”   (AQ, male, 26) 
 
This encapsulates the general feeling around having friends that are not on social 
media, while my participants stated that they understood why some people might 
choose not to be on Facebook (usually due to having an issue with an ex-partner), 
it is still something that caused them some level of inconvenience and frustration.  
It is also interesting to note this participant’s question – ‘Why would you not be 
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on Facebook?’, he is genuinely puzzled by this and it hints at Raynes-Goldie’s 
suggestion that: 
“there can also be significant social costs involved in Facebook 
refusal…the ensuing network effects mean that a refusal of Facebook is 
also a refusal of the norms of social behaviour in one’s group” (2012 
p.214) 
 
Given the benefits being offered by having an online presence, the costs of 
shunning these are seen as undesirable.  This leaves individuals with very little 
choice, but to continue using these sites, rather than developing new habits, which 
make their life less convenient (Vertesi, 2014) and potentially mean that they miss 
out on social events with greater regularity.  The issue is that we have become so 
reliant on the level of convenience offered by these websites, that it is difficult to 
imagine not using them, and going back to doing things the way we did 
previously (Wu, 2018).  This highlights the difficulty felt by individuals in terms 
of balancing the ability to take part in modern life while maintaining a level of 
privacy that they are comfortable with. 
 
Concerns regarding this issue are also apparent amongst survey respondents, 
when asked for free-text responses to the question: ‘What do you think stops you 
from having more control?’  (Shelton, et al., 2015).  While concerns regarding 
participating in digital culture are not the greatest concern, as shown in the below 




  % All (n) 
Companies don't allow control 44.00 (33) 
Lack of awareness/transparency 17.33 (13) 
Impossible to participate in digital culture without 
sharing info 14.67 (11) 
Misc. 13.33 (10) 
Legal issues 10.67 (8) 
Total responses8 100.00 (75) 
 
This category warranted comments such as: 
 
“It is not possible in this day and age to keep your information private and 
also have a public presence online.  I want to have both”  
(Survey respondent, gender not supplied, 30-34) 
  
“Need to provide information to participate in digital society”  
(Survey respondent, female, 25-29) 
 
Therefore, it has not escaped my participants' attention that opting out would not 
only be difficult (if not impossible) but may additionally leave them at a 
disadvantage in terms of their social life.  It is also important to stress that some 
enjoy the services afforded to them by engaging with social media and the internet 
and do not want to delete their account.  
 




It is also important to recognise that the responses given here may go some way to 
highlighting how the concept of the privacy paradox (Utz and Krämer, 2009) is 
not all that it seems.  This concept is often used to suggest that people do not care 
about privacy as much as they say they do, because behaviour is perceived to be a 
greater indicator of beliefs (Preibusch, et al., 2013).  However, as seen here, part 
of the discrepancy between an individual’s beliefs and actions may be that they 
would like more control but feel constrained by companies, who will not allow 
them the level of control they desire.  As discussed above, this can be in the way 
that companies lack transparency when informing their customers what happens 
to their data once they have collected it, as well as making terms and conditions or 
privacy notices oblique and difficult to understand.  Many perceive this as a way 
of ensuring that customers agree to what the company wants to do with their data, 
without really understanding what they have agreed to. 
 
Even when individuals are concerned enough to take action and make changes to 
their privacy settings on social media (for example), they could still be in a 
situation whereby they do not have the level of privacy they desire.  This is not 
the same as taking no action; in situations where there are no options or 
alternatives (as I suggest is the case here), behaviour cannot be taken to be an 
indicator of how an individual feels about the situation (O’Neill, 2002). 
 
It is also worth noting here that various issues affect an individual’s behaviour in 
terms of the action they take (or do not take) in order to increase their privacy.  
Buchi, et al. (2017) suggest that it is simply not enough for individuals to want to 
do more to protect their privacy or to care about their privacy, if they do not have 
the necessary skills to take action, their concern will be insufficient to elicit any 
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action.  This highlights why users do not always amend the default privacy 
settings on social media, for example, believing it to require a lot of additional 
time and effort in order to implement the level of privacy they would like (Vitak, 
2012), as discussed previously. 
 
It is also important to remember that privacy is not necessarily a case of complete 
withdrawal from a situation; people can want privacy and want to be on social 
media sites, the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  Privacy is not a 
dichotomy, it is nuanced, and as such individuals often want different levels of 
privacy in different situations, this is where the complexity of the situation is 
revealed.  It is too simplistic to simply state that if an individual is a member of a 
social networking site or shops online, then they do not care about their privacy.  
This is not the case and the nuanced concept of privacy will be examined in 
greater detail in the ‘Context Matters’ chapter. 
 
Finally, opting out of utilising social media sites may not offer a reasonable 
solution (Hargittai and Marwick 2016) for many individuals (as discussed above).  
If we consider the lack of trust around how companies behave with our data once 
we have shared it with them, and the lack of options available to us, this can lead 
to individuals having a sense of cynicism and apathy, which at times is expressed 
by my participants, but is by no means their only response.  Many, in fact 
discussed the tactics that they employ when engaging with companies to resist the 
control of the company in one way or another.  This resistance and its 




This section has investigated the barriers to control put forth by my participants 
when sharing information with companies.  This is often a case of companies not 
allowing them to have the control they desire, through a lack of transparency, 
particularly when considering the terms and conditions that people are presented 
with when creating an online account.  These agreements are often long, with 
confusing language and are felt to be purposely onerous by participants who have 
neither the time nor inclination to sit down and read the whole document before 
agreeing to them.  This is believed to be a strategy on the part of the company to 
ensure that individuals will agree to the terms and conditions without paying too 
much (if any) attention to the clauses contained within them. 
 
However, it was also recognised that individuals are lacking in the necessary 
knowledge to be able to understand the terms and conditions they are being 
presented with.  There is often too much vying for our attention and so 
agreements are clicked on and accepted without a great deal of consideration of 
their contents.  In fact, studies (McDonald & Cranor, 2008 and Obar & Oeldorf-
Hirsch, 2018) demonstrate that the requirements placed on individuals to manage 
their information are impossible to reach. 
 
Individuals also often feel that although they would like to do more to protect 
their privacy, they lack the necessary skills to do so, therefore rather than a lack of 
action being a sign that individuals do not care about their privacy, it is more that 
they do not feel able to take the necessary action.  There is also the belief that if 
an individual has not suffered a problem in the past, they are protected, and need 
take no further action.  This can lead to a false sense of security as individuals feel 
167 
	
that the default privacy settings and so on are enough to keep their information 
safe, although this is not necessarily the case. 
 
It is often suggested that the only way to really have control is not to engage with 
social media sites to begin with, or to close down any accounts that an individual 
has.  However, social media has become such an integrated part of our lives, that 
many believe this would only serve to make our lives more inconvenient, and 
potentially lead to missing out on social events and family news.  This is often 
deemed too high a price to pay.  Therefore, it may make more sense to share 
information in order to access the convenience offered, even if this leads to 




Chapter Four: Fight The Power 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter examined issues of control, in particular the concerns many 
have regarding a potential loss of control when sharing data with companies and 
on social media.  As a counterpoint to this, I will now offer a detailed examination 
of the decision-making process itself and consider how individuals are able to 
utilise (limited) autonomy in specific situations.  Given the discussion above, 
regarding the reticence people often experience while sharing information, it is 
important to understand the circumstances under which people might continue to 
share information.  This is considered in relation to making tradeoff decisions and 
how this may involve bias, rather than being what many would perceive as a 
logical decision. The focus here is on the difficulties faced by individuals when 
attempting to decide whether to share information with a company.  This draws 
on work around the ‘availability heuristic’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982 p.20) as 
well as issues around many people’s preference for instant gratification, 
(O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2000) when faced with particular decisions. 
 
A further issue with tradeoff decisions involves the recent phenomenon of the fear 
of missing out, which can be a motivating factor in terms of remaining a user of 
social media and is often prioritised over privacy concerns.  There are, however, 
other issues which play a role when decisions are being made, such as the 
convenience offered by sharing data and individuals’ willingness to pay for 
privacy; these will be examined fully in this chapter.  I also use the lens of 
Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power (1977) to suggest that we are not as in 
control as we believe.  Although it may appear that there is little opportunity for 
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people to exercise control, I will offer signs that there are small, everyday ways in 
which individuals do attempt (and succeed) in creating their own pockets of 
control, whereby they are able to resist the rules imposed upon them while 
appearing to submit to them. This will be considered through the lens of de 
Certeau (1988) and Fiske (1989).   
 
How are tradeoff decisions made? 
 
As discussed previously, individuals believe that companies ask for too much 
information from them, and as such, when faced with a request for information, 
they attempt to consider whether they actually want to provide it.   
 
As such, a calculation is made regarding whether any potential benefit outweighs 
any potential cost and thus makes sharing the information worthwhile.  It is the 
view of many participants that sharing information is to be expected when 
utilising social media for free: 
 
“Erm, I think the problem we have is that people don’t like information 
being collected, but they want all the, all the nice and quick services and 
everything else to be able to do that…So, it's kind of a hand in hand.  If 
you want the tech, and you want the advancements, you have to surrender 
a little bit of personal information.”     (CB, male, 37) 
 
“Yeah, and also cos like, yes, you could like completely stay off any kind 
of social media but for example, I like Facebook, cos it’s free messaging 
and people are, because everyone else seems to have like data, it’s a really 
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handy way of getting hold of people [HEF: Yeah]. So that’s, that’s one of 
the things, and I just like getting information about stuff I’m interested in, 
so I’m, I’m getting something positive out of it as well.” (JZ, female, 25) 
 
“I see it as a tradeoff that I want, they want some information from me to 
improve their data collection and who's using it and therefore how they 
market their and having a business and how they market their product 
based around their main client-users, but I'm getting to call America for 
free anytime I like, for as long as I like.  So, for me, that's fine.”  
(CB, male, 37) 
 
This is borne out in previous research on the subject, which shows that individuals 
are often willing to share information with companies, to gain access to a variety 
of benefits (Phelps, et al., 2000 and Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005).  This ranges 
from receiving a more personalised service (Chellapa & Sin, 2005) to greater 
convenience (Hann, et al., 2007 and Rainie & Duggan, 2016).  Broadly, it is seen 
as being a bargain that individuals must enter into in order to take part in 
consumer society, as recognised by my interviewees.  As the quotes above 
demonstrate, many are happy to participate in this bargain, and broadly feel that it 
is a fair exchange in order to access the service or information they require.  This 
relates to the discussion around the ‘calculus of behaviour’ (Laufer & Wolfe, 
1977), in my literature review and highlights the potential for individuals to carry 
out internal calculations regarding the costs and benefits when being asked to 
share information.  This is one of the findings of research carried out by Rainie 
and Duggan (2016), who find that ‘…consumers understand and appreciate the 
benefits of sharing – at least under certain circumstances’ (p.7).  The qualification 
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is of interest here, because it suggests that there are only particular situations in 
which individuals deem the benefits of sharing information to be of value.  The 
contextual nature of such decisions will be examined in the next chapter. 
 
While much of the theory around tradeoff decisions suggests that individuals are 
making rational decisions, this is not always the case.  Acquisti (2004) highlights 
how difficult it is for individuals to behave in a rational way when attempting to 
make privacy-related decisions.  People are often unable to access all the 
information required to make a meaningful decision regarding what should 
happen to their data (as discussed in the previous chapter).  This means that the 
conditions under which people are attempting to make decision in this area are 
uncertain. 
 
Aside from this issue of a lack of information, Acquisti and Grossklags (2005) 
suggest that it may be useful to consider potential biases that people may be 
unconsciously applying when attempting to make a decision under uncertain 
conditions.  These biases can lead individuals to believe that the benefits far out-
weigh the costs (even when this is not true), as is often the case when a person is 
asked to share information with a company.  One such bias is the ‘availability 
heuristic’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982 p.20).  Heuristics are used by people as a 
way to ‘reduce the complex tasks of assessing likelihoods and predicting values to 
simpler judgemental operations’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p.1124).  In the 
case of tradeoff decisions, the availability heuristic suggests that when we are 
trying to assess how likely something is to happen, we attach a greater probability 
to instances that we can recall more easily.  Therefore, in a situation where an 
individual is being asked to share information, if they can remember someone 
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they know having an issue after sharing data, they would be more cautious.  
However, if they cannot recall any issues (or can only remember the benefits 
described by friends), they would be more likely to accept the benefits and 
apportion them greater weight than the costs of sharing information. 
 
In situations where no real-life examples are forthcoming, an individual may 
move onto ‘imaginability’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 p.1127), which is similar 
to the situation described above, except that the bias is towards instances that the 
individual can more easily imagine (rather than a real example that they can 
recall).  In both of these instances, bias can play a role and due to this, the 
individual may be overly cautious or not cautious enough depending on how 
easily they are able to recall or imagine the benefits and costs of following a 
particular course of action. 
 
This suggests that while tradeoff decisions appear to be logical from the outside 
(and even to the individual making the decision) they could be a reflection of 
biases held by that person.  However, this is not the only issue to consider when 
examining the tradeoff decision-making process. 
 
What role do free access and fear of missing out play? 
When making tradeoff decisions, one of the benefits is deemed to be the free 
access to a particular social network or website (as discussed in the previous 
chapter).  As reflected in the quotes at the beginning of this section, many 
participants feel that that it is not only fair, but to be expected that in order to 
access a service or social network without any financial cost, they must be willing 
to share some of their information.  As demonstrated in these quotes, it is deemed 
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unrealistic to expect to pay nothing whatsoever to gain access.  Floridi (2015) is 
less accepting of this explanation, suggesting that online services appear to offer 
us ‘gifts’ in terms of being able to access a particular site or service for free and  
we are encouraged to accept this at face value.  However, issues arise when these 
services become a ubiquitous part of our daily lives; we come to rely on them, and 
struggle to imagine our lives without them.  This raises questions regarding 
whether the tradeoff decision is as much of a choice as my participants believe 
and is recognised by one of my interviewees in particular: 
 
“…if err Google tracks everything you do and records it and then sells that 
information off. I don’t doubt they do that, but I’d prefer they didn’t. [both 
laugh]. [H.E.: yeah]. Erm and the other way for me to stop them doing that 
is to not use Google and there’s no way to do that in today’s society [H.E. 
laughs], you need Google, [H.E. laughs], which sounds like a drug 
addiction!”       (GD, male, 25) 
 
Although this participant is making a joke when he suggests that his reliance on 
Google is akin to a drug addiction, what he says is not without foundation, as 
highlighted in my discussion of Raynes-Goldie’s (2012) work in the previous 
chapter.  She highlights how these sites have become a part of everyday life and 
for individuals to eschew this, is to miss out on something important.  She is not 
alone in this view, as Nissenbaum (2011) also questions how realistic a choice is 
when it is dichotomous.  Individuals are given the option to participate in social 
media or not to participate, and she argues that this is not as much of a choice as it 
may seem.  She also draws attention to the costs that individuals are likely to 
suffer if they choose not to participate, in terms of being socially excluded.  
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Again, this highlights how we might feel that we are making decisions regarding 
whether to share our data, but we are potentially much more constrained than we 
realise.  This complicates the tradeoff decision as individuals are no longer simply 
deciding whether to share their information or not.  The choice becomes whether 
to reduce our privacy (through sharing information) and thus be able to maintain 
our social relationships or to retain our privacy, but to miss out socially on the 
events occurring in our friends’ and families’ lives.  This can be made even more 
difficult if the maintenance of these relationships rests upon being a member of a 
particular social network.  As stated by Scholz (2013), for an individual to refuse 
to engage with social media, ‘would be tantamount to social isolation’ (p.8). 
 
This suggests that coercion plays a role, because although those using social 
media are not physically forced to participate, that is not to say that they are not 
being coerced into sharing information on some level.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter and above, social media has become a part of our everyday lives, 
and without the access offered by these sites people may suffer socially.  If all of 
my friends and relatives are Facebook users (for example), it is harder for me to 
maintain a relationship with them, if I am not also a member of Facebook 
(Andrejevic, 2013).  This represents a potential cost for those refusing to engage 
with Facebook and as such, users are being compelled to participate in social 
media through a fear of being socially excluded if they do not (Dyer-Witheford, 
2015). 
 
This fear of missing out socially plays a role in the decision-making process.  
Nippert-Eng (2010 and Stoilova, et al., 2019b) discusses how her participants 
speak of there being a tradeoff between this concern and privacy fears, and as 
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such, fear of missing out is often prioritised over fears related to their privacy.  
This is not the only concern that is prioritised in this way and the fear of paying 
more for products is also important.  Therefore, if a person decides to sign up for 
a loyalty card, it may indicate that they place greater importance on saving money 
(through special offers) than on their personal privacy.  It will be useful here to 
offer a brief reminder of the issues discussed in the ‘Commercial Surveillance’ 
section of my literature review, in particular how data has become a commodity 
for many companies, including social media sites.  The collection and selling of 
user data has become an important income stream for many companies and as 
such offers advertisers a way of allocating resources much more efficiently by 
targeting them at those who are likely to be interested in the product being sold.  
As such individuals receive personalised offers based on their previous behaviour 
and so are less likely to be faced with advertisements for items that are of no use 
or interest to them.  Given how lucrative this practice has become, it is of little 
surprise that personalisation has led to increased data collection, as companies 
believe that the more data they have, the more accurately they can predict 
consumer behaviour.  Companies have also gone to great lengths to extoll the 
virtues of the collection of data in order to placate consumers who may feel 
concerned about their data being collected and utilised in this way.  The main way 
in which this is communicated is in highlighting the benefits of personalisation to 
individuals, while obscuring how this data is often sold on to third-parties to make 
it even more valuable to companies.  This message regarding the benefits of 
personalisation appears to have resonated with my participants and is mirrored in 




“…thinking about maybe Tesco Clubcards, I know there was a big thing 
around that and, and people feeling violated, but, I, that's tailoring in a 
good way.”       (ES, female, 36) 
 
“They collect data on what I buy then they suggest things that I want to 
buy and that can be handy sometimes, or Ocado obviously does that, 
collect all the information in terms of groceries and then they tell me what 
I'll probably want to buy that week and they're usually right!”  
(GM, female, 37) 
 
“…sometimes I will offer up information and sign up to things, 
speculatively, not even when I'm buying something, if I feel like that's an 
organisation or a you know, a company that I'm really interested in and 
therefore, would want them to, to have my information and let me know 
about things, or pass it on to other people.”   (ES, female, 36) 
 
Therefore, these participants feel that they are able to access tailored offers or 
shopping lists through sharing information with a company, in this way, their loss 
of privacy is felt to be ‘worth it’ for the offers that they then receive. 
 
However, others show greater reticence when discussing items such as 
personalised advertising: 
 
“…I sit on the fence with a little bit like Facebook erm, ads and kind of 
giving people access to the sort of things you host and like and therefore 
tailoring ads around that.  Part of me is like, 'Well there's gonna be ads 
anyway, they may as well be tailored around the things that I like.  Erm, 
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you know, I might as well see stuff that's relevant, than see stuff that's not 
relevant, I suppose',”      (ES, female, 36) 
 
“…so like it's funny because you know, the idea of all the adverts that 
come up on my Facebook, they, they are tailored to either website searches 
or erm, if I've put my e-mail into something else, it comes up with 
something else.  Now, whilst I think that's an invasion of my privacy, I 
also see it as quite convenient, [both laugh] because, it knows from my 
searches that I like certain things, so if I like New Look or I'm looking for 
this type of dress, it will come up with all different types of dresses… But 
I do feel most times, nine times out of ten it's just it is harmless, it's there, 
they use it then it’s found me the dress I needed [HE laughs], there we 
go!”        (MJ, female, 25) 
 
Therefore, participants struggle with two opposing issues, the fact that supplying 
information tends to lead to advertisements and website experiences being much 
more personalised (and so more meaningful to them) is broadly deemed to be a 
benefit of sharing information.  However, there is still discomfort in companies 
knowing so much about them, as highlighted in the above quotes.  While the first 
quote appears to be positive, the use of language such as ‘might as well’ and ‘I 
suppose’, suggests that there are more complex feelings below the surface.  
Similarly, the second interviewee states, that to her, the personalised 
advertisements on Facebook constitute, ‘an invasion of my privacy’, but she then 




It is also important to remember that while use of force is not necessarily obvious, 
it is broadly indicative of existing power relations.  This can be seen when we 
consider that as noted above, the benefits of personalisation for individuals are 
highlighted by companies while the benefits that the companies themselves 
experience (particularly the revenue generated from third-party sharing) are less 
widely known.  It is also important to note, that when companies hide the third-
party sharing that occurs, individuals are being asked to share information for one 
purpose, while the true usage of that information is hidden from them, offering 
them very little agency in this situation.  This asymmetry of power is more 
obvious when considering the terms and conditions that we must agree to in order 
to access social networking sites, especially when considering how little 
information we are offered regarding the practices of social networking sites (such 
as amalgamation of user information and so on) (Andrejevic, 2013). 
 
How are time-consistent/inconsistent decisions made? 
As examined in the previous chapter, individuals are not always able to access all 
of the information they require when attempting to make tradeoff decisions 
(O’Neill, 2002).  This leads to uncertainty about the potential costs and benefits, 
meaning that they can never be completely sure of what the potential outcome 
will be.  As discussed previously, an individual may underestimate or 
overestimate the likely cost or benefit in a given situation.  This adds a level of 
complexity to the decision-making process, particularly as immediate gratification 
can play a role here and so a person may make a decision that makes sense for 
them now (to receive an immediate benefit), but in the long-term, will actually 
have a more detrimental impact (thus leading to a future cost) (Acquisti & 




This echoes the work of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2000) who suggest that people 
tend to be ‘time-inconsistent’ (p.233), meaning that they err towards immediate 
gratification and make different decisions at different times.  In terms of an 
individual’s privacy, this means that a person will have a specific preference, such 
as to protect their privacy by sharing as little information as possible with online 
companies.  As such they may decide that they will not share information such as 
their date of birth when they open an account online with a new company in the 
future.  However, when the future arrives, that person’s preferences have changed, 
and in the moment that they are trying to access a website and so when asked for 
their date of birth, they will share it (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2000).  This can be 
seen in the below quote: 
 
“but I'm one of the worst ones for doing this, by putting in my card details 
and saving them.  I really wish I wouldn't, but I always forget to tick the 
box that says you don't want your card details saved, always.  Most of the 
time, right, even in life, anyone, most of the time you’re in a rush, you're 
never just sat down doing something, you're in a rush to, I don't know, 
you're late for work…and you're just doing it [HEF: yeah], just err, and 
you're not even thinking about it, like, paying bills.” (VR, female, 28) 
 
This quote highlights the issue with time-consistency examined by O’Donoghue 
and Rabin (2000).  VR does not want to save her card details with companies and 
intends to select the option that means that her card details will not be saved, but 
in the moment, she is in a hurry and so forgets her intentions.  The immediate 
gratification offered by paying a bill takes precedence over her intention to protect 
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her privacy and ensure that her card details are not saved. 
 
Unfortunately, people do not always behave in a way that will generate the least 
costs for the greatest benefits.  As such, while an individual may logically want 
more privacy, as per the time inconsistency approach examined above, when the 
time comes to make a decision, it may not be so straightforward.  Choices often 
need to be made between options that offer gratification now, with potential costs 
in the future or something that has a potential low cost now, but a greater benefit 
in the future.  So for example, if a person has a choice of behaving in a way that is 
easy and convenient now (but offers less privacy) or in a way that will afford 
them greater privacy in the future (but is less convenient now), they are more 
likely to select the convenient option which may ultimately lead to less privacy.  
This can be seen when considering areas such as healthy eating, when individuals 
will decide that they want to lose weight and eat more healthily, however, the 
immediate gratification offered by a chocolate bar is often too difficult to resist, 
especially because the benefit of losing weight and becoming healthier, will not 
be noticeable for quite some time (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009).  This is similarly 
true for increased privacy, except, it is possible that the benefits may never be felt, 
particularly as a benefit in this case often involves the absence of something, such 
as the absence of annoying spam emails or the absence of our data being hacked.  
Therefore, we may go to the effort of increasing our privacy for no tangible 
benefit, thus making the immediate gratification offered by providing the 
information all the more attractive. 
 
As noted, VR is discussing how she does not have the patience to go through and 
read the terms and conditions when she is trying to download a new app, at that 
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time, her priority is accessing the app, and her future privacy is of very little (if 
any) concern to her.  She is a busy person and as such does not have the time to 
worry about these potential future issues.  This relates to the point above 
regarding the difficulties faced by individuals, who want to be able to protect their 
privacy (delayed gratification) and only share the information that they are 
comfortable with, but at the same time, they want to access a website or app 
(immediate gratification).  This highlights the inherent difficulties involved in 
attempting to make tradeoff decisions, in ensuring that the decision we make is 
the one with the highest benefits and lowest costs.  Acquisti (2004) suggests that 
this is due to psychological distortions and this offers an explanation for why 
individuals do not behave in privacy protective ways despite claiming that they 
want to.  He goes as far as to state that, ‘The conclusions we have reached suggest 
that individuals may not be trusted to make decisions in their best interests when 
it comes to privacy’ (2004 p.27).  As highlighted above, this also demonstrates the 
difficulties that many people face in terms of time-inconsistency in that they 
intend to protect their privacy in the future, but when they arrive in the future, 
they do not do so. 
 
That is not to say that individuals are sharing information without any concerns, 
and it is important to point out that many of my participants are sceptical about 
the benefits offered by sharing data: 
 
 “Erm, it’s basically kind of like an intuitive thing of things [information] 
they don't need to provide me this service.  Err, and I get that some, some 
companies, they, they, they get their money from, from information 
gathering and, and targeting people, and whatever they are doing, erm, but 
that, there’s no kind of benefit in it for me, in a way that I, I don't expect 
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anything, to get anything from it, but erm, as I said if it doesn't feel right 
that they should have that information its…it's a no go” (DM, female, 31) 
“So, yes, I could do without it, but I like what I’m getting from it so that’s 
why I use it [social media]. If I wouldn’t like what I was getting from it, I 
wouldn’t be using it”      (JZ, female, 25) 
 
“Exactly, that's it, but like, I do think about that quite a bit, it's like, is it 
worth for a free whatever or to be entered into so, shall I, no, it's not worth 
it…if it's worth the option or you have the option of saying yes or 
no.  Nine times out of ten, it's no to be honest with you, so, it's not worth 
it.”        (MR, male, 37) 
 
These participants are aware of the bargain that they are entering into but are not 
necessarily convinced that the benefits outweigh the costs and as such do not 
always give up their information; they exercise a level of scepticism that Acquisti 
does not believe is possible.  In the terms used by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2000), 
these individuals may be time-consistent and so immediate gratification is less of 
an issue for them.  This scepticism is not limited to my participants and is 
demonstrated in work carried out by the Pew Research Centre (Madden, 2014), 
who found that there was a level of scepticism amongst their participants, 
particularly around the potential benefits offered by sharing information.  
However, they did find that in particular situations, individuals are willing to 
share their information if it allowed them to access a service or website without 
incurring a monetary cost.  The responses are shown below, alongside responses 





It is clear from this chart that opinion tends to be in favour of sharing information 
in order to access a site or service provided by a company for free.  It is 
interesting to note that the level of agreement is higher for my participants than 
for the Pew Research Centre participants, however, this may be due to the surveys 
being carried out at different times (the Pew Research Centre survey was carried 
out in 2014, whereas mine was carried out in 2016/17).  Therefore, attitudes may 
have changed over time, as we are increasingly making these tradeoff decisions in 
our daily lives.  Another important point to note is that the respondents for the 
Pew Research Centre covered a wide range of ages, while all of my respondents 
were aged between 20 and 40, and so older adults may be more reticent to such a 
tradeoff, which could have lowered the overall level of agreement for Pew 
Research.  Finally, it is possible that the difference relates to the fact that 
participants for each of these surveys were from different countries.  The Pew 
 
9 Please note, percentages do not add up to 100 as those responding ‘Don’t know’ or ‘Prefer not to 





















How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statement?
"I am willing to share some information about myself with online companies 
and organisations in order to use their services for free." (Madden, 2014)
Strongly agree/ agree Strongly disagree/disagree
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Research Centre carried out its research exclusively in the United States, while 
my survey was carried out online, and so would be largely completed by 
participants in the UK (although this cannot be guaranteed) 
 
One further reason for the higher level of agreement in my survey could be that 
individuals feel that they are in control of what they share with companies and so 
believe they are able to choose how much information to reveal.  This potential 
explanation will be examined in more detail later in this chapter. 
 
Further to the above question, my survey also asks participants about another 
aspect of the tradeoff bargain - personalisation: 
 
 
Again, here it seems that participants willingly accept that they will receive more 
targeted advertisements and recommendations if they share some of their data.  As 
stated in one the quotes previously, individuals know that they are likely to face 




How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statement?“I 
accept that online services are more personalised because of the increased 
access online companies and organisations have to my personal data.” 
(Madden, 2014)
Strongly agree/agree Strongly disagree/disagree Don't know/Prefer not to say
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for it to at least be something that might actually be of interest to them.  There 
was the sense that advertising is inescapable, so it makes sense to them for it to be 
potentially useful, rather than for a product that is not.  It is interesting to note that 
both of the above questions attract similar percentages who either agree or 







Don't know/Prefer not to say 6.23 (19) 9.84 (30) 
Strongly agree 5.57 (17) 20.00 (61) 
Agree 63.93 (195) 49.18 (150) 
Strongly agree/Agree 69.50 (212) 69.18 (211) 
Disagree 18.36 (56) 16.07 (49) 
Strongly disagree 5.90 (18) 4.92 (15) 
Strongly disagree/Disagree 24.26 (74) 20.99 (64) 
Total10 100.00 (305) 100.00 (305) 
 
This bears out the comments made by my interviewees, in that individuals 
appreciate that in order to access particular services, it is only fair that they give 
up something, which, if it is not going to be money, will be something that is of 
value to the company, such as their information. 
 
While the overall agreement and disagreement percentages are similar, when 
broken down further, there is much stronger agreement with the statement that 
 
10 Please note, this question was not compulsory and so participants were able to move on to the 
next question without providing a response. 
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focuses on receiving a more personalised service (20.0%), than the one regarding 
receiving a free service (5.6%).  This hints at the view that while there is no 
monetary charge when accessing a service for free, that is not to say that 
individuals believe it to be completely without cost.  This means that for all of the 
narrative surrounding free services being provided by social media sites (for 
example), this is not necessarily widely believed, and individuals are aware of the 
costs involved.   
 
It also highlights that individuals feel that receiving a personalised service is of 
greater benefit than accessing a service or website for free, particularly if they do 
not actually believe that it is free.  This may be because the benefits of 
personalisation feel more tangible to people than simply accessing a website for 
free.  As Floridi (2015) highlights, we have become used to free access – very few 
websites hold content behind a paywall and so it has become the norm to access a 
website without having to pay for the privilege.  As such, we have come to expect 
to access content for free, and so the benefit of doing this has become less obvious 
to us than receiving a relevant recommendation.  Personalisation feels as if we 
have saved time and/or effort, because the advertisement (and by extension the 
item) has been brought to us, rather than us having to search for it. 
 
Are individuals willing to pay for privacy? 
Although many appear to accept that trading information is the price we pay for 
accessing some websites, views around paying for additional privacy are 
ambivalent.  This is something that I wanted to explore, as it offers an alternative 
to the bargain individuals are currently presented with, in terms of sharing 
information in order to access reduced prices, and/or special offers.  It also makes 
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sense given that companies treat our data as a commodity (as discussed at greater 
length in my literature review), and so it is important to consider how individuals 
feel about paying to retain a greater level of privacy, particularly as many would 
like greater control over their information.  This is also a topic which has been 
discussed in online articles (Tufekci, 2015), as well as having been investigated 
previously (Preibusch, et al., 2013) suggesting that it not something that can be 
ignored or dismissed completely.  It is important to note that in considering this, it 
is suggesting that privacy is property, which is not necessarily the way in which 
privacy is perceived by many, however I approach this from the perspective of the 
commodification of privacy and the way in which it has become a commodity to 
many companies (particularly, but not limited to social media (Fuchs, 2014)).  
This also links with the work of Zuboff (2015 and 2019) and Couldry and Mejias 
(2019a and 2019b) which were discussed in my literature review.  Here, I offer a 
brief reminder of their pertinent points when we consider the option of paying for 
increased privacy.  In her discussion around ‘surveillance capitalism’ (2015, 
p.77), Zuboff suggests that companies collect as much data as possible for each 
individual that utilises their site, thereby increasing their profits.  Similarly, 
Couldry & Mejias (2019b) argue that the basis of our everyday lives have been 
changed in order to allow our data to be collected and collated, without us 
realising.  Even when we are aware of the information being collected, companies 
are more than capable of convincing us of the benefits of sharing our information 
(Couldry & Mejias, 2019b).  This then allows companies to continue to collect 
our information and sell it on without concern for those supplying it (this issue 
was dealt with in my literature review when I discussed the potential exploitation 
of users).  As such, the question remains that if companies are able to make 
money from carrying out data collection and aggregation, does it not redress the 
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balance somewhat if individuals are offered the option of paying to avoid this?  
This point in particularly pertinent when consideration is given to Zuboff’s claim 
that surveillance is not attempting to remove privacy rights, rather it is re-
distributing them, so that they are no longer spread between all individuals but 
concentrated amongst surveillance capitalists.  Therefore, if individuals are 
interested in paying for additional privacy, they are in effect paying to restore the 
original distribution of privacy rights.  However, views on the subject are not 
clear-cut and there is ambivalence here, as highlighted in the responses to the 
below question: 
 
How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
"I would be willing to pay more for a service or product if it meant I could share 
less information." (Madden, 2014)  
  % All  (n) 
Don't know/Prefer not to say 19.67 (60) 
Strongly agree 10.16 (31) 
Agree 28.20 (86) 
Strongly agree/Agree 38.36 (117) 
Disagree 35.74 (109) 
Strongly disagree 6.23 (19) 
Strongly disagree/Disagree 41.97 (128) 
Total11 100.00 (305) 
 
There is little difference between those who would be willing to pay in order to 
share less information, and those who would not (3.6%), with a greater proportion 
 
11 Please note, this question was not compulsory and so participants were able to move on to the 
next question without providing a response. 
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of respondents unwilling to pay.  This suggests that offering people the option of 
paying a premium for privacy is not necessarily the solution to concerns regarding 
the amount of information we share with companies.  This also highlights the 
complex nature of our relationship and views regarding free services that we gain 
access to through sharing personal data, and the difficulty in finding a simple 
solution to this issue. 
 
Previous work around the subject of paying for increased privacy is also unable to 
obtain a definitive answer.  As discussed in my literature review, Preibusch, et al. 
(2013) carried out a series of experiments to test how the tradeoff between price 
and amount of data collected impacted on individuals’ decisions when making a 
purchase and offered some surprising insights.  Their study found that individuals 
do not necessarily choose to purchase items from companies that collect less 
information, even when the price is the same as companies collecting more 
information.  The researchers offer the explanation that it may have been because 
individuals assume the collection of additional information would lead to greater 
personalisation if and when they revisited the site at a later date.  This again 
suggests that the potential for personalisation is a much greater influence than is 
expected, although, the researchers could not say that this was definitely the 
reason.  In terms of price, they find that for those individuals who are already 
concerned about their privacy, price is not important and they are happy to pay 
more to share less information. 
 
This is borne out by other research, which suggests that those who are already 
concerned about their privacy are willing to pay more to share less information 
(Tsai, et al., 2011).  However, they are unable to say whether the price should be 
190 
	
an absolute amount, or whether it should be relative to the price of the item being 
purchased.  This suggests that at least some of the complexity in offering privacy 
for a price may be in the price itself.  The price difference in the DVD 
experiments above (Preibusch, et al., 2013) was €1, therefore, this may be small 
enough that those already concerned about their privacy are willing to pay it, but 
if there was a greater price difference, they may have been less willing to pay.  
This links with the findings of Hann et al. (2007) who find that where companies 
offer a monetary reward for personal information (in the form of discounted prices 
or the chance to be entered into a prize draw), individuals are more likely to be 
motivated to share information.  They suggest that if the reward is large enough, it 
will negate any concerns regarding privacy, although it needs to ‘exceed a 
threshold of $10-20’ (p.27).   
 
There is some research which suggests that individuals are willing to pay a 
premium for privacy (Tsai et al., 2011), and this offers an explanation for the 
ambivalence expressed by my participants towards paying.  The issue may be 
dependent upon the actual cost that people would be expected to pay to protect 
their privacy.  It is possible that they would be willing to pay a minimal amount, 
but if companies ask them to pay over a certain amount, it would be deemed too 
high and they would need to reconsider whether to share the information or use 
the company at all.  This would also explain why the responses to my survey 
question are clustered around ‘Agree’ and ‘Disagree’ options, rather than the 
stronger versions of these opinions.  The willingness to pay to share less 
information is also likely to have a contextual element to it in that it will depend 
on the type of information being requested, so an individual may be more willing 
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to pay not to share their medical history (for example) than their favourite colour.  
The issue of context will be dealt with in the following chapter. 
 
Previous studies regarding the impact of price upon charity donations are relevant 
here.  Weyant and Smith (1987) consider whether suggesting large or small 
donation amounts makes a difference to the actual amount that people donate to 
charity.  They find that when small donation amounts are suggested ($5, $10 or 
$25), more money is raised overall than when larger amounts are suggested ($50, 
$100 or $250).  They put forth that this is because when a larger amount is 
suggested, it de-legitimises any smaller donation amounts, so that even though 
individuals are able to donate any amount that they choose, the suggestion of 
larger amounts leads to individuals feeling that a smaller donation would be 
inappropriate.  This has interesting implications for my findings, as how willing 
an individual would be to pay for their privacy could depend on the price that is 
being requested, as well as the importance that the individual places upon that 
information.  It may have therefore, been useful to offer survey participants the 
option of ‘It depends’ (and allowing them to expand on this), when responding to 
the question regarding whether they would be willing to pay more to reveal less 
information.  Therefore, it is worth bearing in mind that there are multiple ways in 
which price can make a difference. 
 
Opinions on the subject of paying for increased privacy become clearer when we 





(r-square: 0.009, p-values: 0.000-0.775) 
 
Here there is a clear divide between those in their twenties and those in their 
thirties, with the older groups being much more willing to pay for privacy than 
younger groups.  There are a number of possible explanations for this.  One 
reason is that those who are older are simply more able to pay for increased 
privacy, they are more likely to be settled in a career and earning more money 
than their younger counterparts and so for them it may be a case of being able to 
pay to avoid the things that they find unacceptable.  In fact, recent work by the 
Pew Research Centre (Madden, 2014) suggests that 67% of US millennials 
(broadly this term is used to describe those born between 1981 and 2000) do not 
believe that they currently earn enough to have the kind of life that they want.  As 
such, if millennials are not earning the amount they would like, it suggests that 

















How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statement? "I 
would be willing to pay more for a service or product if it meant I could 
share less information." (Madden, 2014)
Strongly agree/agree Strongly disagree/disagree
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This has been reinforced by studies that show that those in this generation are 
financially worse off than those in previous generations (O’Connor, 2018).  It 
suggests that those in their late twenties are less likely to own their own homes 
than those in their early thirties.  The issue of student debt has also had an impact 
on individuals’ incomes, and it is worth noting that my survey was completed by a 
disproportionately high volume of those who had completed higher education 
(26.5% had completed undergraduate studies, while 35.9% had completed 
postgraduate education).  Therefore, those who have recently graduated are likely 
to be dealing with student debt, which would, again reduce an individual’s level 
of disposable income and thus their ability to pay for increased privacy. 
 
Another potential explanation for this difference in opinion is that these age 
groups do essentially represent two distinct groups; those who are used to getting 
and sharing information for free (those in their twenties) (Twenge, 2017) and 
those who are not (those in their thirties).  Therefore, those in their twenties are 
simply more used to making this tradeoff and so if it is a social norm for them, 
then it is entirely possible that they have never considered it being any other way.  
Those in their thirties, however, are far less used to it and so are potentially more 
suspicious of the suggestion of access to services or websites for free.  Therefore, 
they consider this bargain more and would rather avoid sharing more of their data 
and are willing to pay to do so.  Different age groups may also have different 
attitudes towards technology and social media; boyd (2014) suggests that teens 
differ from adults in that they are more accepting of social media in general.  They 
are unconcerned about the changes brought about by technology and are far more 
interested in the benefits that it offers.  Adults, on the other hand, are far more 
aware of how things were previously, (before the introduction of technology) and 
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as such recognise the changes that have occurred.  This can lead to differences in 
attitudes and concerns, as boyd suggests, ‘To teens, these technologies…are just 
an obvious part of life in a networked era, whereas for adults, these affordances 
reveal changes that are deeply disconcerting’ (2014 p.14). 
 
While this discussion around teenagers’ attitudes may not appear to be relevant to 
my work, boyd’s research was carried out between 2003 and 2012, and so these 
teenagers will now be adults, who may retain these attitudes towards technology 
and social media.  This offers a potential explanation for the difference in views in 
the above graph, therefore, those who perceive social media as being a part of 
their lives, may be less concerned about their privacy, believing that this is simply 
the way things are.  Older individuals, on the other hand, are likely to remember 
how things were before, and so may be more willing to pay to regain some of the 
privacy that they feel they have lost due to social media sites.  Therefore, the 
choice of whether to pay for increased privacy, may not be a choice for everyone 
and so it may be necessary to share information in order to achieve discounts on 
products or free access to social media.  For my younger participants, it may be 
that privacy is a luxury they are simply unable to afford. 
 
Are acts of defiance possible? 
 
This section will provide a response to the following question: 
How do individuals attempt to regain some control in situations where they 
seemingly do not have any?  Given the discussion in the previous chapter, and 
above, it may seem that it is impossible to have meaningful control when dealing 
with online companies and the only sensible way forward is to submit to the status 
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quo and share whatever information we are asked for.  While it is true to say that 
there is an asymmetry of power, in favour of the social networking sites and other 
organisations, that is not to say that everyone who engages with social media has 
given up on having a level of privacy that they are comfortable with. 
 
Therefore, in small, seemingly insignificant ways, people are drawing a line and 
refusing to move beyond it when they feel that companies are attempting to 
collect an unreasonable amount of information.  As such, individuals have 
developed a number of ‘tactics’ (de Certeau 1988 p.185) that they employ in 
situations whereby they are not comfortable with sharing the information being 
requested.  These tactics offer a way to resist the increasing demands for 
information that we are faced with. 
 
Gillespie (2007; van Dijck, 2013; Cohen, 2017 and Bucher, 2018) suggests that 
technologies guide their users down the path of acceptable behaviour and often 
facilitates some user actions while restricting others.  Although we would like to 
think that we are in control, we generally use the technology offered to us in the 
prescribed ways, rather than demanding that the technology changes to fit around 
how we would like to use it.  As noted in the previous section, individuals will 
often forego some privacy or control in order to achieve greater convenience, 
which is what makes technology so persuasive, it allows us to ‘get things done’ 
more efficiently so that we can move onto something else, as illustrated by VR’s 
comments:   
 
“Most of the time, right, even in life, anyone, most of the time you’re in a 
rush, you're never just sat down doing something, you're in a rush to, I 
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don't know, you're late for work, or, you know, as you know…and you're 
just doing it [HE: yeah], just err, and you're not even thinking about it, 
like, paying bills.”      (VR, female, 28) 
 
VR’s comment highlights how technology provides a means to an end, and as 
such we do not necessarily consider alternative ways to use it.  It also means that 
as we come to rely on technology to carry out mundane, everyday tasks, we forget 
how we completed these tasks previously and become frustrated when there is an 
issue with the technology.  At the beginning of December 2018, there was a data 
outage which meant that O2 customers were unable to access any services which 
relied on data to work (BBC News, 2018b), this led to customer complaints 
regarding the difficulty they had in carrying out simple tasks such as finding their 
way around in a new city.  It appears that those complaining have become so 
reliant on using apps on their smartphones to navigate that they were (literally) 
lost without access to location services.  This demonstrates a reliance on 
technology that causes issues for individuals when it fails them. 
 
Gillespie (2007; van Dijck, 2013; Cohen, 2017 and Bucher, 2018) also notes that 
in any given situation, there are structural constraints which tend to be overt but 
there are also more implicit cultural rules.  Often explicit reasons are given for the 
existence of certain rules or terms and conditions, such as requiring users to 
provide their real names, in order to protect them from potential identity theft.  
There are, however, also subtle means in place which encourage users to be more 





How is disciplinary power exercised on social media?  
This links with Foucault’s work regarding disciplinary power (1977), which offers 
a useful explanation for our behaviour when sharing information, as per the 
discussion in my literature review.  As a brief reminder, Foucault suggests that we 
are encouraged to behave in particular ways, as certain behaviour is rewarded; this 
is not necessarily something that is obvious and we only tend to notice this when 
we feel friction when attempting to behave in a way that is in opposition to what 
is expected.  We thus ‘become’ through this covert discipline (1977), and as 
discussed throughout this thesis, it is in the best interests of social media sites to 
encourage users to share as much information as possible so that it can be 
packaged and sold to others.  Foucault (1977) suggests that the environment thus 
becomes a tool for training those within it and this is what I argue has happened 
on social networking sites, in that users are ‘trained’ to connect with as many 
friends and acquaintances as possible, all the while, generating income for the 
platforms they are utilising.  Therefore, disciplinary power is not only integrated, 
but almost completely hidden from users, who do not have this option.  It is also 
important to note that while the actions and behaviour of users is revealed to the 
platform owners of the site they are using, it is not limited to that site, and through 
the amalgamation of data (as discussed in my literature review) come to be known 
by the owners of sites they have never used or visited.  During the course of my 
interviews, only one interviewee mentions data from social networking sites being 
amalgamated and sold.  While many speak with annoyance about their 
information being shared with advertisers, none appear to view this as being 
coercive, or anything to be concerned about, again, this is how disciplinary power 





Similarly, Foucault suggests that those who are disciplined are unable to see 
power, rather it is felt when their bodies feel restricted and unable to move in a 
particular way.  As such, I suggest that this happens on these sites when an 
individual is directed to follow a particular order of actions, without deviation.  
Often, when completing a registration form, the information is requested in small 
chunks, so, for example, a person might be asked for their name and address 
details on one page, and on the next, their banking details and so on.  In this way, 
they are being directed to share specific information in a particular order and are 
restricted, and often unable to move on until all fields on the current page have 
been completed.  This is frustrating for my participants: 
 
“Erm, yeah, I find that irritating, you know a lot of the time they ask you 
for information that seems superfluous, obviously for marketing and you, 
they don't let you progress with buying something unless you actually fill 
in the details”       (GM, female, 37) 
 
“Companies? Mm, God, I, I, I hate it, I find it unavoidable sometimes, you 
know for example, you’ve gotta sign, to get 10% off in a store or 
whatever, you’ve gotta like put your e-mail down”  (TM, female, 25) 
 
This again links back to the often-heard complaint from my participants that 
companies collect too much data from us, and as such, this is not necessarily 
something that participants are accepting of as part of the tradeoff bargain.  Their 
frustration often leads them to consider ways in which they could access the 
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website or service that they wanted to without having to share data that they were 
uncomfortable sharing. 
 
How can small wins increase control? 
Therefore, while individuals are often required to share information with 
companies, that is not to say that they will always do so.  Even in situations where 
it may appear that the only options available are to share the information or 
discontinue the transaction or registration process, that is not the case.  My 
participants found ways around sharing this information: 
 
“Erm, again, I, I literally will give erm, I have a redundant e-mail address 
erm, which I will give them as my initial contact, erm, and I never give 
them the right mobile number, I change the last digit.” (CB, male, 37) 
 
“…sometimes I just lie because I'm irritated erm, I almost always try to 
just not fill it in and I only then fill it in if they won't let me progress and 
then erm, and then yeah, I lie and then later on I get e-mails, so I put in 
everything, like, fake names, all this kind of stuff, and then I get lots and 
lots and lots of e-mails to these fake names so I know, I mean, I don't, I 
never remember which website that I've put that particular fake name to 
but I'm just like, 'Well, clearly they are selling my data', even if they say 
they aren't…”       (GM, female, 37) 
 
It is clear that individuals are not simply accepting that they must provide 
information to a company and when data is flagged as being mandatory, they 
resist in a subtle way, which allows them to gain access to the service or website 
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without having to provide their data.  I term this behaviour ‘small wins’, as it 
offers a means of resistance, which is likely to go unnoticed by the company 
itself, and at a macro level, will change very little.  However, for my participants, 
it gave them a feeling of power, of not being forced to submit to someone else’s 
will.  It allowed them to feel that they had ‘got away’ with bending the rules.  In 
Foucauldian terms, it allows them to resist the disciplinary power and exercise a 
little control in a situation in which they appear to be powerless.  Please note that 
when I am discussing control here, I mean in the sense of individuals being able 
to make the decision of whether to share information with a company and behave 
according to that decision.  As discussed previously, there are often times when 
people are compelled to share information that they are not comfortable sharing, 
and so when I speak of control here, it refers to individuals having the ability to 
behave in ways that align with their beliefs. The work of de Certeau (1988) and 
Fiske (1989) is particularly relevant here, as both speak of the various tactics 
available to those who are disempowered versus the strategies of those who are 
powerful. 
 
De Certeau argues that rather than being submissive, individuals may appear to 
have accepted the dominant message, but have instead subverted it in their own 
covert way.  He speaks in terms of ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’ (1988 p.185), to 
highlight the difference in power in these sorts of relationships.  He defines 
strategies as practices coming from a position of power, offering the ‘proper’ way 
to behave.  I argue that strategies are utilised by social networking sites when they 
direct users’ behaviour and as examined above, are able to allow or deny access to 
their resource.  As such, the terms and conditions set out by these sites offer the 
‘proper’ way to behave.  Tactics on the other hand, are for those deemed to be 
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‘other’: those who are on the margins who have no power.  Tactics are not 
deemed to be proper, however, they are often employed in daily life.  Therefore, 
de Certeau suggests that tactics are a tool for people trapped in a system that they 
are unable to escape from, in other words, they provide the means to subvert the 
dominant system and spaces.  If we, again consider social networking sites, here, 
these could be described as being a dominant space, for the reasons outlined 
previously, in terms of the rules that those inhabiting those spaces are expected 
and required to follow.   
 
Although the spaces in which consumers are able to utilise tactics is growing 
smaller, there is still room for subversion.  When subversion occurs, it is not a 
case of the imposed rules being overtly rejected, instead they are used in a 
modified way, this is why, it may appear to others that the dominant message has 
been taken on by those in a submissive position, but this is not the case (Fiske, 
1989).  As such, it seems that they have accepted their position, but this is not so.  
This style of subversion is not planned, rather it happens ‘in the moment’, when 
an opportunity presents itself. 
 
I would describe the actions of my participants as employing ‘tactics’ in order to 
maintain the level of privacy that they are comfortable with, while appearing to 
share the information that companies require.  Participants describe the tactics 
they employ without a second thought; it is simply something that they do: 
 
 “That’s the thing, look at Facebook for example, I mean I write a post 
about once a month, I, I go on it all the time, but I don’t ever actually do 
anything on it. So, because I’m not doing anything, I suppose in a sense, 
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I’m not really contributing in the way that they, businesses would want, or 
people would want. Erm, yeah, so I suppose in that sense it doesn’t really 
work on me quite the same as it would others…”   (LG, male, 24) 
 
“So, so, for example, I have a erm, I have a, I have a main e-mail address 
and then an e-mail address for junk…I have a kind of fake date of birth in, 
in, in, in my head…Erm, yeah so I will, I will, I will, purposefully deceive 
them in order to pass the form…err then I'm gonna give you what you 
want, but I'm not necessarily going to give you the true value of it.”   
(PW, male, 37) 
 
This suggests that these participants are ‘making do’ with the tools available to 
them.  The company they are interacting with requires certain information from 
them, however, they are subverting this requirement by supplying false 
information so that they can access the website without compromising their 
privacy.  In essence, they have fooled the company into believing that the data 
they have supplied is true.  My participants understand that they are subverting 
the system in some way, as the quotes above illustrate, particularly the second 
quote, in which PW talks about how he will supply false information so that he 
can gain access to the website, but he will not give the company anything of 
value, in terms of true information.  This type of behaviour is not limited to my 
participants, and has been described in other studies, in similar ways.  Hargittai & 
Marwick (2016) describe how students struggle with navigating Facebook’s 
privacy settings and so take matters into their own hands in order to achieve their 





Employing tactics as described above, can be a useful way for individuals to feel 
in control of what is happening to their information, and this can lead to them 
feeling less concerned about their privacy (Nowak & Phelps, 1992).  It seems that 
simply being able to take action can reduce worries in this area, potentially 
because it moves control back into the hands of the individual, rather than the 
company (even if only in a small way).  This links with the previous chapter and 
the importance that people place on feeling in control of their information and 
what happens to it, as such, supplying false information to companies can lead 
individuals to believe that they have more control.  This can be particularly 
helpful in situations whereby individuals feel unable to trust those collecting their 
information and as such may mitigate the discomfort of sharing information with 
an organisation that a person does not trust. 
 
Supplying false information I not a new tactic and when carrying out research 
previously, Metzger (2004) found that 20% of his participants admitted to 
providing false information.  Although I did not ask my survey participants 
whether they had done this while completing my survey, I did ask them whether 






This suggests that sharing false information with companies is widespread 
practice for my participants, as two-thirds of respondents admit to doing so.  
Although I did not ask them to specify the type of information, I suspect that often 
it is their e-mail address, as many of my interviewees had set up an email address 
specifically for ‘spam’ emails.  In this sense, it is not strictly speaking, false 
information, as the e-mail address does exist, but it is more that it is not the 
person’s main e-mail address, and so is not one that they check regularly.  
However, it is still a tactic that they are employing, as it is subverting the 
dominant power, by refusing to submit to the expectation of the company 
requesting information. 
 
While supplying false information offers individuals the opportunity to appear to 
be participating in the social norm of sharing information (when they are, in fact 
subverting this), that is not to say that it is the only method employed in these 




Do you ever provide false information to online companies and 
organisations?
Don't know/Prefer not to say Yes No
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altogether.  Although this is an obvious refusal to engage with the social norm and 
so may not appear to fall under the ‘small wins’ theory I put forth, this is not the 
case, particularly when we consider the work of Fiske (1989) in greater detail.   
 
Fiske suggests two ways in which individuals can employ a counter-reading of the 
dominant culture, through ‘resistance’ or ‘evasion’, (1989 p.2) which I argue is 
broadly the two categories that my participants’ responses fall under.  It is 
important to note that it has been argued that any form of evasion or resistance 
that takes place on an individual level is occurring within the status quo and so 
cannot be considered true evasion or resistance.  However, this ignores the micro 
level of everyday life and as such does not recognise the differences (as well as 
the links) between the various levels of resistance.  It is also important to note that 
at an individual level, people may feel unable to make grand gestures which lead 
to large-scale changes, but by utilising evasion or resistance, on a day-to-day 
basis, they feel slightly more in control.  In this way, individuals are drawn to 
resist the meanings being offered as a way of having autonomy over the meaning 
of their life, which they do not have ordinarily.  Where individuals have no 
control over their lives, they cannot be empowered individuals, which means that 
they are unable to take social action.  In situations when individuals are able to 
make gains in their daily lives, it means that they have been able to create space in 
which they can take action and create shifts in social power relations (albeit 
potentially small ones).  It is also worth remembering that de Certeau (1988) also 
recognised that it is only possible to resist from within the dominant culture, not 




It has been argued that if individuals are focused on merely improving conditions 
for themselves (rather than radically altering the system as a whole), then these 
tactics work to make the system itself stronger and delay the possibility of any 
real change.  However, Fiske argues, that the resistance offered by popular culture 
has an impact at a micro level, and it offers a gradual erosion of the micro level, 
thus ‘weakening the system from within’ (p.11).  I would suggest that this is what 
is happening when individuals share false information, because in doing so, they 
are supplying information that offers little (if any) value to those collecting the 
data.  Therefore, when it is linked with other data, even if that information is 
correct, the inferences or predictions made will be based on partially incorrect 
information and so are less likely to be accurate.  The impact of this may be 
limited, if only a few people take this action, as those collecting the information 
are unlikely to notice and may in fact only succeed in ensuring that the individuals 
themselves are presented with advertisements that are not relevant to them.  
However, if this action was taken on a larger scale, it would raise questions 
regarding the efficacy and efficiency of the commodification of individuals’ 
information and could potentially render it pointless.  It is important to note that 
this would require a large number of people to take this action and given that the 
actions of companies are broadly hidden when considering what happens to our 
data once we have shared it, this is unlikely to happen (although not impossible).  
It is also worth considering that generally, in their day-to-day lives, individuals 
are not necessarily aiming to make grand structural changes, rather they are often 
simply trying to make it through the day, with as little fuss as possible. 
 
Fiske (1989) suggests the shopping mall as an example of a place where 
resistance can occur through acts of subversion.  As such, although it is a place for 
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consumption, the shopping mall is freely accessible by individuals whether they 
intend to make a purchase or not.  Therefore, when individuals visit the mall with 
no intention of consuming, they are subverting the purpose of that space.  I 
suggest that this can be adapted to describe one form of subversion which occurs 
on social networking sites, in terms of those who join these sites but refuse to post 
regular status updates therefore resisting the dominant use of the space and 
refusing to use it for its intended purpose.  This ensures that the owners of the site 
are able to collect very little information about them in order to sell it to 
advertisers.  This is exemplified in the below quote: 
 
“That’s the thing, look at Facebook for example, I mean I write a post 
about once a month, I, I go on it all the time, but I don’t ever actually do 
anything on it. So, because I’m not doing anything, I suppose in a sense, 
I’m not really contributing in the way that they, businesses would want, or 
people would want. Erm, yeah, so I suppose in that sense it doesn’t really 
work on me quite the same as it would others…”   (LG, male, 24) 
 
Fiske would argue that this individual is able to ‘evade…control’ (1989 p.33) and 
as such LG can freely use Facebook to contact friends and family in a convenient 
way, without having to pay for it with his privacy. 
 
Fiske offers a further example which is useful here, when he discusses those who 
play video games in arcades and attempt to play on machines for as long as 
possible, having only paid a minimal amount of money to do so.  This is seen as a 
battle against the arcade owners, whereby the video game players ‘win their 
pleasures…by resistance rather than through cooperation.’ (p.86).  Therefore, it is 
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a way of taking control in a system which is set-up to encourage people to spend 
money quickly, therefore when a player is able to play for a long time with very 
little cost, it is seen as ‘beating the system’ (p.81). 
 
In the same way as above, this could be used to describe the social media users 
who enter as little information as possible when creating an account with the site.  
The aim in this case would be to enter as little information as possible while still 
being able to maintain relationships with others through the site.  The battle here 
is between the social media site, and the user, with the user managing to ‘beat the 
system’ (Fiske, 1989 p.81) if they are able to share minimal data, thus making 
them essentially worthless to the site as there is little to sell to advertisers.  It is a 
way of refusing to provide surplus value, while still making use of the resources 
offered by the site, essentially for free.  It is important to note here that (as 
discussed in my literature review), social media relies on more than simply the 
information we post (Bucher, 2018) and as such inferences are made based on 
who we are linked with and so this may not be quite as effective in terms of 
evading the collection of information as perceived.  While this is not overtly 
recognised by my participants, it was mentioned during the discussion of sharing 
false information: 
 
“Erm, yeah so I will, I will, I will, purposefully deceive them in order to 
pass the form…err then I'm gonna give you what you want, but I'm not 
necessarily going to give you the true value of it.”   (PW, male, 37) 
 
Therefore, this participant is quite open about providing false information that 
will have no value to the advertisers who will be sold his information (because it 
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is not truly his information).  The sharing of false information is another method 
that can be used to beat the system, especially when the information being 
requested is mandatory.  Therefore, by providing false information, the user is 
again able to access the site without paying with their information.  While many 
do not necessarily speak in the same terms as this participant, there is a 
recognition that providing false information is a way of refusing to play by the 
rules of the social networking site. 
 
When Fiske talks about evasion, he argues that ‘evading this power or inverting it 
is an act of defiance’ (1989 p.9), which is what I argue my participants are doing 
when they refuse to share information; they are evading the coercive power of the 
organisations collecting this information and in doing so are refusing to fully 
engage with it.  In many ways, this offers a counter-argument to the neo-Marxist 
argument put forth in my literature review that while individuals may not 
consciously recognise that they are being exploited when using social media, they 
do feel a level of discomfort when asked to provide information they do not want 
to share.  This was described by Foucault (1977) in terms of individuals being 
compelled to behave in particular ways by disciplinary power, but only noticing it 
when they feel restricted in some way.  As such, when people want to behave in a 
particular way, but are unable to do so, they have limited options available and so 
employ methods of evasion or resistance, rather than simply submitting to the 
inevitable exploitation described by neo-Marxists. 
 
As discussed previously, the two main ways in which individuals are able to defy 
expectations are through resistance (providing false information) or evasion 
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(refusing to provide information). Therefore, it will be useful to compare the 
proportion of individuals utilising these options:  
 
  
% Provide false 
information (n) 
% Refused to provide 
information (n) 
Don't know/Prefer not to say 4.58 (14) 3.91 (12) 
Yes 66.99 (205) 88.60 (272) 
No 28.43 (87) 7.49 (23) 
Total12 100.00 (306) 100.00 (307) 
 
This demonstrates that while people admit to sharing false information (67.0%), 
they are much more likely to refuse to share information altogether (88.6%).  This 
could be because they feel that refusing to share information feels more honest; 
they are taking action to demonstrate their reticence towards sharing that 
information.  Some may be uncomfortable with purposely deceiving the company 
involved, and as such feel that refusing to share information is at least honest.  It 
is also possible that in situations whereby individuals employ refusal of 
information, there is an alternative company or way of carrying out the task at 
hand, and so they do not lose that opportunity by refusing to share information.  
Alternatively, supplying false information may be utilised in situations whereby 
there is no alternative and refusal of information would present additional 
inconvenience to the individual.  There is also the possibility that those 
participants had simply not considered providing false information as an option. 
 
 
12 Please note, this question was not compulsory and so participants were able to move on to the 
next question without providing a response. 
211 
	
This distinction between providing false information versus completely refusing 
to share information can be seen in other research in this area, whereby 
individuals are much more averse to supplying false information than to simply 
refusing to share it.  In Preibusch, et al.’s (2013) study, participants are asked 
what they would do if a non-governmental website asked them for information 
that they did not want to share and offered various options.  The majority of 
respondents say that they would cancel out of the transaction (74%), while others 
said that they would provide false information (24%).  While the difference here 
is much starker than in my research, both demonstrate a preference towards 
refusal of information rather than providing false information. 
 
Dommeyer and Gross (2003) reveal similar views in their research and find that 
generally people will refuse to share information (50%), rather than provide false 
information (11%) when asked to share a telephone number.  This suggests that 
people are more reticent when faced with the option of sharing false information, 
Dommeyer and Gross suggest that this may be because ‘…it is viewed as 
dishonest and unethical’ (p.48).  It is interesting to note, that as time has 
progressed, the proportion of respondents who report being willing to share false 






While it is interesting to compare these results it is important to remember that the 
questions in the three studies are phrased differently, and so the percentages are 
not necessarily directly comparable.  However, it is worth considering why 
changes may have occurred.  It could be due to a change in attitudes towards 
companies, in that they now feel much more faceless and abstract, and so 
individuals are less concerned about supplying false information to them.  It is 
also possible that the amount of information we are being asked for has increased 
over this time period, as the way in which we interact with companies has 
changed and so we still want to be able to take part in this ‘essential’ part of daily 
life, without sharing more information than we are comfortable with. 
 
Some interesting differences come to light when we consider the role gender 
might play in terms of which tactics are employed.  When Sheehan (1999) asks 
participants how often they adopt particular behaviours when online, she finds 
that women are less likely to take action than men when concerned about their 



















Changes in proportion of those providing false information versus refusing to 
provide information over time
False information Refuse information
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much more frequently than providing false information.  However, while women 
were more likely to refuse to share information than men, they were less likely to 
provide false information.  The reason for this is deemed to be that men and 
women behave differently when it comes to protecting their privacy and men are 
more likely to take an active role and complain when companies collect (or 
attempt to collect) information that they do not want to share, while women are 
more passive and so will opt for action that is less confrontational. 
 




While my responses are similar to those from Sheehan’s study, there is little 
difference in the percentages employing each of the methods here, particularly in 
terms of refusing to share information.  This could be due to a difference in 
attitude and behaviour of men and women, however, it could also be that attitudes 
have changed over time and it has become more commonplace for everyone to 
simply refuse to share information that they are unhappy sharing, particularly if 




























It is important to note that whether an individual is employing resistance (sharing 
false information) or evasion (refusing to supply information at all), they are not 
attempting to change the overall system under which they live, these micro acts 
offer them a means to improve their daily experience (Fiske, 1989).  This is what 
the ‘small wins’ I have examined here do; they give individuals a feeling of 
gaining a little control by being the one who decides what will happen to their 
information.  In that transaction, at that moment, despite knowing deep down that 
we are relatively powerless to stop the collection of our information on a large 
scale, the individual is able to simply say ‘No’, and withhold the information 
being requested, whether that is through sharing false information or in refusing to 
share the information altogether.  These ‘small wins’ offer a moment in which 
individuals take back a small piece of power and are able to feel that they have 
‘won’ in a small way.  It is important to remember that although I have suggested 
that when people refuse to share information or share false information, this is an 
act of resistance, there may be other explanations for this.  During my interviews, 
participants expressed feelings of control regarding being able to decide whether 
to share information or not and being able to minimise the information they share, 
however, this may not be the case for everyone who behaves in this way, and as 
such other interpretations should not be discounted.  Further, my focus here was 
in the conscious sharing of information, as this is something that participants were 
able to grasp and take diverging action (if they chose to).  However, there are 
numerous other ways in which information is gathered by companies (Stoilova et 
al., 2019a), such as the items that individuals click on and the information or 
profiles they browse.  Therefore, data generation is often something that occurs in 
the background and so is something that people have far less control over, unless 
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they choose to opt out of using the internet altogether, which as discussed 
previously, carries many disadvantages.  As such, this is why I discuss the above 
actions as small acts of resistance as the overt sharing of information is not the 
only way in which social media sites are able to collect information from us.  
Therefore, even in situations whereby a person is registered with a social 
networking site under false details and only views the profiles of others, they will 
still generate a level of information, particularly as companies utilise those we are 




The previous chapter considered issues of control, with particular focus on how 
much control individuals feel they have, whether they would like more and what 
barriers exist which reduce their ability to maintain the level of control they would 
like.  I offered an examination of the concerns raised by my participants and 
suggested that continued sharing of information may not be an indication of 
acceptance, rather a resignation to do so.  This chapter built upon this to consider 
the ways in which individuals can be said to be making tradeoff decisions.  This 
offered a suggestion that rather than feeling apathetic, people are simply weighing 
up the potential costs and benefits and sharing data accordingly.  Individuals are 
attempting to make logical, reasoned decisions in terms of trading their 
information for various benefits, (such as product discounts or targeted 
advertising).  I argue that while this may appear to be a positive way for 
individuals to exercise their autonomy, the situation is more complicated than it 
initially appears, and due to the ‘availability heuristic’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1982 p.20), the decisions we make may not be those that offer the greatest 
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benefits.  This may also be compounded by our time-inconsistent nature 
(O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2000), in which our intentions towards greater privacy are 
defeated by the convenience offered in the moment.  It is also important to 
consider the perceived benefits from sharing data such as greater convenience and 
being able to maintain relationships with friends and family through social 
networking sites.  These incentives cannot be underestimated and the fear of 
suffering social isolation due to withdrawing from social media in particular may 
be too much for many to bear.  Even when concerns are expressed, people are not 
necessarily sure what the best course of action is.  As such, individuals feel a 
certain level of ambivalence, especially around whether they are willing to pay for 
additional privacy.  There appears to be an age-related difference in attitudes 
when considering those aged between 30 and 40 (who are willing to pay) and 
those aged 20-29 (who are unwilling to pay).  However, given the potentially 
precarious financial situation that many people in their twenties currently face, it 
may be more a case of being unable to afford to pay for increased privacy, rather 
than being unwilling to do so. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, it can be difficult to exercise autonomy 
when being asked to share information and, in this chapter, I took this further to 
use the lens of Foucault’s disciplinary power to consider how this is demonstrated 
through social media.  By applying a Foucauldian approach, it is clear that despite 
not noticing it, we are often subject to disciplinary power in terms of the rules that 
we must abide by when utilising these sites.  This kind of discipline is difficult to 
recognise, as it tends to rely on coercion to train users to behave ‘correctly’ and so 
encourages us to share much of our data, while making it appear that we are 
making a choice to do so.  Although, it may seem that in these situations we are 
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unable to exercise any real autonomy, I suggest that we can behave as any 
disempowered group would and utilise the limited tools available to us to 
tactically subvert the rules (de Certeau, 1988 and Fiske, 1989).  These small wins 
offer the ability to either resist or refuse the data collection we are subject to on a 
daily basis and take the form of supplying false information (resist) or refusing to 
provide certain information (refuse).  Although they do not necessarily offer 
large-scale action at a macro level, at a micro level they allow people to maintain 
the level of privacy they desire, while appearing to have accepted the dominant 
message that sharing information is preferable.  As such while these acts of 
defiance may not be noticed by those collecting the information, they offer a way 
for individuals to feel in control in their daily lives. 
 
While the focus so far has been on how individuals feel about sharing their 
information with companies in a general sense, the next chapter will take a more 
nuanced approach to this and examine the role that context plays.  This will 
consider how individuals feel not only about the type of information they are 





Chapter Five: Context Matters 
Introduction 
 
In the previous two chapters, my focus has been on issues surrounding the sharing 
of information with companies, and concerns that my participants have around 
issues of control when being asked to share information.  I have examined the 
ways in which individuals attempt to take control in seemingly small ways, as 
well as offering an explanation of the various barriers they encounter in their 
attempts to share only the information they want to.  This chapter will take a more 
detailed view to consider the conditions under which individuals are more 
concerned about sharing their data. 
 
Initially, I discuss the importance of context to individuals, in terms of the value 
of being able to keep different areas of one’s life separate from each other (this is 
often a case of professional-life versus personal-life).  This section examines the 
issue of ‘context collapse’ (Vitak, 2012 p.451), and the problems this can cause 
for individuals when different contexts overlap, causing a clash between expected 
social norms.  It will also consider the importance of Nissenbaum’s theory of 
‘contextual integrity’ (2010 p.2), and how this can be said to offer an explanation 
for the discomfort we feel when contextual norms are broken.   
 
Following this and utilising the work of Raynes-Goldie (2012), I propose that 
levels of concern around sharing information depend very much on the type of 
data being requested.  As such, I will be applying Raynes-Goldie’s distinction of 
‘institutional’ and ‘social privacy’ (p.81) to examine how different types of data 
can evoke different levels of concern from individuals.  In creating this 
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distinction, she suggests that institutional privacy relates to what organisations do 
with the information that we share with them, while social privacy is linked with 
information that impacts upon our reputation and who we are in the eyes of 
others. 
 
While the distinction made by Raynes-Goldie is persuasive, I suggest that in 
addition to this, social privacy itself can be broken down further, into ‘intrinsic’ 
and ‘issued’ information categories which while not mutually exclusive, offer 
some potential insights into different levels of concern around different types of 
information.  Within this section, I will also explore an alternative explanation for 
variations in concern around different types of information, in terms of how 
immediate and visible the threat is, utilising the ‘availability heuristic’ (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982 p.20). 
 
The final section of this chapter will consider the impact of different audiences 
upon levels of concern for my participants.  This will focus on my survey results 
to consider various combinations of audience and information type.  While the 
levels of concern around many information/audience combinations are broadly as 
expected, there are a number of counter-intuitive findings which will be examined 
here with potential explanations offered. 
 
It is important to remember that while audience-type offers a level of 
complication to the concerns individuals have around their information, it is one 
of numerous additional factors that could be considered.  Other factors include 
(but are not limited to) the reason for the information being requested, and the 
content of the information itself.  As such, some information will be shared with 
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little concern if the individual it relates to believes that the information itself is of 
little consequence.  This will also be examined in the final section of this chapter.   
It is important to note that the more factors that are considered when examining 
privacy concerns, the more will be revealed in terms of the impact they have, and 
as such, my work here is exploratory in nature. 
 
At this point it will be helpful to provide a brief reminder of what I mean when I 
discuss the terms ‘internet privacy’ and ‘social media privacy’.  Internet privacy is 
a term I use to encompass any information that we share with companies when 
online, broadly when accessing a service, whether that is online banking, 
purchasing an item online or using social media.  Social media privacy, however, 
refers to privacy in relation to a smaller sub-section of sites which we use to 
connect with friends and family.  Both of these terms refer to the collection of our 
data when we are online, and includes information we may be aware of sharing, as 
well as information that we are not aware of sharing. 
 
What issues occur when contexts collapse? 
 
Context plays a crucial role in our daily lives.  Throughout the course of a day, we 
move between different contexts, often without giving it any thought.  Generally 
speaking, we are not the same version of ourselves in each situation, rather, we 
put on what Goffman referred to as a ‘performance’ (1980 p.109) whenever we 
interact with others.  For example, I might begin my day by working out at the 
gym, before getting the bus to work, where I spend most of my day working in an 
open-plan office, later on enjoying lunch with colleagues.  At the end of the day I 
might get the bus home and then meet a friend at the cinema in the evening.  Each 
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of these situations requires different behaviour (and a different performance) and 
has its own set of social norms, which often only become apparent in the event of 
them being broken (Nissenbaum, 2011).   
 
To offer an illustration, if I were to sit next to a stranger on the bus and tell him or 
her about a situation in which my husband had recently upset me and ask for their 
advice, it would probably make them feel extremely uncomfortable, however, if I 
did the same while enjoying an evening out with my friend, it would not seem 
unusual.  The social norms of these situations are broadly unspoken but are 
known to those within them and dictate the acceptable (and unacceptable) 
behaviour for each one.  This highlights the relational nature of privacy, and how 
it is demonstrated through the interactions that we have with one another 
(Stoilova et al., 2019a).  This conception of privacy builds on the work of 
Nissenbaum (2010), who suggests that social norms tell us what to expect in a 
given situation and how they are a product of the society in which they exist.  This 
concept is also highlighted by Blank, et al. (2014) who describe these contexts as 
being ‘circles’ (p.25), that represent the different areas in our lives which are 
generally separate from each other.  Therefore, they suggest that there is not a 
single overarching standard that sets out how we should behave in all situations, 
rather it depends on the social context in which we find ourselves.  This reinforces 
the importance of the distinction between public and private areas as discussed 
previously and highlights the way in which we behave differently when we are in 
a space deemed to be private, versus one which is deemed to be public.  In this 
way, (in a broader sense) we can see how social context exists on a macro level, 
when there is what many deem to be a binary distinction between public and 
private areas (although this is not necessarily the case).  This highlights the way in 
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which social context plays a role in our behaviour, even when we fail to consider 
it. 
 
Nissenbaum (2010) also suggests that contexts do not necessarily stand alone, and 
highlights the possibility for them to overlap, which leads to individuals having to 
manage numerous contexts simultaneously.  She argues that this is not an issue in 
and of itself, rather problems arise when action permitted in one context is not 
permitted in a different, overlapping context (Sheehan, 2002).  This causes issues 
for individuals as it can be difficult to identify what the acceptable behaviour is in 
such a situation.  This is problematic because, as noted above, we behave 
differently in different situations and so when contexts overlap, we risk having to 
reveal a part of ourselves that had until that point remained hidden to those in a 
particular context.  This can be troubling as it may mean that others gain a worse 
impression of us when they discover who we ‘really’ are (Goffman, 1968). 
 
When this happens, it is often referred to as ‘social convergence’ (boyd, 2008 
p.18) or ‘context collapse’ (Vitak 2012 p.451) and has become increasingly linked 
with our online lives, particularly in relation to social media.  This is because 
sites, such as Facebook, have a tendency to blur previously distinct contexts and 
as such, once someone is added to your list of friends, they are potentially given 
access to all of your posts and so on, regardless of whether they are a close friend 
or an acquaintance13 (Raynes-Goldie, 2012).  This is problematic, as it is not how 
friendships operate in the offline world; here, we may choose to share things with 
 
13 There are two things to note here: firstly, when posting a status update on Facebook, users can 
decide to exclude particular friends from seeing that post and secondly, Facebook’s use of 
algorithms means that being friends with someone does not automatically give them access to all 
of their posts.  Dependent upon various factors, a user may only see a limited selection of a 
friend’s status updates.  Nevertheless, the potential exists for an acquaintance to have access to 
more of an individual’s Facebook status updates than a close friend.		
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our close friends, that we would never divulge to work colleagues, for example.  
This causes issues of control for users especially because social networking sites 
limit the options available when responding to a friend request to either accept or 
reject.  Whilst in reality, people manage this through only sharing certain posts 
with specific groups or excluding particular ‘friends’ from seeing posts, a starker 
choice is more consciously posed. 
 
The issue with ‘context collapse’ (Vitak, 2012 p.451) is that ‘Information that is 
well-known and freely available in one circle (say, a family) could be 
embarrassing or damaging if it were to become known in another setting (such as 
an employer)’ (Blank, et al., 2014 p.26).  Therefore, due to this loss of distinction 
between different contexts, everything is potentially known by everyone, which is 
problematic for the individual involved, particularly if it casts them in a poor light 
to their line manager (for example).  This is an issue because individuals may post 
a status update to Facebook, believing that they are doing so in one context 
(personal context, for example), which has one set of norms ‘only to find that 
others [such as their employer] have taken them to be operating in a different one’ 
(Nissenbaum, 2010 p.225).  The potential for a clash of personal and professional 
contexts is highlighted as a concern amongst a number of my interview 
participants: 
“Errrr, the only person or people I’d be intere- I’d be concerned about is 
my employer because… I don’t want them to be looking at the things I 
post online and assuming things about me…I think my employer should 
have a more professional image of who I am and I don’t think them 
looking at it [social media posts] will give them a good idea of who I am.”  




“Cos I feel like, you know, when I’m in my social life, my friends, it’s 
such a, I’m in a very different world and headspace to when I’m at work.”  
(PF, male, 39) 
 
“…but Facebook for me is, like I said, you know, I’m trying to keep that 
as private as I can, so erm, I’m try- I’m cutting out work colleagues as 
much as I can…I mean I do try to keep work and, and, and, and private 
separate”             (TP, female, 40) 
 
This demonstrates the concerns that my participants have in terms of the potential 
issue of their work and personal contexts becoming merged so that their employer 
or work colleagues have access to more information about them than they are 
comfortable with.  It also hints at the way in which many of us attempt to portray 
ourselves as being professional at work but accept that this is not necessarily who 
we are when we are not at work. 
 
Therefore, the nature of social networking sites means that we cannot know with 
any certainty who our audience is; when we post information to Twitter, for 
example, we have no idea which of our friends will read it and comment on it, or 
whether they will share it more widely.  boyd (2014) argues that if we choose to 
engage with these sites, there is little we can do, except to accept that context 
collapses will occur (and attempt to resolve them when they do) or not to 
participate at all.  As discussed previously, eschewing social media completely is 
problematic for many individuals in their daily lives.  Engaging in this way has 
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become embedded in the everyday lives of many to such an extent that refusal to 
engage with social media is not perceived to be a realistic option. 
 
Participants are aware of this issue, to varying degrees, and some attempt to fine-
tune their privacy options in a bid to gain greater control over who can see their 
information: 
 
“I mean for one example, I haven't done this in my existing job, but a 
previous job where I was, I was friends on Facebook with my manager, I 
set it up so that he was the only person that couldn't see my posts, cos I 
just wanted to take that out of my mind that I can post stuff, I think that 
was mainly about political stuff that I just, I'm sure it probably would have 
been OK, but I erm just thought I'd rather like just not have to think about 
what's he gonna think about me saying this stuff?”   (PF, male, 39) 
 
“…I've made dedicated groups sometimes with just the people that I went 
on that holiday with, you know, for sharing purposes…” (TM, female, 25) 
 
This highlights not only an awareness of the varying contexts that my participants 
are moving between in their daily, online lives, but also demonstrates the attempts 
that some are making to gain a little more control, in order to maintain the 
boundaries between contexts.  While they do not necessarily speak in these terms, 
it is clear that these participants feel it important enough to make efforts to 
differentiate which groups of people (or individuals) can see specific information 
about them, and which cannot.  Given the additional knowledge and effort 
required to make these changes, I suggest that the issue of context collapse is 
important to my participants and is concerning enough for them that they are 
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taking action.  It is also interesting to note here that participants are trying to 
obscure information, which is not necessarily embarrassing, but rather could cause 
an issue for them if it were to move between contexts. 
 
While it may seem initially that the issue here is the movement of information 
between contexts, this can also be linked to my earlier discussion around control.  
These participants (and others) are making efforts to control who has access to 
their information and are attempting to maintain boundaries around it in terms of 
the various contexts in which it can be known.  This highlights the importance of 
maintaining control over this information to ensure that it is only seen by those 
that they choose to allow to access it.  Here, the context in which the information 
is being shared appears to be less important than controlling who has access to it.  
PF even says that although he restricted the information that his manager was able 
to see, he was sure that it would not have been an issue, therefore it could be said 
that what is actually important to PF is that he was able to take action to control 
what others are able to know about him, rather than what the information is itself. 
 
This is an important point, as questions are often raised regarding how much the 
public actually cares about their privacy, given the amount of data that they share, 
particularly on social media.  However, Nissenbaum (2010) argues that if we 
consider privacy as a right insofar as ‘context-appropriate flows’ (p.187) of 
information, it means that it is perfectly reasonable for individuals to say that they 
are concerned about privacy, while sharing information as long as their behaviour 
(in terms of what they share and what they withhold) is consistent with the 
contextual norms of the given situation.  There are ‘context-relative informational 
norms’ (p.140), which set out the movement for specific types of information and 
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transmission rules which must be followed (such as the relationship between the 
transmitter and the receiver and how each party should behave).  Transmission 
principles vary according to context and so, for example, there are differences 
between the friendship context and the healthcare professional context (although, 
there are also some similarities).  While in both contexts sensitive and confidential 
information is shared, in the friendship context this will be reciprocal, but this 
would be completely inappropriate in the healthcare professional context.  
Therefore, different norms define different situations and what is acceptable 
within them.  
 
Intrinsic and issued information 
 
Through discussions with interview participants, it became clear that different 
types of information elicit different responses in terms of concerns regarding the 
information being shared.  Although my initial focus (and indeed the focus of the 
next section) is on the combination of types of data and specific audiences with 
access to it, it is useful, when considering types of information, to begin from a 
broader perspective. 
 
Raynes-Goldie (2012) suggests that an individual’s privacy can be separated into 
one of two broad (but distinct) categories: ‘social’ and ‘institutional’ (p.81).  
While institutional privacy focuses on how institutions use and store our data, 
social privacy is more concerned with the ‘management of identity, reputation and 
social contexts’ (p.82).  Raynes-Goldie’s concept of social privacy links directly 
with the above discussion regarding context collapse and the issues that this can 
cause for individuals, particularly in terms of them being able to maintain control 
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over the impression that others have of them in different contexts.  She also 
highlights how Facebook only allows users to control their social privacy (through 
the privacy settings on the site) however, there are no options available which 
allow users to make changes in terms of their institutional privacy.  She argues 
that this distracts users, encouraging them to believe they have complete control 
over their privacy when in reality, they are only afforded (limited) control over 
their social privacy.  This in turn, makes it more difficult for users to consider 
what Facebook itself is doing with their information ‘behind-the-scenes’ and as 
such, her participants are far more concerned with their social privacy than with 
their institutional privacy.  This is problematic because if there is greater focus on 
one type of privacy (in this case, social), there is a possibility that the other type 
of privacy will be forgotten.  Although Raynes-Goldie’s focus is on Facebook, I 
suggest that this could lead to companies in general believing that they are able to 
do whatever they choose with individuals’ information, with little concern or 
regard for those supplying the data.   
 
Miller (2016) suggests that when companies collect large amounts of information, 
individuals cease to exist, becoming nothing more than data, which requires no 
ethical concern or responsibility.  He refers to this as ‘abstraction’, which ‘refers 
to the removal or withdrawal of something from its setting or context’ (p.56), 
therefore, in this situation, individuals cease to be considered to be a ‘real’ person 
who should be treated with respect.  As such, if institutional privacy is not 
considered by individuals, companies will continue to collect vast amounts of 
information, unchallenged, building up ever greater profiles and selling this 
information to data brokers.  This practice is something that people are largely 
unaware of and so they share more information than they realise and only become 
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aware of this when a tailored advertisement appears on their Facebook page (for 
example).  Many participants speak about how this makes them feel 
uncomfortable: 
 
“the idea of all the adverts that come up on my Facebook, they, they are 
tailored to either website searches or erm, if I've put my e-mail into 
something else…Erm it's weird that it comes up on things like my age and 
my marital status and if I'm in a relationship but not married, and I find 
sometimes that I get all these wedding, or engagement things pop up…so 
erm it's those type of things that I find bizarre” (MJ, female, 25) 
 
“I suppose', but then yeah, on the flip side of that, it's kind of you feel 
sometimes like you're talking maybe to a…group of close friends, when 
you're on Facebook or when you're googling you think you're at home, 
you know, on an evening, on your own just doing some stuff that you need 
to do, and you realise then when an ad pops up the next day that 
somebody's watching, or a machine is watching, something is watching 
and it does make you feel kind of a little bit err, violated, I guess.”  
(ES, female, 36) 
 
While this may not appear to be a serious issue, it is clear that individuals are not 
comfortable with the practice and when confronted with tailored advertising, are 
left feeling uneasy.  This is particularly interesting as it appears to contradict the 
findings reported on page 184 whereby almost 70% of my participants agreed or 
strongly agreed that they accept online services are more personalised because 
companies are able to access their personal data.  However, I would suggest that 
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this is not as strange as it may appear, given previous comments from interview 
participants (MJ in particular), whereby they accept that they do not think about 
their data privacy on a daily basis, however, when confronted with it in the form 
of a personalised Facebook ad, are suddenly reminded of how much is known 
about them, and this leads to feelings of unease.  Therefore, potentially my survey 
respondents are aware of and accept that their data is sold to companies, on an 
intellectual level, (although they do not necessarily dwell on it) but may feel 
differently when a Facebook advertisement reminds them that companies know 
more about them than they had realised or consented to. 
 
While Raynes-Goldie’s distinction between institutional and social privacy is 
persuasive, and her explanation of social privacy is logical, it requires 
clarification, in terms of which information can be said to be ‘social’.  She 
focusses on social information as it relates to information shared on social media 
sites.  This however raises questions regarding other types of information that 
does not fit neatly into the institutional or social category.  As such, Raynes-
Goldie’s social categorisation appears to offer no clear space for the commercial 
information that I have been considering throughout this thesis.  However, I 
would argue that as this is information that could impact upon how a person is 
perceived by others it can still be said to lend itself to the broad category of 
‘social’.  Therefore, rather than limiting my consideration solely to Raynes-
Goldie’s narrow definition of social information, I instead, suggest that our 
commercial information can be included in the social category.  This is 
particularly pertinent when we consider the aggregation of our data (as discussed 
in my literature review), in terms of the inferences that are often made based upon 
this information, especially as judgement can be made based upon this (as per 
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Raynes-Goldie’s definition).  For example, there have been instances whereby an 
individual’s sexual orientation has been revealed to their families before they have 
had the opportunity to do so, causing issues for them (Fowler, 2012).  Therefore, 
despite information not necessarily seeming to lend itself to the categorisation of 
‘social’, given that it is often linked with more overtly social information, and due 
to the impact it may have on how others perceive us on its own, I broaden the 
category of social to include it.  During my interviews, a number of my 
participants spontaneously made a distinction between different types of 
information: 
 
“So, I see private information as my location, maybe, and where I’ve been, 
but my personal private information, are probably thoughts and things that 
I would share with family members…So, I see that as slightly different, as 
that’s more intimate to me…that’s like numbers, and serial numbers, 
postcodes…that’s all standard information, but I associate the information 
that was shared from the dating website: feelings, emotions and intimacy 
as different”       (MJ, female, 25) 
 
“I think it’s more emotional privacy, rather than things like my bank card 
details, or how much money I’ve got in my account…I personally feel this 
big divide between like, emotional and kind of, you know, normal 
information, so like my credit card details and stuff like that”  





“I would find the dating website the most worrying, in all honesty because 
I think, you know, that’s kind of qualitative information and data, whereas 
obviously, the rest of what we’ve spoken about, especially when it comes 
to the bank details etcetera. They are digital, they are something that can 
be changed, that can be manipulated etcetera, whereas obviously, the 
information about you…What makes them, as a person?”  
(TM, female, 25) 
 
These participants suggest that there is an important difference between types of 
social information that individuals share.  I have termed these different types of 
information as intrinsic and issued.  As my participants suggest, what I term 
intrinsic data is related to our thoughts, beliefs, values and feelings, in other words 
anything that we would potentially consider to be a part of who we are.  This type 
of information is termed as constitutive (or ‘ontic’) by Floridi (2005 p.198), in 
that it is a part of us, in the same way that a limb is a part of us, and as such 
cannot be easily separated from us.  Issued information on the other hand, is 
information that is about us, and as such, is what Floridi deems to be ‘arbitrary’ 
(2005 p.197) data; it is bank account or credit card numbers, National Insurance 
numbers, mobile telephone numbers and so on.  In other words, it is information 
that is issued to us by others (usually an institution), and as such, can easily be 
detached from us.  It is not a part of who we are, and we have no emotional 
attachment to it, whereas we are emotionally attached to our intrinsic data, as it 
forms part of our identity.  However, it is important to note that this suggested 
dichotomy between intrinsic and issued data may not be true for everyone, and as 
such this is at best considered to be an ideal model of information-type.  Deciding 
where information should fall is potentially an interpretation to be made by each 
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individual in terms of the level of attachment they feel towards the information in 
question.  There does seem to be a distinction to be made here, between different 
types of information, as it is something that my interviewees spoke about without 
prompting, and they had very definite ideas regarding when greater concern 
would be elicited.  This highlights potentially broad categories of information that 
can be used to consider groups of information, rather than categories of single 
types of information. 
 
This complication becomes clearer if we consider financial information.  At first 
glance, it seems that financial data (such as account numbers) falls under the 
issued data category, in that it is not an integral part of our identity, rather, it is 
information that is ascribed to us by an institution.  In Floridi’s terms, it is 
‘attached to the bearer/user like a mere label…it is merely associated with 
someone’s identity and can easily be detached from it without affecting the 
individual’ (Floridi, 2015 p.247).  When presented with the vignette regarding a 
situation in which financial details were hacked and leaked on the ‘Dark Web’, a 
number of participants share the view of Floridi regarding their attachment to this 
information: 
 
“…financial one, yeah, just again, cos I just think, actually the risk of that 
information getting taken is [pause]…I think although it’s an 
inconvenience, the impact’s actually quite small because if somebody was 
to, I don’t know, clear out your bank account, and it was because of that, 
then in reality, you’d get it back anyway.  So you wouldn’t, d’you know 
what I mean?  The actual inconvenience, yes, but actually lose out, no.”  




“I s'pose you know maybe I'm being a bit careless here about the financial 
stuff so but I, I dunno, I kind of assume that if like money was taken out of 
my account, although that'd be a big hassle, a) that's unlikely and b) if it 
did happen, they [the organisation that was hacked] would be liable for 
that, I assume and so therefore I could recoup it, so that doesn’t worry me 
as much as err, as much as the headlines about these stories suggest that 
we should be worried…”      (PF, male 39) 
 
For these individuals the hacking of their financial data would be an 
inconvenience, but ultimately, they do not believe it would have a lasting, 
detrimental effect on them.  Their perspective appears to be one of detachment 
from their issued data, they believe that any damage caused, in terms of money 
stolen, would be rectified and the money replaced.  They do not believe that this 
would be particularly problematic, in the same way that the loss of another type of 
data might be.  This is in line with Floridi’s views regarding arbitrary and 
constitutive data discussed above.  As such they appear to think of their bank 
details as being something separate from them (issued data); if their details were 
hacked, they would simply contact the bank and expect any losses to be dealt with 
and a new account number to be issued swiftly and with little fuss.    It is also 
clear that they believe it is possible to restore any damage caused or losses 
incurred, as both MB and PF talk about how they would expect any money taken 
to be replaced, and so in their eyes, it would be almost as if their account had 
never been hacked, as their balance can be restored to its previous state.  This is 
an interesting perspective to have as they do not appear to consider the prospect of 
longer-term issues which could be caused if an individual’s financial information 
is hacked, such as incurring a poor credit rating, which could be much more 
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difficult to resolve.  These participants make no mention of this, apparently 
believing that the extent of such an issue would be ensuring that the bank 
reimbursed them for the money that was taken and issuing them with a new 
account number.  However, there were also a number of participants who were 
concerned about the longer-term issues relating to the hacking of their financial 
information and their perspectives will be considered later in this section.   
 
Intrinsic information 
Some participants felt that we are more vulnerable if intrinsic information is 
hacked and released to a wider audience (as was the case with the dating website 
vignette): 
 
“Erm, because of the personal nature of what it was they were sharing and 
sending.  I think it's completely different to knowing where you 
are…compared what it is you're…saying to someone that is like pillow 
talk in a way, it's not the same, everything's evolved in the way that we 
communicate with people.  Erm, you share private messages to people 
online the same way you would have written love letters, it's a completely 
different way of doing it…I think I'm most, I don’t know, I, I feel like I'm 
most attached to the dating website information being leaked, erm I feel 
emotionally attached to it, because I think you know, I can see how 
relationships and lives were torn apart by the intimate sharing of 





“Ahm, it's a disaster, I think, for the, for the actual people, cos like you, 
you do, I think, you know, people are a little bit less like guarded 
whenever it's not like a face to face interaction anyway.  So, I think in 
terms of chatting on like message boards and things like that ahm, it also 
you know ah, if they're trying to meet someone new, might be trying to 
explore like a different part of their identity that isn't, isn’t I mean, public 
knowledge maybe or something that like they're also trying to sort of 
figure out, and, and then in terms of, of erm intimacy and romance, it's 
something which is very private, so you know it's like an extra ah, 
problem…”        (SG, male, 31) 
 
The comments here suggest a different kind of vulnerability when information 
which I have termed intrinsic is revealed to a wider audience.  They highlight how 
individuals broadly consider these ‘private’ messages to be just that, and so often 
individuals reveal information that they would not share with others more widely 
or offer up a side of their personality that they usually conceal.  This highlights 
the need for a private space in which we can be ourselves, and the need to be able 
to control who knows certain things about us. As discussed previously, when 
information of this nature is shared without consent, it is more than inconvenient, 
it leads to feelings of vulnerability which cannot be put right in the same way that 
financial information (for example) potentially can be.  It is not possible to re-
issue an identity to someone, and the repercussions can be far-reaching, in a way 
that the spread of financial information may not be.  As discussed above, Floridi 
(2005) recognises this to a certain extent, when he discusses the constitutive 
nature of information.  This is why the hacking of intrinsic data (as in the dating 
website vignette) is deemed by the participants above to be so devastating – the 
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information being shared is part of our identity, and as such, cannot be changed or 
restored.   
 
For Floridi, this means that we need to re-think the law around issues of privacy, 
he suggests that, ‘…in the precise sense in which an agent is her or his 
information…it expresses a sense of constitutive or intimate belonging not of 
external and detachable ownership, a sense in which my body, my feelings and 
my information are part of me, but are not my (legal) possessions’ (2005 p.112).  
As such, he argues that maintaining privacy over our information is incredibly 
important as, ‘The right to be let alone is also the right to be allowed to 
experiment with one’s own life, to start again, without having records that 
mummify one’s personal identity forever, taking away from the individual the 
power to mould it’ (2005 p 112).   
 
I argue that this is what my participants are expressing above, particularly SG, 
who suggests that in the context of a dating website’s messaging facility, an 
individual may be attempting to explore a part of their identity that they have not 
considered before, and so to have this exposed to others, when it is not something 
that they are sure about, could be incredibly damaging for them.  The importance 
of being able to experiment with new or different identities was also highlighted 
by boyd (2014), who spoke to teenagers about their use of social media and found 
that impression management was very important to them.  Although, her concern 
was context collapse (as discussed above), this is in a sense what happens in 
situations such as when intrinsic information is released to a wider audience, 
therefore, this is indicative of the issues for individuals, when this type of 
information is shared without their knowledge or consent.  It can affect the 
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impression that others have of them, which, depending on the information itself, 
can be damaging to them.  This highlights the importance of intrinsic data to 
individuals in a way that has not necessarily been considered previously, 
suggesting that there are concerns around information other than our bank details.  
It is also important to note that although my participants were asked specifically 
about different situations in which different types of information were hacked and 
shared, those who spoke about the difference between issued information and 
intrinsic information did so spontaneously, before the vignette part of the 
interviews. 
 
Financial information – a complicating factor 
While the above quotes suggest that individuals are more concerned when 
considering their intrinsic information as opposed to their issued information, this 
was not the case for everyone.  This unexpected complexity becomes much more 
apparent when we consider responses to various vignettes that interviewees were 
presented with.  Some participants appear to be more attached to their bank details 
(or at the very least, they foresee greater repercussions to having their account 
hacked): 
 
“…the financial one cos I think that’s the one that can do the most damage 
and is the one that can hold most people to account.”  (DC, male, 36) 
 
 “Well at the end of the day it's, it's to do with what so banking details? 
[HEF: Yeah] Well yeah, anything to do with banking details is highly 
problematic…I think anything financial is, I don't know why just cos it's 
obviously, it underlines everything in life, financial means…”  




“Erm, probably anything to do with, anything to do with my bank details, 
to be honest, cos that's what everyone worries about…but someone like 
me or you or you know who, who works, and that bit of money is all we've 
got, that's, that's what makes you worry…So, no, my bank being hacked, 
just makes me like even sweat, thinking about it.” (VR, female, 28) 
 
Some also express concerns in terms of the issues this could cause in the future: 
 
“And they [companies] should do everything within their control to make 
sure that no one can be damaged by that because the damage that will be 
done is you know, you're, it's always gonna be financial, and you don’t 
know what people are gonna be damaged by that and the people who are 
using that data don't really care.  So…you could be hitting a student who's 
worked hard and trying to get everywhere, and suddenly they can't go and 
buy a house because their credit rating's shocking cos someone somewhere 
has run up a load of debt in their name, err or created a passport in their 
name!”        (DC, male, 36) 
 
These comments potentially undermine the dichotomy of intrinsic and issued 
information set out earlier in this chapter, as financial information does not 
conform to the issued group that it would logically be assigned to.  According to 
the categories previously identified, issued information, does not make up part of 
our identity, and as such should not elicit a particularly strong response, however, 
this is not what can be observed from the above comments.  When discussing this 
scenario, the participants discussed earlier in this section seemed unconcerned 
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about their financial information being hacked, believing that the bank would 
reimburse them for any losses incurred.  The participants here, however, do not 
share this optimism, with concerns being raised around having no money in their 
bank account or worries about the potential long-term issues such as the ability to 
obtain credit and live the kind of life they wish to.  In contrast to the previous 
participants, these individuals make no mention of believing that the bank will be 
able to restore their account balance and resolve any issues.  Of particular note is 
VR, who discusses having a physical reaction to the mere suggestion of an issue 
with her financial information, suggesting that she does not simply consider this 
to be an issued piece of information that means nothing to her.  For these 
participants there is not the same detachment as for others, and so they are not 
able to shrug off a situation such as the hacking of their financial information in 
the same way.  Therefore, although an initial evaluation may suggest that financial 
data is issued and as such, does not constitute part of our identity, given the 
importance that money plays in the lives of many, it does still elicit an emotional 
response when considering what could happen if we were to suddenly find 
ourselves without it.  In addition, I would raise the point that while I have 
highlighted the complications which arise in categorising information in terms of 
financial information, that is not to say that this is the only type of information for 
which this is true.  It should be borne in mind that there may be other types of 
information that elicit ambivalent feelings in the way that financial information 
does and as such further exploration of this matter is required. 
 
Further to this, I would add that it is important to remember that financial 
information contains more than the account number that we are issued with upon 
opening an account, which in and of itself has no meaning to us.  It is therefore 
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the information behind this issued information that is of a greater concern for 
many.  The trepidation that some have around financial information is around 
someone gaining access to their accounts (and thus their money), or potentially 
people finding out what their salary is and making judgements based upon that.  
Therefore, the account number is only a concern insofar as it is the key to other, 
more detailed information that could cause an issue for the individual concerned.  
As such, those who are not concerned regarding their financial information may 
have no need to worry in terms of recouping their losses and/or what people might 
think of them, while those that it would cause an issue for have a greater need to 
worry. 
 
Financial information can be deeply personal and is linked to social class and 
status in society, issues which I will not deal with in detail here, but it is important 
to acknowledge.  Further, this information can also highlight tensions regarding 
the social and the economic, which links to my previous discussions around the 
commodification of data (Fuchs, 2013).  In particular, if we consider that 
differential pricing may be offered to individuals on the basis of information they 
share, then those who have a customer loyalty card (for example) are able to 
access discounts that those without one cannot.  While 69% of my survey 
respondents stated that they accepted trading their data for personalised services14, 
responses to the question of paying for privacy were more ambivalent.  This 
suggests that it is possible that people accept this tradeoff in situations whereby 
they are financially unstable and so need the discounts available for sharing their 
data.  This potentially means that they share their information because they have 
 
14 Although my survey did not specifically ask participants whether they accepted the tradeoff of 
data for the discounts offered by loyalty cards, this personalisation question offers a hint at the 
level of acceptance 
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to, not because they are comfortable with this tradeoff.  This further hints at the 
potential for exploitation whereby those who are more financially precarious may 
be coerced into sharing information in order to make items more affordable 
through the loyalty discounts offered.  This also feeds into the discussion 
regarding those who are willing to pay to protect their privacy and the potential 
implications for such a system whereby only those able to afford it could be 
granted the level of privacy they would like. 
 
This concern around financial information suggests that not all types of 
information will fit neatly into one of the suggested information types (intrinsic 
and issued).  This highlights the importance of viewing these information types as 
being ideal, flexible, and potentially open to interpretation.  They are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive but offer a useful framework for considering the 
ways in which we can think about different types of information and what it 
means to us.  It will be useful here to briefly consider the work of Stoilova et al. 
(2019a and 2019b), previously referenced in my literature review.  In their work 
regarding children’s conceptions of privacy, they set out not only three contexts 
for privacy (‘interpersonal’, ‘institutional’ and ‘commercial’, 2019a, p.7), but also 
highlight how different types of information (‘data given’, ‘data traces’ and 
‘inferred data’, 2019a, p.7) are prioritised in each of the privacy contexts.  This 
offers an alternative view of the categorisation of our information and thus may 
account for the complications I have described above regarding intrinsic and 
issued information.  Unfortunately, Stoilova et al.’s work was released in 2019 
and so it was not possible for their findings to be fully examined in relation to my 
findings, but it is worth bearing in mind the different ways in which various 




It is also important to be aware of other factors that play a role when we think 
about different types of information and how concerned individuals would be 
about others knowing that information.  This will be considered in further detail in 
the next section; however, it is worth mentioning here that there are a number of 
additional factors which could impact upon the level of concern an individual 
feels about their financial information being hacked.  This includes the level of 
regular income that individual has (if any) as well as how easily they could 
ameliorate the impact of having their money stolen, for example would they have 
easy access to money in a separate savings account?  Further to this, it may also 
depend on how trusting they are of financial institutions in terms of how readily 
they would be able to correct any issue in terms of a person’s financial 
information being hacked.  As such, a person who believed their bank to be very 
trustworthy and capable of dealing with issues, may again demonstrate this in 
terms of less concern regarding their financial information. 
 
Finally, it may be that while these categorisations are a useful way of separating 
types of information into different groups, the level of concern felt by people does 
not necessarily correlate with these categories in the way I have suggested.  The 
above comments suggest that the level of concern itself is linked to the potential 
repercussions that may be experienced and so the impact of the information being 
revealed to others may be more instructive of the level of concern.  As such 
someone who is not exploring a different side of their identity may have little 
concern for their messages being revealed to others in the same way that someone 
who is financially secure would have less concern about their financial 
information being revealed.  This, in turn may link to issues of identity and 
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whether a person believes they are portraying their ‘true self’ to others, or that 
they are hiding a facet of their personality which they do not want to reveal.  As 
noted throughout this thesis, my work is exploratory in nature and as such, further 
exploration is required before complete conclusions can be drawn.  However, it is 
clear that distinctions are being made by individuals when considering different 
types of information. 
 
How does the availability heuristic affect the decision-making process? 
While a number of my participants discuss the importance they place upon 
intrinsic information, when interviewees were asked to rank the vignettes in terms 
of which would cause the greatest concern, financial information ranks the 
highest. This complicates my suggested model, acting as a reminder that 
information privacy is not something that can be easily fitted into rigid categories.  
Given the contextual nature of information privacy, it is extremely difficult to 
locate a model that encompasses all types of information in all contexts, however, 
as discussed previously, the model I offer here is one way of considering our data 
and the different levels of importance that we assign to it. 
 
One compelling alternative model which is relevant is that of the previously 
discussed ‘availability heuristic’; (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982 p.20)  which 
suggests that those who can more easily recall an incident are more likely to 
overestimate the likelihood of it occurring.  They also know how it feels to 
experience this situation which can make the possibility of it occurring again feel 
much more likely, or at the very least make the person involved much more 




It is important to note that those who have not had direct experience of an issue 
with their data, may still employ the ‘availability heuristic’ (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982 p.20)  if they see a number of media reports regarding hacking 
incidents and individuals losing money as this will increase the ‘imaginability’ 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 p.1127) of an incident occurring.  As such 
individuals often rely on the availability heuristic when potential threats are more 
immediate and visible. 
 
This is certainly the case with social privacy issues in general, therefore 
individuals concern themselves with protecting this type of information 
(regardless of whether it is issued or intrinsic).  This may be, in part due to 
concerns regarding what the consequences will be (as with the above example of 
financial information), and how keenly they would be felt.  This is a view shared 
by Raynes-Goldie, who suggests that ‘social privacy challenges can have 
immediate social consequences’ (2012 p.184), and this, ‘tends to distract from the 
potential, intangible institutional privacy threats, such as data collection, 
aggregation and mining’ (2012 p.184).  This was recognised by one of my 
participants when discussing two of the vignettes in particular: one involving 
communication information being collected on a large scale by the government, 
and another (which he refers to as telecommunications) which involves the 
customer records of a telecommunications company (including banking details) 
being hacked: 
 
“you’d think the government one would be worse, it is in some senses, but 
the, the telecommunications has a more direct effect on people [HEF: 
yeah], it makes someone have to change their credit card information, their 
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bank information, reset all their passwords, it’s a massive fuss. Whereas 
the government snooping on what you do it will very likely have little 
direct effect on you”      (GD, male, 25) 
 
However, he was not the only participant to recognise that concerns tend to 
increase, the closer the threat is to you: 
 
“…I suppose if something bad did happen and like my identity was stolen, 
or something like, then I would think more about maybe how much 
information I put online, I mean I keep my Facebook profile, you know, 
on the high security settings”     (CY, female, 24) 
 
“…I guess when a story comes out in the media, you think, it makes me 
think about it and I might check my privacy settings, and kind of check my 
friend list again, on Facebook.  Erm, but yeah, it's not something I think 
about day to day.”      (ES, female, 36) 
 
As with Raynes-Goldie’s work, the focus of the concerns discussed by these 
participants is their social privacy, CY talks about the potential for identity theft, 
but concludes that she has her Facebook profile on the highest security settings, 
and this seems to reduce her concerns.  Similarly, ES highlights how the media 
may play a role in terms of bringing attention to potential issues, suggesting that 
visibility has an impact.  This offers a potential explanation for why people may 
express greater concerns regarding the hacking of their financial data, as it is often 
the focus of media reports.  As discussed throughout this chapter when individuals 
are subject to availability bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982), they tend to 
overestimate the likelihood of an event occurring, due to how easily they are able 
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to recall or imagine an example of it.  Therefore, if a person can think of recent 
media reports regarding bank accounts being hacked, or they know a number of 
people who this has happened to, they will perceive it to be far more likely than it 
may actually be in reality.  This offers an explanation for why the far more 
immediate repercussions of issues with social privacy warrant greater concern 
than those of any issue with institutional privacy. 
 
As highlighted by the above quote from GD, the collection of information by 
large institutions, is likely to have very little (if any) direct impact upon 
individuals.  The data is simply collected in the background, as we carry out our 
day-to-day activities, it requires no additional effort from us, and so it is easy for 
us to forget that it is happening.  This is contrasted with the immediately-felt 
effects of having our identity stolen, for example, as this would require a certain 
level of effort on our part to ensure that we are issued with new account numbers, 
and that those who had stolen our details are prevented from taking money from 
our account(s) and affecting our credit score and so on.  The link between the 
immediacy of the threat and our level of concern may also explain why some 
express greater concern regarding financial information being hacked rather than 
intrinsic information.  As one of my participants suggests when discussing the 
dating website vignette: 
 
“…but I honestly if I was involved in that [online dating], I would not be 
that worried because I'd assume there's such a flood of information here, is 
anyone really gonna actually see this that I wouldn’t want to see this?  I 
would kind of assume that that's probably not gonna happen…”   




There appears to be greater concern around financial information being revealed 
as it is potentially believed to cause a greater issue to individuals than information 
which is intrinsic in nature.  As noted by PF, when a large volume of intrinsic data 
is hacked and released, the likelihood of being singled out is low, unless you stand 
out in some way from the others.  Therefore the consequences associated with 
financial information being hacked feel much more real and threatening to my 
participants than the various types of intrinsic information which they do not 
believe is particularly remarkable or problematic.  This was not discussed by my 
participants in great detail, and when the issue was discussed, the consensus is 
that they are not harbouring any kind of potentially damaging secret and so even if 
information were to be exposed, it would not constitute a problem for them.  This 
belief that we are merely a ‘face in the crowd’ will be discussed at greater length 
in the next section. 
 
What contextual concerns exist? 
 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the level of concern that individuals feel 
regarding information sharing relies on a number of factors, which includes the 
type of information as well as the extent of the consequences of sharing that data.   
 
One potentially complicating factor to recognise from the outset is suggested by 
Huberman, et al., (2005) who argue that whether an individual believes him or 
herself to be ‘typical or positively atypical compared to the target group’ (p.22) 
makes a difference to how comfortable they feel in revealing information.  When 
they asked participants how much they would need to be paid in order for them to 
divulge different pieces of information within a group, they find that perception 
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has an impact.  In terms of weight, if an individual feels themselves to be below 
average or around the average weight for the group, they require little payment, 
while those who feel that they weigh more or much more than the average require 
a much higher payment.  This suggests that we are less concerned about our 
privacy when we believe that we are merely a ‘face in the crowd’, as was 
highlighted by some of my interview participants: 
 
“My feeling is, I’m not doing anything illegal so why would it bother me? 
There’s nothing for them to find out about me [HEF: Mmhm]. But 
possibly if I was involved in something that was a bit more, even if it’s not 
really illegal, perhaps something a bit more secretive, or, perhaps I’d be 
more worried about it, but at the moment I feel like, ‘well, what are they 
going to find out?’. It’s not very interesting [HEF laughs]. So, people can 
look.”        (TS, female, 37) 
“I'm not particularly concerned because I don't [pause] think people are 
looking, I'm not particularly interesting person to look at”  
(CY, female, 24) 
 
The above quotes highlight how my participants believe that as the data they are 
discussing is not particularly interesting or suggestive of illegal or illicit activity, 
it is likely to garner very little interest, and so in some respects, they are not 
worried about who sees it.  As with the research of Huberman, et al., (2005), they 
believe that their information is fairly typical and so would not stand out or call 
for attention from those collecting the information.  There is a suggested 
mundanity to their information and as such, they cannot foresee a situation 
whereby sharing it would cause them an issue in any way.  This links with 
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comments in the previous section whereby PF in particular felt that he would not 
need to worry even if his dating website information were to be hacked, because 
so many records would be released that it is unlikely that he would stand out.  
What participants are essentially saying here is that they do not believe that their 
information would have a particular value to others, and as such, they do not 
believe that sharing it would cause them any issues now, or in the future.  The 
lack of concern here is likely to be related to the type of information being 
considered. 
 
What is the impact of type of information? 
Huberman, et al., (2005), suggest that there are some types of information that are 
deemed to be much more sensitive to individuals than their weight.  When the 
researchers rank pieces of information by the proportion of respondents who 
require payment of over $100 to reveal it, they find that financial information is 
deemed to be of greatest concern.  Often when research has been carried out in 
this area previously, the main area of concern is around financial information or 
information that could identify an individual, such as their name or address 
(Ackerman, et al., 1999 and Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005), this is also highlighted 
as a concern for my participants, when asked: Are you concerned about sharing 
some types of information more than others?  
“Erm, I mean, I'm concerned about [pauses], I mean in the sense, the 
obvious sense I guess of like I'd be more concerned about sharing my bank 
details than my erm, just pictures of a night out or something…”  




“I wouldn’t like to share my address, necessarily…you know I wouldn't 
like other people to know particularly where I lived if it wasn't for you 
know receiving goods.  Erm, same with phone number, I wouldn't want 
nuisance calls or anything…Yeah, I s'pose, yeah, yeah, the ones that you 
could physically be, someone could turn up at your house or something 
like that, I don't want that, or someone to speak to you personally, I s'pose, 
yeah.”        (CY, female, 24) 
 
“Yes, err and also, I’m not too worried about my address as much but yeah 
[HF: Mmhm] cr- anything related to credit card or anything basically that 
can lead to them other kind of fraud being, erm [HEF: Uh-huh] err 
committed with that information, yes, I, that’s definitely something I, I 
would think more about than, yeah, than a picture”  (JZ, female, 25) 
This can also be noted when considering the free text responses to the survey 




  Frequency Percent 
Address/location info/holiday dates 161 28.90 
Financial info 84 15.08 




Family info (including photos) 41 7.36 
Date of birth/ birthday 39 7.00 
Personal details/issues 28 5.03 
Miscellaneous 25 4.49 




Employment details (place/name of employer) 20 3.59 




National Insurance/government issued ID 14 2.51 
Photos (Inc. nudes, at parties, personal) 12 2.15 
Health/medical info 10 1.80 
Full name/signature 9 1.62 




Information about others (friends/colleagues etc.) 8 1.44 
Political/religious views 6 1.08 
Citizenship data/passport 5 0.90 
Total responses 15 557   100.00 
 





It is clear to see that address or financial information is of the most concern to 
individuals, who are potentially concerned about identity theft or being burgled 
while on holiday, and the issues this would cause them.  However, if we consider 
the responses to the subsequent question: Why would you not share the above 
information? a different picture emerges:16 
 
  Frequency Percent 
Personal safety concerns (i.e. abuse/harassment 
/stalking) 84 23.86 
ID theft/banking/hacking concerns 79 22.44 
Info is private/personal 76 21.59 
Concerns re: potential repercussions 27 7.67 
Physical security concerns (burglaries etc.) 26 7.39 
Concerns re: protecting others (Not my info to share) 23 6.53 
Miscellaneous 18 5.11 
Concerns re: spam/info being sold/shared with 
unknown others 16 4.55 
Info is stored forever 3 0.85 
Total17 352  100.00 
 
Therefore, it is not simply a case of people being concerned about identity theft, 
as the highest concern is actually around issues of personal safety, rather than 
identity theft, this could also hint at concerns regarding the consequences of issues 
 
16 The table shows the categories that free-text responses were assigned to. 




occurring.  As noted in the previous section, many of my participants believe that 
issues around identity theft can be remedied, in that bank account details can be 
changed and re-issued, however, if an individual is a victim of harassment or 
stalking, the consequences of this will be felt much more keenly and cannot be 
remedied in the same way that other information can.  Again, as examined in the 
previous section, this may be indicative of media reporting around the issue of 
harassment and stalking, suggesting that this is particularly prevalent, and 
something that people ‘should’ be concerned about.  It may offer another example 
of availability bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982), in that we may know of others 
who have suffered this, or remember media stories, which highlight this as a 
potential threat to us. 
 
If we focus on the two biggest concerns overall, ‘Personal safety’ and ‘Identity 
theft’ and factor in gender, it is clear to see a difference in concerns: 
 
 






















Concerns around personal safety are driven by women, which suggests that there 
may be a gendered dimension to concerns regarding what information individuals 
are willing to share online.  Quotes such as those below are typical of the free-text 
responses from female survey participants: 
 
“I am always very conscious of who knows where I am, just in case 
anything were to happen such as being stalked or anything worse, 
especially as a woman.”     (female, 20-25) 
 
“Concerned about possibility for physical stalking”  (female, 20-24) 
 
“Fear of being stalked”     (female, 25-29) 
 
These sorts of comments occurred far less often for men, who appear to have 
more diverse concerns; when categorising all responses given for this question, 
those given by men are spread across all of the categories.  Women’s responses, 
however, are concentrated on the above categories, suggesting that women’s 
concerns may be more specific than men’s in terms of information sharing. 
 
This difference in concerns between men and women has been found in previous 
research, with Thelwall (2011) suggesting that women are concerned about their 
physical security to a greater extent than men.  He suggests that media scares 
‘may create an atmosphere in which women may worry about the potential for 
strangers to contact or physically locate them’ (2011 p.253).  He argues that 
women are more concerned about their personal safety in an online context 
particularly in terms of being harassed offline, due to information they have 
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posted online.  As such, strangers will represent risk and danger to women in 
particular.  This is perhaps unsurprising given that statistics suggest that women 
are five times as likely as men to have been sexually assaulted (Office for 
National Statistics, 2018) and given that concerns around crime tend to be 
gendered (Ferrarro, 1995).  The most recent statistics from the Crime Survey for 
England and Wales (Office for National Statistics, 2018) show that over a period 
of twelve years (2006-2018) women aged 16-59 have been the victim of stalking 
to a greater extent than men, with the most recent figures (2018) showing this 
percentage for women to be more than double that of men (women 5.4%, men 
2.6%).  It is important to note, however that the prevalence of stalking is relatively 
low, and it is possible that concerns regarding stalking far outweigh the actual 
incidence of it.  This is not the only area in which this occurs, and Dedkova 
(2015) suggests that this situation can be problematic in her observation of the 
discrepancies between high levels of concern regarding children being groomed 
online by strangers and the low levels of occurrence.  She suggests that this could 
be due to media coverage, which presents the issue as much more prevalent than it 
is, leading people to have a disproportionate perception of its likelihood.  This is 
particularly problematic as it can lead to policy and resources being focused on a 
relatively low-level threat, while a higher-level threat is ignored.  In terms of the 
concern highlighted here regarding the potential for being stalked, this could lead 
to women focusing on the threat of being stalked by a stranger who discovers 
details about them online, rather than the potential for intimate partner violence, 
which may be much more common.  Again, this links to the ‘availability 
heuristic’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982 p.20) in that if the media is reporting on 
cases of stalking and so on, it is likely to be at the forefront of women’s minds 




Another interesting point to note regarding this question is that the concerns 




(r-square: 0.005, p-value: 0.261) 
It is particularly striking to note that for each category, those in their twenties 
appear to be more concerned about these issues than those in their thirties.  There 
are a number of possible explanations available for this, in particular, the concerns 
around identity theft may be due to the more precarious financial situation that 
those in their twenties currently find themselves in.  As per the discussion in the 
previous chapter, in general, millennials are worse-off financially than previous 
generations (O’Connor, 2018), and this may affect concerns regarding the impact 



















Why would you not share the previously stated information? (Age)
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-40
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Information and audience combinations 
The above discussion highlights how concerns around privacy can depend very 
much on the type of information being requested.  However, this is only part of 
the issue, we will now examine concerns around data-sharing in terms of who it is 
being shared with.  This issue has been studied previously, in particular Olson, et 
al. (2004) carried out research which asks participants to rank how comfortable 
they are in terms of sharing various pieces of information with different types of 
audiences.  They find that participants did not want to share most items with the 
public, but neither did they want to share everything with their spouse.  They 
found broad areas of agreement, but also areas where participants shared little 
common ground, particularly in terms of sharing personal statistics with co-
workers. 
 
My research was similar in that participants were given a piece of information to 
consider and asked to rank how concerned they would be for various audiences to 
have access to that information.  They were asked to rank each audience from 1 
(not at all concerned) to 5 (extremely concerned).  The audiences range from 
those who would be expected to raise few concerns (the participant’s spouse, 
immediate family or friends), those who would generally be deemed 
acquaintances (neighbours and work colleagues/employer) to those who would be 
expected to cause a greater level of concern (stranger, third-parties or the 






Audiences in this group (spouse, immediate family or friends) cause varying 
levels of concern for participants, with spouse consistently having the lowest level 
of concern, regardless of the type of information.  The graph below offers a 
comparison between the three audiences: 
 
 
(Paired samples tests p-values range: 0.00-0.002) 
 
It is perhaps not surprising that although the levels of concern themselves are 
different, the pattern that they follow for these audiences is very similar, 
suggesting wide agreement amongst participants.  This suggests that 
Nissenbaum’s theory of ‘contextual integrity’ (2010 p.2) could be representative 
of how we live our daily lives, given the broad agreement for these types of 
information and audiences.  It suggests that there is some common context in 
which we exist, which means that we have greater concern when considering 

















































Mean level of concern by close/familial audiences




However, that is not to say that there was no variation within this group of 
audiences, and it should be noted that this is one of only two groupings where 
men had a higher average concern than women for some information/audience 
combinations.  In fact, men are more concerned than women about their spouse 
and immediate family having access to their financial, demographic and online 
behaviour information, as well as being more concerned about their social 
behaviour information being known by their spouse.  Although women were more 
concerned than men for a greater number of audience/information combinations, 
it is striking that it is the above combinations which elicit greater concern from 
men than women.  It is also worthwhile to consider that the instances where men 
are more concerned is around sharing information with their spouse, or immediate 
family, this is not the case when friends are the audience.  It is difficult to know 
why this might be the case, without drawing unsubstantiated generalisations and 
is something that would be worth investigating further in the future. 
 
When considering these audiences, it is particularly noteworthy that concerns 
around medical information show the largest difference between women and men 





(p-values: Spouse: 0.038, Family: 0.006, Friends: 0.013) 
 
This could be due to women (aged 16-60) attending the doctors more regularly 
than men (Wang et al., 2013), and therefore having more of a medical history and 
thus more information to consider.  As such, if men visit the doctors less than 
women, there is less information and so less to worry about, which could explain 
the lower concern level expressed here.  The study carried out by Wang et al. 
(2013) finds that the difference in incidences of visiting the doctor between 
women and men is partly due to reproductive issues and again, this could offer an 
explanation for women’s concern over their medical information, as contraception 
(for example) can be a contentious and deeply personal issue.  As such, it is 
perhaps not surprising to find that women are less concerned with their spouse 
knowing this information (especially as it is likely to involve them), but more 





























This category encompasses audiences which individuals generally would not 
know very well (if at all) and consists of their neighbours and work 
colleagues/employer.  Within this category there is greater concern than for the 
previous one, which is to be expected, as these audiences tend not to have intimate 
knowledge of an individual.  The closeness of the lines on the graph below 
highlight how difficult it is to separate concerns regarding these two audiences: 
 
 
(Paired samples tests p-values range: 0.00-0.222) 
 
This graph suggests that there has been wide agreement amongst participants, but 
it is interesting to note that the audience causing the greatest concern is not 
consistent, so for financial, demographic and medical information, neighbours 
would be of the greatest concern, while for communication, online behaviour and 
social information, it is an individual’s employer (or work colleague) who causes 
the greatest concern.  This could simply be because people recognise that their 






















































interviewees previously), and so this is why they would be a little more concerned 
if this were to become known in the work context.  Again, this hints at the 
potential issue of ‘context collapse’ (Vitak, 2012 p.451), as discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, whereby it could cause an individual an issue in terms 
of their personal or social life context becoming merged into their professional life 
context.  Where the employer has received a lower concern score, such as with 
medical information, this could be due to these participants having no medical 
issues that they would worry about their employer knowing.  Therefore, if they 
had a medical issue that they would not be comfortable for their employer to 
know, they may have a higher concern level around this combination of 
information and audience.  This is highlighted by one of my interview 
participants: 
 
“I'm very aware of sharing erm, my health issues…Erm, so it's something 
that I haven't actually disclosed at work, erm only to certain people…So, 
in terms of the health status that's quite, yeah.  Because again, this is about 
potential employers, you know, if they figure out that I'm, I'm a person 
with a lot of health issues, then how likely are they going to employ me, so 
that's, that side of it, the health aspect is more, I think that's the most 
important one.”      (TP, female, 40) 
 
This participant conveys her concern around her employer (in particular any 
future employer) learning of the health issues she has, and potentially not 
employing her because of it, therefore she would be more likely to have a higher 
level of concern around sharing her medical information with her employer than 




When considering gender, there is little variation for these information/audience 
combinations, and it is also important to note that for all combinations in this 
category, women express higher levels of concern than men.  It is unclear why 
this would be, it is possible that in a work context, women may feel that they have 
to work especially hard to be seen professionally and so would be concerned if 
their social or communication information became more widely known amongst 
those that they work with.  This concern has a basis in previously carried out 
research by Gorman and Kmec (2007), who find that women are subject to 
‘stricter performance standards’ (p.828) than men, ‘even when women and men 
hold the same jobs’ (p.828).  Although this research was carried out some time 
ago, if this is still the case, it provides a potential explanation for why women feel 
especially concerned when considering their social or communication information 
being accessed by those they work with or their employer.  If women are held to 
higher standards, it means that seemingly innocuous social media posts could 
cause them greater damage professionally than men posting similar updates, and if 
this were the case it would make sense for them to be more concerned about such 
information being seen by an employer.  However, it is important to note that this 
view is not expressed by my participants.  Another potential reason for this is the 
nature of the information posted online by women and men.  Thelwall (2011) 
suggests that despite being more concerned about online privacy, women still tend 
to share a greater level of personal information than men, therefore the concern 
level here could be due to women sharing more information.  As with the 
discussion around medical information above, if men are sharing less information 






This final category contains three audiences, which are likely to be unknown to 
the individual concerned, and so would potentially be the most problematic.  The 
audiences are: a stranger, any third-party that the individual has not chosen to 
share data with and the government/police. 
 
 
(Paired samples tests p-values range: 0.00-0.503) 
 
This chart shows a little more variation than for other audience categories which 
is interesting, given that it is around audiences who are unknown to the individual 
concerned.  While the level of concern for both stranger and third-parties is 
virtually the same across all categories, there is less concern around the same 
information when considering the government/police.  There are a number of 
potential explanations for this. In the case of information such as demographic or 


















































Mean level of concern by unknown audiences
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through the National Health Service and census (for example), and so there is 
little need to be concerned. 
 
“…Err, then, then I’m probably going down to the government one, err as, 
as the fourth one, so, going, you know, err, I would, kind of expect the 
government the government is going to do that [collecting information].”  
(PW, male, 37) 
 
“… the government, cos government do it anyway [collect information], 
so, there’s no point worrying about it.”   (VR, female, 28) 
 
Although the above quotes do not mention specific types of information, they 
demonstrate the expectation (shared by a number of my participants) that the 
government is collecting our information and there is little to be gained from 
worrying about it.  This offers a potential explanation for the lower levels of 
concern regarding government collection of information expressed in my survey.  
This may also hint at a level of cynicism in terms of the expectation that the 
government collects information about everyone, and so could lead to some 
resignation in terms of the collection occurring whether we agree to it or not.  
There is also the perception that there is something suspicious about those who 






“Yeah…if you…do everything you're meant to do and you tell them all 
the information, you've got nothing to worry about, you know, again, it 
goes like with the website, where people, with their data being exploited, 
if you're doing something that you shouldn't be doing, then yeah you are 
gonna have a concern, because you're trying to get away with something, 
that you shouldn't be doing in the first place.”   (CB, male, 37) 
 
This participant believes that it is only those people who are attempting to behave 
in an immoral or illegal way who would be concerned about the 
government/police having access to various pieces of information.  The 
presumption here is that an individual does not need to worry about the collection 
of their data, as long as they are behaving in a legal or moral way.  This 
participant had little concern around government/police collection of data as he 
believes that they have nothing to hide and so concern is unnecessary.  This may 
also be the reason that survey participants appear less concerned about the 
government/police than other audiences in this category having access to their 
information. 
 
While it has been informative to separate the audience groups into different 
categories to examine them in detail, further patterns emerge when we consider all 
of the information/audience combinations together.  This allows us to make 
comparisons between different types of audience, in a way that was not possible 






This section will examine the patterns that emerge when all information/audience 
combinations are considered in tandem, as this offers a way of gaining an overall 
picture of where concerns lie for my participants.  As noted previously, there are a 
number of similarities in terms of the level of concern expressed by participants, 
and this supports Nissenbaum’s (2010) claims regarding the importance of 
‘context-relative informational norms’ (p.129).  This offers an explanation for the 
broad agreement demonstrated, particularly as her approach recognises the 
importance of the relationship between those involved in a particular situation.  
This tends to be the person sharing the information and who they are sharing it 
with.  Therefore, her suggestion of appropriate flows of information is applicable 
here, as it suggests that as long as information flows in the expected manner, there 
should not be an issue.  The previous graphs suggest that there is broad agreement 
amongst my participants in terms of what appropriate flows of information look 
like, as represented by the level of concern.  I argue that in situations where the 
level of concern is high, this is where the flow of information is deemed to be 
inappropriate by individuals, with the opposite being true where the level of 
concern is lower.  Therefore, higher levels of concern, can be seen as an 
indication that the information flow is deviating from the accepted norms, which 
causes higher levels of concern.  Given that my research is exploring the 
intersection of information and audience type as it relates to individuals’ concerns, 
it is difficult to say whether one of these items is driving the level of concern 
more than the other, or whether it is the combination itself. 
 






(Paired samples tests p-values range: 0.00-0.579) 
 
It is clear from this graph that different information/audience combinations evoke 
different levels of concern from individuals, suggesting that there are a range of 
attitudes towards privacy and who should or should not have access to specific 
information.  There are, however, clear patterns, in terms of different types of 
information, for example, demographic information is of a lower concern than 
financial information regardless of the audience.   
 
What is particularly striking, is that while most audiences follow a similar pattern 
in terms of concern level across the different types of information, the 
government/police audience does not.  In fact, despite this audience-type being 
categorised as ‘unknowns’ (as we are unlikely to personally know those in this 
group), it is of less concern for most types of information than the audiences that I 
have categorised as ‘acquaintances’.  This is surprising as the two other audience-
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types from the ‘unknowns’ group (stranger and third-parties) score very similarly 
and are of the greatest concern for all types of information.  This is potentially due 
to the nature of third-parties and strangers; they are unknown to us, and so we 
cannot know what they are likely to do with any information that they obtain 
about us, this is generally a cause for concern.  However, despite the 
government/police also being unknown to us, it could be that there is a belief (as 
discussed previously), that we need only be concerned about this collection if we 
are involved in some type of illegal or illicit behaviour18.  As illustrated by the 
below quotes there is a belief that the government/police are collecting 
information for our own good (to combat crime or terrorism).  This view is shared 
by several participants: 
 
“We, I always have this argument if you’ve got nothing to hide, then you 
don’t have anything to worry about…I think it’s the same scenario, if 
you’re not doing things you shouldn’t be doing, then you shouldn’t have to 
worry about it. I want, I’d rather be safe [HE: Mmhm] than dead”  
(AL, female, 36) 
 
“I'm not particularly concerned because I don't [pause] think people are 
looking, I'm not particularly interesting person to look at like maybe if I 
was on some sort of watch-list maybe, but I don't think I'm particularly 
interesting to look at.  So, I'm not particularly worried, well I'm not 
searching for anything I would be worried that if anyone saw…” 
(CY, female, 24) 
 
18 It is also important to note that while the level of concern regarding the government/police 
audience is lower than other audiences in the ‘unknowns’ category, it is still of high concern as the 






“Again, the flipside of that is that actually protecting things like national 
security's quite key, and unfortunately there are people that will use 
messaging and things like that, that obviously put other people at 
risk.  And we need to use all the tools that we've got at our disposal as a 
society, I think to, to try and combat that the best way we can.”  
(MB, male, 37) 
 
This suggests that despite the government or police being unknown to individuals, 
there is a level of trust, which would not be possible with the other audiences in 
the ‘unknowns’ category.  Trust is facilitated when we trust the information we 
are provided with by others (often experts), in that we accept that they know more 
than we do in a given situation and so we trust the information that they supply us 
with (O’Neill, 2002).  In this case, these participants believe the information that 
the government shares regarding the necessity of collecting information in order 
to keep citizens safe.  It is impossible for checks to be made into the claims of the 
government, but these participants are expressing their trust in the information 
provided, and as such have fewer concerns regarding this collection. 
 
However, this may also hint at the cynicism discussed earlier in this chapter; 
potentially individuals feel that there is little they can do in terms of choosing 
whether to share information with the government/police, and so there is little 
point in being concerned about it.  This is highlighted in work from Twenge 
(2014), who suggests that since generation X (which the older participants would 
be categorised as), people believe that collective action does not have an impact 
on the world around them.  Therefore, if this is a belief shared by my participants, 
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they may believe that there is little point objecting to the government or police 
collection of information.  For strangers and third-parties on the other hand, we 
are able to take steps to ameliorate this, if we choose to.  As such, we can avoid 
sharing information with third-parties, in terms of refusing to share information or 
providing false information (as several my participants admitted to doing in the 
previous chapter).  Therefore, concern here could be around whether participants 
feel they are doing enough, or whether they know enough to be able to avoid 
sharing this data, as examined in Chapter Three. 
 
While the high level of concern around the third-party audience suggests that 
people are concerned about their institutional privacy and what happens to their 
information when it is passed on, I would suggest that concerns expressed here 
are more around issues such as spam and junk emails.  This is the main concern 
when this audience was discussed with my interviewees and offers a potential 
explanation regarding why the government/police is of lesser (although still 
significant) concern to individuals than other unknown audiences.  We experience 
very few consequences from the government/police collecting our information 
when compared to the potential consequences from third-parties and strangers, 
this can make government/police information collection seem less harmful to 
individuals in comparison (as suggested previously by GD).  Government 
collection of information has no noticeable impact on our day to day lives in the 
same way as the other data collection.  In fact, only one interviewee 
spontaneously mentioned data aggregation or other aspects which could be 
considered to be institutional in nature.  This suggests that this is not an issue that 
immediately comes to mind for many individuals, and therefore is unlikely to be 
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what my survey participants are thinking about (however, it is important to note 
that I cannot say this with complete certainty). 
 
It is perhaps surprising to find that concerns here centre around seemingly 
inconsequential items such as spam and junk mail, which many would deem to be 
harmless, if a little annoying.  However, my participants spoke of this with 
annoyance, potentially because it is something that occurs quite often and so, 
employing the ‘availability heuristic’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982 p.20)  is 
something that comes to mind quite easily for them, when they are considering 
this issue.  While receiving junk mail is not an occurrence that causes harm to the 
recipient (above a general feeling of annoyance), it is something that offers a 
visible reminder of how little control an individual really has over their 
information once they have shared it with an organisation.  Receiving spam 
messages is a reminder that whether they have agreed to it or not, their 
information has been shared with a third-party, which serves as a reminder that 
there is little they can do to stop this from happening.  This may suggest to the 
person that despite their best efforts, they have not been successful in maintaining 
the boundaries that they would like. 
 
One final point, which becomes more apparent when all of the 
information/audience combinations are viewed together, is the lack of variation in 
concern levels between the different types of information for the stranger and 
third-party audiences.  It is clear from the graph that there is very little diversity 
between the mean concern levels reported for these audiences, whereas for all 
other audiences, the difference between the highest and lowest concern levels is at 
least 1 point, and in some cases, it is much higher than that.  This suggests that 
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there are real differences between how concerned individuals are about different 
types of information being accessed by different types of audience when they 
personally know the audience involved.  However, when they do not know the 
audience at all, there is much less variation in terms of concern level, it is almost 
as if all types of information become equally concerning when we cannot see or 
know who has access to our data. 
 
As a final point, on this subject, it is worth noting that the overall context plays a 
role here, therefore, given that my participants are likely to be UK-based, and 
have self-selected to take part in a survey about privacy, it is possible that these 
responses highlight the self-selection bias discussed in my methods chapter, and 
therefore a more representative sample may have lower levels of concern, given 
that they would not necessarily have a pre-existing interest in privacy.  It is also 
possible that had the focus of my survey not been commercial surveillance, and/or 
the types of information had been different, again this would have elicited 
different levels of concern. 
 
While it is useful to gain an overall picture of where concerns lie for my 
participants, it is often unsurprising, however, when we examine the results in 
terms of demographic groups, there are some important counter-intuitive findings.  
Therefore, we will now turn to the different concerns of the various age groups 






As discussed previously, when discussing concerns around privacy, there is 
generally a belief that younger individuals are less concerned about their privacy 
than older individuals (boyd, 2014).  While my research is only concerned with a 
specific age range (those aged 20-40 years old), there are still a number of 
interesting insights to be gained here. 
The age group that appears to be the most concerned are those aged 30-34 years 
old.  This group expresses the highest level of concern for 59% of 
information/audience combinations, while those in the oldest age group (those 
aged 35-40 years old) account for the greatest mean level of concern for only 20% 





19 In total, there were 49 information/audience combinations, therefore when discussing levels of 
concern in this section, I am talking about the proportion of these 49 combinations for which each 





Highest mean level of concern by age group
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276 
	
While it is true to say that those in their thirties have the highest mean level of 
concern, for the majority of combinations (80%), those in their twenties still 
expressed the highest level of concern for 20% of the information/audience 
combinations, suggesting that there are specific areas which are problematic for 
them.  It is also interesting to note that of those in their twenties expressing 
concern, those aged 25-29 express the highest level of concern for 18% of the 
information/audience combinations, suggesting that this group is especially 
worried. 
 
The above figures suggest that there is not a straightforward divide between those 
who grew up with the internet (those in their twenties) and those who did not 
(those in their thirties), as was my expectation at the outset.  We can learn more if 
we examine where concerns lie in greater detail, focusing on which 
information/audience combinations cause the greatest concerns for each age 
group.  As the youngest age group (those aged 20-24) expressed the highest 
concern level for only one information/audience combination (2%), they will not 
be included in the subsequent discussion. 
 
As noted above, the age group expressing the highest average concern for the 
largest proportion of information/audience combinations, is those aged 30-34 
years old.  This group has the highest mean level of concern for at least one type 
of audience for each type of information.  The focus of their concerns seems to be 
around demographic information, for which they have the highest mean level of 
concern for all audiences.  However, they are also concerned about their online 
behaviour information as well as their communications data, which cause 
concerns for six and five audience types respectively (out of a total of six 
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audience types).  One of the reasons for this level of concern could be that as 
individuals start families of their own, and feel more responsible, they could feel 
that they have more to lose, should something untoward occur.  Individuals have a 
more permanent, long-term job, and so they are no longer working in precarious 
part-time work (Arnett, 2015), which on the surface appears to offer greater 
stability to an individual, however, it could cause increased levels of anxiety in 
terms of the level of responsibility which is now on their shoulders.  Therefore, it 
may have the opposite effect, and induce greater levels of anxiety due to the 
stakes being higher, and there being so much more to lose should the worst 
happen. 
 
When considering the various age groups, those aged 30-34 are consistently the 
most concerned about their family having access to various pieces of information 
about them, as demonstrated on the below graph: 
 
 


























This demonstrates that there are particular types of information that concern those 
aged 30-34 more than other age groups when accessed by their family, in 
particular, demographic, online behaviour and medical information.  This concern 
around family was highlighted by my interviewees: 
 
“there’s more people that could hurt you in, in, in like your circle if you 
will, rather than the wider circle that you’ve chosen to be part of anyway.”  
(TM, female, 25) 
 
“But of course, you know, for other family members, they have, they have 
other friends and they have other friends, and it's and it's then allowing 
your circle to become wider, which actually isn't even really your choice, 
and I think that's quite tricky.”    (SM, female, 36) 
 
This suggests an awareness that despite concerns which are often raised regarding 
those that we do not know having information about us, people in our lives could 
also cause us harm if they know certain things about us.  The second quote also 
highlights how there is the potential for unintended issues to occur due to the 
wider circle of acquaintances or friends that family members have. This was also 
borne out in my interviews when discussing the dating website vignette, whereby 
a number of participants spoke about how they would be much more concerned if 
information from that site became known by those they know, rather than 
someone they do not know.  This age group (30-34) could therefore be 
particularly concerned in part because they are likely to be in a long-term 
relationship, with a child (or children) and as with SM’s comment above, may be 
concerned that their relatives may inadvertently reveal information to a wider 
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audience.  This is not necessarily carried out with any malice, but potentially 
because the relative is unaware of how far they are sharing information or the 
level of sharing that their relative is comfortable with. 
 
Potentially the reason that those in their early thirties are the most concerned is 
because they are only just beginning to become established as a parent, partner or 
in their career while those who are older may be less concerned because they are 
more established in these areas and so have a safety net in place.  On the other 
hand, those in their late twenties may still be in more casual relationships, 
working in part-time, or zero-hours roles and so have yet to begin to become 
established as those in their early thirties are.  Those in their twenties have been 
termed to be in a specific phase of development, known as ‘emerging adulthood’ 
(Arnett, 2015 p.2).  As such these individuals are seen as being on the cusp of 
adulthood, when life becomes more serious, as the 30-34-year-olds in my survey 
are discovering. 
 
The 30-34 age group is particularly interesting because when we consider which 
audiences cause them the most concern, it is somewhat counter-intuitive when 
compared to overall concerns.  As discussed above, the family audience causes 
the most concern for this age group, (in comparison to other age groups) for every 
type of information, however, the friends and government/police audience groups 
are of a concern for five out of six information-types.  This is specific to this 
group, because when considering those aged 35-40 years old, the audience that is 
the most concerning for them is strangers (for three types of information) and for 
those aged 25-29 years old, it is evenly distributed between neighbours, strangers 
and work colleagues/employers (with each of these audiences being of particular 
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concern for two types of information).  Therefore, those aged 30-34 years old 
appear to be more concerned about those in their lives having access to 
information about them than those unknown to them.  There is the potential that 
this is due to those concerned facing relationship or career issues that they have 
not experienced before, particularly as relationships become more serious and 
jobs become careers (Arnett, 2015).  Therefore, there may be an expectation that 
the individual should be able to deal with these issues without making mistakes, 
and they may feel that if those in their lives knew more about these issues (and 
their response to them), they may judge them harshly.  There may also be a level 
of anxiety around an individual feeling that they are behind others in terms of 
progressing into adulthood, maybe they have not reached the milestones that they 
believe they should have for someone of their age.  This could again, lead to 
anxiety around others finding out about this, particularly those who are family 
members who may be disappointed in them. 
 
It is important to note here that how an individual defines their family changes 
over time, particularly across the age groups that I am examining here.  As more 
students leave university with debt, many are left with little choice but to return to 
living with their parents, often into their mid- to late-twenties (Hooker, 2019).  
Therefore, family for those in their twenties is potentially very different to that 
defined by those in their thirties.  By the time they reach thirty, most individuals 
have different responsibilities, such as a long-term partner, potentially a child and 
are no longer answerable to their parents.  As such, their family and 
responsibilities will differ from those who are living at home with their parent(s); 
this could offer an explanation for different levels of concern regarding 





In this chapter, I have acknowledged the importance of context in terms of 
individuals and the opportunities afforded to them by being able to 
compartmentalise different areas of their lives. However, with the growth of 
social media, it is becoming increasingly difficult for boundaries to be maintained 
between different contexts.  As such, there are times when ‘context collapse’ 
(Vitak, 2012 p.451) occurs, which can cause issues for people, particularly when 
they are forced to reveal a part of their identity previously unknown in one of the 
contexts.  Nissenbaum’s work on ‘contextual integrity’ (2010 p.2) is especially 
useful here, as it highlights how we are often unaware of the different contexts 
that we move between until we face an issue.  This also served to highlight how 
different situations tend to have different contextual norms, which set out how 
information should flow within that context and offers an explanation for the 
discomfort we sometimes feel when asked to share information. 
 
By considering the broad categories of privacy, as set out by Raynes-Goldie 
(2012), in terms of ‘institutional’ and ‘social privacy’ (p.81), I was able to set out 
the two categories that I believe information encapsulated in the ‘social privacy’ 
realm can be broken down into: intrinsic and issued information, once we have 
broadened social privacy to include commercial information.  To do this, I utilise 
Floridi’s (2005) conception of ‘arbitrary’ or ‘ontic’ (p.197/8) information as a 
foundation.  The distinction between types of information was brought to me by a 
number of my interviewees and offers a way of considering our emotional 
attachment (or lack thereof) to different pieces of information.  By examining two 
of the vignettes from my interviews (one regarding issued information being 
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hacked and the other intrinsic information), to demonstrate that the situation is not 
quite as clear as it initially appears.  While issued information is not necessarily 
part of our identity, many appear to have an emotional attachment to it, 
particularly when we consider financial information.  I suggest that this may be 
due to the availability bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982), which suggests that we 
feel more threatened by issues which we can more easily imagine occurring. 
 
Finally, this chapter focused on various combinations of information and 
audience, which allowed me to draw some particularly interesting and at times, 
counter-intuitive findings, especially when considering different demographic 
groups.  Of particular note was the finding that women have greater concerns 
around information being revealed which could lead to a physical safety threat 
such as stalking.  This again may be due to availability bias (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982), but also speaks to the gendered nature of fear around certain 
types of crime. 
 
In terms of the audience/information combinations, many of my findings appear 
to be as expected.  However, the government/police audience causes a lower level 
of concern when compared to other unknown audiences.  I posit that this could be 
due to the belief, expressed by a number of participants, that only those who are 
involved in illicit or illegal behaviour need to be concerned, as well as a general 
trust in the government’s claim that collecting our information is necessary to 
counter terrorism and other threats we face. 
 
The issues at stake here are much more complex than they seem initially, and 
while my work has taken a particular interest in the intersection between type of 
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information and audience, there are other combinations that could have been 
included, although to do so may have proved to be impossible, given the 
potentially infinite number of combinations.  In this work, I have attempted to 
explore how different audiences and types of information can impact the level of 
concern individuals feel, which has rarely been attempted previously. 
 
The focus on contextual matters in this chapter suggests that it is too simplistic to 
assume that people who share their information (either with companies or on 
social networking sites) do not care about privacy.  This is clearly not the case, 
and I have demonstrated the varying degrees of concern regarding two factors – 
the type of information and the audience that will have access to that information, 
thus highlighting the nuanced nature of privacy.  The context in which we are 
being asked to share information plays a vital role in whether we feel comfortable 
sharing it, and as discussed, issues can be caused when contexts collapse, and 
information is revealed in an unintended context.  This is more than simply a case 
of an individual being caused minor inconvenience or embarrassment; in cases 
where a person is experimenting with their identity, the revelation of one facet of 
their identity in an unexpected context can have serious implications, and thus 
where opposing contexts collapse we lose the ability to create our own identity 
(Floridi, 2005) and who we are becomes fixed.  This is problematic because we 
are then potentially unable to express ourselves fully or modify who we are, 







This thesis offers an initial exploration of how individuals negotiate the 
boundaries of internet privacy.  By exploring the key themes of control, defiance 
and context, I add some much-needed nuance to the debate around privacy, 
highlighting the importance of context in particular.  My focus on those who 
engage with social media means that I am able to demonstrate that the axiom that 
those who utilise social media have few concerns regarding their privacy, is an 
oversimplification which obfuscates the contextual nature of privacy.  As stated 
previously, while we do not necessarily want everyone to know everything about 
us, neither do we want to hide everything from everyone.  When we care about 
our privacy depends on the situation we are presented with, as well as factors such 
as the specific information we are being asked to share and who we are being 
asked to share it with.  Decisions regarding whether to share information or not 
are deeply personal and as such cannot be considered in terms of a privacy 
dichotomy, whereby privacy is either on or off.  Ultimately, this thesis does not 
offer a definitive answer regarding the value of privacy, as it is dependent on the 
individual concerned and the particular situation, however, I have utilised a 
qualitative approach to answer the following research questions: 
 
• How much control do individuals feel they have over the information they 
share in their daily lives? 
• How do individuals feel about the amount of information they share with 
companies and online? 
• How do individuals negotiate the boundaries of internet privacy? 
• In what contexts is privacy important to individuals? 
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My responses to these questions were designed to explore privacy, especially 
from the perspective of those who share information on social media, however, it 
was also important to ensure that I did not focus solely on information shared in 
this way.  Given the ubiquitous nature of Big Data and the aggregation and 
commodification of the information we share with numerous companies (not all 
of which are social media organisations), I felt it necessary to include this 
information-sharing in my study.  As such, I explored how people feel about 
sharing information with companies in addition to on social media, especially as it 
is a situation in which individuals may feel under more pressure to share 
information.  This view is held by a number of my participants:  
 
“you know everyone's gotta have a phone bill really haven’t they?  And 
you need to give your details for that to work, it’s not really quite such an 
optional thing”      (AQ, male, 26) 
 
This demonstrates how difficult it can be for people to exercise control in 
situations whereby they are required to share information, and highlights in a 
small way how situations differ in terms of what people feel they need to share 
(and whether they have the option to withhold information).  This was an 
important area of study, as social media sharing is broadly deemed to offer greater 
control. 
 
In answering the above research questions, I have been able to examine issues 
around trust, control, context and decisions regarding whether to share 






How much control do individuals feel they have over the information they share in 
their daily lives? 
This is a key issue when considering privacy and is closely linked with issues of 
trust, as people attempt to control the information they share and who they share it 
with.  There is often a sense of mistrust, particularly in terms of the third-parties 
that companies sell data to without the knowledge or consent of those who have 
shared their information.  This is demonstrated in the following exchange between 
myself and an interviewee: 
 
“So, what is it that you don't like about the third-party...” (HEF) 
“Who the hell are they?  You know, erm, you don't, you've got no idea 
who they are”        (CB, male, 37) 
 
The issue with third-parties is that people are often unaware of who they are and 
what they will do with information once they have it.  There is an awareness of 
the practice of information being sold between companies, but participants feel 
unable to have control in a meaningful way, especially when we consider the 
difficulty in understanding exactly what we are agreeing to when presented with 
lengthy terms and conditions.  In fact, these documents are deemed to be so 
confusing that many do not attempt to read them, believing this to be a strategy by 
companies to encourage individuals to accept the terms and conditions without 
examining them in detail.  This can lead to minor acts of defiance which take the 
form of either supplying false information or refusing to share information if there 
is an option to do so.  This offers a way for individuals to feel a small sense of 
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control in terms of maintaining the level of privacy they desire while accessing 
the site or service they require. 
 
It is also important to note here that despite the perception of a lack of control, 
that is not to say that people are resigned to having little control and do not desire 
more, rather they employ tactics and take opportunities when they present 
themselves to gain additional control, as described above.  When dealing with 
social networking sites, however, there is often a feeling or perception of having 
greater control over information, particularly in terms of deciding what to post 
online, such as status updates or tweets.  Here too, though, there is the potential 
for a loss of control in terms of when friends and family post items and tag an 
individual or when something posted on social media is shared more widely than 
the individual posting it intended.  This necessitates greater consideration prior to 
posting and often those who cannot be trusted to maintain privacy boundaries are 
excluded from accessing specific posts (generally without their knowledge).  In 
this sense, it can be argued that individuals are able to employ greater control over 
their information and how widely it is shared amongst their friends and/or family 
circle and it can even be argued that this is a tool employed by social media 
companies to distract us from the reduced control we have when considering what 
the site itself does with the information that users share on the platform (Raynes-
Goldie, 2012). 
 
The issue of control is one that can be contentious and while people may want 
more control, this is likely to come at a cost particularly in terms of convenience.  
As such, the desire for additional control is potentially tempered not only by 
considerations of how achievable the desired level of privacy is, but also whether 
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achieving that level of privacy is worth the costs that may be incurred.  This is an 
issue that is more serious than it may seem at first glance, especially as many 
depend on the use of social networks to maintain relationships with friends and 
family who live in other countries, for example.  It is also important in terms of 
the convenience it offers to people when organising social events, or simply 
learning about the events occurring in their friends’ lives, and thus to consider 
eschewing these sites in order to regain some privacy, could result in a level of 
social isolation for that individual. 
 
How do individuals feel about the amount of information they share with 
companies and online? 
This is linked with the above issue of control, in that the absolute amount of 
information that an individual shares is immaterial, what matters is the level of 
control they have over how much they share.  For example, there may be two 
individuals who share the same objective amount of information but if one feels 
that they are required to share more than they are comfortable with (and thus feels 
less in control), they will be unhappy with the amount of information they share.  
Ultimately, the amount of information that participants are comfortable with 
sharing is a subjective decision which often relates to issues of trust. 
 
In situations where participants feel they can trust those that they are sharing their 
information with, they are broadly happy with the amount of information being 
requested.  However, issues arise when we are asked for information that does not 
appear to be relevant to the activity we are engaged in.  This raises suspicions that 
the company requesting the information is doing so in order to sell it on to a third-
party.  Here the issue is that the company is not being honest with the person 
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involved when requesting the information, in a sense pretending that they need the 
information for their own records, when this may not be the case.  Here, the 
amount of information being requested raises questions regarding what it is 
needed for and what will happen to it once shared. 
 
It is also important to recognise that when participants share information it does 
not necessarily signal tacit acceptance, neither does it mean that they are happy or 
comfortable in doing so.  This is demonstrated in discussions of the privacy 
paradox, in that an individual may talk about their dissatisfaction with the level of 
information they are required to share, while continuing to share information.  As 
discussed previously, there are several reasons why people behave in this way, not 
least because they feel unable to control how much they share. 
 
Therefore, there is a general feeling of discontent regarding the amount of 
information that individuals share, although it must be noted that where people 
feel they have control over their data, they are unconcerned about the amount they 
share, as per the below comment: 
 
“I feel that the amount I share with companies, is perfectly legitimate.  I 
think the amount they share with other companies is not!”  (DC, male, 36) 
 
This demonstrates how many participants feel that they control what they share 
with companies, while recognising that this is as far as their control can reach, and 
what happens to it after that is beyond what they are able to control.  Therefore, it 
is possible for people to feel happy with the amount of information they share 
with companies, while at the same time, being unhappy with what happens to 
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their information at a subsequently.  This highlights how difficult it can be to 
maintain privacy boundaries and recognises the limited control we can be said to 
have when engaging with companies. 
 
How do individuals negotiate the boundaries of internet privacy? 
There are numerous ways in which participants negotiate the boundaries of 
internet privacy, and the ability to do so has become much more pressing when 
we consider issues of context collapse and the potential negative consequences of 
this.  Despite the difficulty involved in maintaining the level of control that 
individuals would like, they are deemed to be responsible for sustaining the level 
of privacy that they are comfortable with. 
 
Despite the issues with control I have examined above, there is often a feeling 
amongst participants that they are making logical tradeoff decisions whereby they 
consider the benefits they will receive from sharing information and weigh that 
against the potential loss of privacy and the potential consequences of that.  This 
belief in the ability to make logical decisions is overlaid with feelings (or at least 
the illusion) of being in control and only sharing information that they want to.  
There is a sense that whatever methods an individual is employing, if they have 
not suffered an issue thus far, they are making the right decisions: 
 
“That's it, it's yeah, it's saying, ' Oh, that's never gonna happen to me, I've 
been fine for 23 years so far, why's it ever gonna happen now?  I'm not 
gonna do anything different, I'm not gonna change my behaviour, so I'm 




The above quote demonstrates that participants perceive the lack of an issue as 
being indicative that they are protecting their privacy in an efficient manner, and 
thus require no additional work or effort; they can continue as they have been 
protected thus far.  This is part of the issue with a topic such as that of internet 
privacy, in that it has become a part of our daily lives to such an extent that we 
barely consider it, until or unless there is an issue.  It is such an abstract notion 
that is it difficult to generate strong feelings about it and this is perhaps why it 
often appears that there is a lack of concern regarding privacy.  However, that is 
not to say that efforts are not being made, and as discussed previously, 
participants do attempt to reinforce boundaries through acts of defiance, such as 
refusing to provide information or by providing false information, which allows 
them to access the service or website they want to without sharing more 
information than they are comfortable with.  Interestingly, as this action is often 
taken in a bid to reduce spam emails, it is often not perceived to be a specific 
strategy in relation to one’s privacy, it is more a part of people’s daily lives, a 
habit that they have developed, that does not take any additional thought or effort.  
However, I argue that it is much more than that, representing a rejection of the 
incessant collection and aggregation of data that has now become a part of our 
everyday lives. 
 
The negotiation of the boundaries of internet privacy is necessarily part of a daily 
practice for individuals whether they recognise it as such or not, and by making 
these efforts to reinforce their boundaries, participants are attempting to exercise 
control over their data.  However, it is important to note that boundaries in this 





In what contexts is privacy important to individuals? 
Context is of utmost importance when considering internet privacy because the 
type of information that participants are willing to share and who they are willing 
to share it with makes a difference to how comfortable they feel when being asked 
to share that information.  Privacy itself is not ‘on’ or ‘off’, instead numerous 
factors impact upon levels of comfort when we are asked to share information and 
as such whether we are more or less willing to share.  Previously, it was easier to 
keep different areas of our lives separate from each other; in particular our work 
and home-life.  However, this is becoming increasingly difficult as contexts seep 
into each other online, especially on social networking sites, where our friends list 
often includes close friends, relatives and work colleagues, thus requiring 
additional thought and effort if we are posting something that may be contentious 
to someone on that list.  Concerns regarding this caused one of my participants to 
change his privacy settings on Facebook: 
 
“I haven't done this in my existing job, but a previous job where I was, I 
was friends on Facebook with my manager, I set it up so that he was the 
only that couldn't see my posts, cos I just wanted to take that out of my 
mind that I can post stuff, I think that was mainly about political stuff that 
I just, I'm sure it probably would have been OK, but I erm just thought I'd 
rather like just not have to think about what's he gonna think about me 
saying this stuff?”       (PF, male, 39) 
 
This demonstrates the importance of context and the concerns that may be felt at 
the prospect of different contexts in our lives converging.  As PF states, he was 
not posting anything that was particularly controversial, but it gave him a sense of 
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peace to know that he did not have to put additional effort into considering what 
he was about to post or who would see it.  Therefore, context is important enough 
that many feel it necessary to take action to reduce the likelihood of different 
contexts collapsing in on each other, and often this is done through making 
amendments to privacy settings on social media.  This also links with the issue of 
control discussed above and is one of the areas in which control can be said to be 
possible. 
 
As discussed previously, although we can categorise social information into 
intrinsic and issued information, there are complications in doing so, as 
participants have differing opinions regarding the type of information that would 
cause them the greatest level of concern.  This highlights the complex nature of 
information type and how context varies according to what is important to the 
individual concerned.  Another complicating factor here is if we consider the role 
that previous experience can play when considering levels of concern then it is 
possible that those who have not experienced a negative consequence previously 
are not as concerned as those who have had an issue.  In particular this may make 
it seem that experiencing an issue is more likely, as they are able to recall the 
previous situation, as per the ‘availability heuristic’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982 
p.20).  This suggests that the context in which participants believe there will be 
immediate negative consequences for them are of greater concern than in contexts 
where there will be few (if any) issues and/or they will be experienced far into the 
future. 
 
Moving away from the type of information, the audience that will have access to 
the information also has an impact on levels of concern.  Although concern levels 
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tend to be as expected in that participants are less concerned about audiences who 
are closely related or are close friends; other groups, however, offer a slightly 
more surprising reading of context.  As such, there is less concern when 
participants are asked to share information with the government/police, when 
compared with strangers or third-parties (that they have not already agreed to 
share information with).  This highlights the potential for less concern when we 
believe that there will be no negative consequences related to sharing data 
(although it is important to highlight that the concern scores for the 
government/police remain above 3 for most types of information).  I have 
attributed the slightly lower levels of concern here to participants’ belief that they 
are not doing anything wrong or illegal and so believe they do not need to be as 
concerned about those in authority having access to information about them.  
Strangers and third-parties, however, are of slightly more concern, potentially 
because it is not always clear who they are and what their intentions are with 
regard to our data. 
 
Context offers an interesting and complicating lens through which to consider our 
privacy, and which contexts cause greater concern is dependent upon many 
factors, while I have considered two important factors, there are others which 




Through the interviews and surveys that I carried out, new light has been cast 
upon how people negotiate the boundaries of internet privacy, particularly in 
terms of the contextual nature of privacy.  However, it is important to note that 
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prior work has considered the role of context; Nissenbaum’s (2010) work has 
been particularly instructive and offered a foundation upon which to consider 
context.  Her discussions around contextual integrity and appropriate data flows 
were particularly inciteful, suggesting that information sharing varies from 
situation to situation.  In some situations people are happy to share data and in 
others they are not.  Therefore, my work sought to examine this further in an 
attempt to discover whether there was universal agreement on which particular 
situations cause high levels of concern and which do not.  I believe that my 
findings have gone some way towards validating the work of Nissenbaum and 
demonstrating the importance of context to individuals, while considering specific 
situations.  By focusing on social media users, I have also studied a group that is 
often assumed to have little or no interest in their privacy, and so this adds weight 
to the argument that this is not the case. 
 
I have also considered the social privacy in terms of commercial surveillance, 
which has rarely been done previously.  To do so, (and as set out previously), I 
have broadened Raynes-Goldie’s (2012) definition of social privacy to include 
commercial information, which upon initial consideration may not appear to be 
social in nature.  However, given the aggregation of data which links numerous 
pieces of information about an individual and the way in which this can affect 
how others view them, I argue that commercial information fits into the category 
of social information.  In doing so, I have been able to complicate matters by 
considering types of information which would not necessarily have been 
considered to be social previously, (such as financial), thus drawing out issues 




While at times, my findings have generated additional questions, particularly, 
which situations generate greater levels of concern in terms of sharing 
information, there can be no doubt that people do care about their privacy and 
what happens to their information.  However, they do not necessarily consider it 
in the course of their daily lives and it often only becomes worthy of more than a 
momentary thought when our attention is drawn to the potential for things to go 
wrong, such as with Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations regarding government 
surveillance (Greenwald, et al., 2013) or the more recent Cambridge Analytica 
Scandal (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018).  Here, we have been reminded 
of the potential for negative consequences when sharing our data, bringing into 
sharp focus how little we know about what happens to our data once we have 
shared it.  Despite the potential issues, we continue to share our information, and 
there are various reasons for this, such as the benefits we receive from doing so as 
well as potentially feeling that there is little we can do to halt this collection. 
 
While participants feel that too much information is requested and lack trust in 
those collecting it (suspecting that it will be shared with others), we do have 
(limited) ways in which we attempt to regain some control and can exercise 
defiance in the face of continued data collection.  This can be in the form of a 
complete refusal to share information or by sharing false information to gain 
access without foregoing privacy.  Regardless of which method is used, 
participants feel empowered by such actions and believe that they have been able 
to take action in their own way and draw a line in terms of how much information 




These tactics are not employed all the time, indeed, to do so may render them less 
effective, however, these methods are employed when individuals deem it 
necessary and are related to the context in which information is being requested.  
Therefore, it is imperative that we consider context when thinking about privacy, 
for this will inform how comfortable a person is with sharing specific information 
with particular audiences.  There is no formula for this, and it depends very much 
on the individual in question, although Nissenbaum’s (2010) work regarding 
appropriate information flows offers a foundation for considering this.  When I 
attempted to define broad categories that different types of social information 
could be separated into (intrinsic and issued information), as a way of refining 
how concerned individuals would be in different contexts, there were issues, in 
that some information did not neatly fit into the expected category (financial 
information was particularly problematic).  However, as discussed previously, this 
may be due in part to the category of financial information being too broad as it 
encompasses account numbers, as well as salary information and the balance of 
our current accounts and so on, which may explain the ambivalence towards this 
type of information.  Therefore, while my study of types of information and 
audience has been informative when considering the issue of context, it does not 
offer a definitive scale regarding which types of information or audience will be 
more or less worrisome than others, except to say that context is vital to 
considerations and negotiations around internet privacy.  However, by suggested 
additional categories of information, and a rationale behind them, I have been able 
to consider types of information that may have been taken for granted previously 







By considering the categorisation of information types, I have built upon the 
foundations offered by Raynes-Goldie (2012) and Floridi (2005) in an attempt to 
develop a useful categorisation of social information, which I term intrinsic and 
issued information.  While this has offered one way of considering different types 
of data in terms of how important the privacy of certain pieces of information is, 
this has not been wholly successful, as there are data for which categorisation is 
not as clear as expected.  The example I offer here is that of financial information 
such as a person’s bank account number, which initially appears to be issued 
information, in that it is issued by a financial institution and not a part of that 
person’s identity in the same way that intrinsic information is.  Therefore, it 
should carry no emotional weight for them and as such if it were to be known by 
an unscrupulous hacker, the individual could simply inform the bank and be re-
issued with a new account number.  In theory, this would be nothing more than a 
minor inconvenience; this view was shared by a number of participants, who felt 
little concern for this type of information, believing that the bank would take 
responsibility and deal with any losses incurred.  However, this view was not 
shared by everyone and for others, there was a much greater emotional attachment 
and as such this led to far greater concerns regarding a situation whereby bank 
details were hacked.  However, this is due, in part to the fact that an individual’s 
account number is the key to accessing their money and so while the account 
number in and of itself is not meaningful, it allows access to items that are much 
more important to us, and so elicit an emotional response.  Further, as discussed 
previously, financial information is not devoid of emotional attachment or 
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response for many individuals, and so this reminds us that other factors may affect 
our response to issues involving particular pieces of data. 
 
This example demonstrates that while some types of information initially appear 
to be straightforward to categorise, (for example, private messages would be 
categorised as intrinsic information), this is not necessarily the case.  Therefore, 
what could be described as a failure in terms of my attempt to offer a new 
categorisation for social information, merely serves to reinforce the contextual 
nature of privacy.  As such, if privacy were not nuanced or contextual, the process 
of categorising information would be much clearer, however, the differing views 
of my participants here highlights that this is not an issue that is amenable to 
categorisation, bringing forth it’s the complex nature.  
 
My consideration of context and its importance when people are attempting to 
negotiate the boundaries of internet privacy is where most of my original 
contribution lies.  Although this concept has been considered previously, 
particularly in the work of Nissenbaum (2010), in terms of how individuals reflect 
upon their privacy and when they are and are not willing to share specific 
information.  This is fundamental to the everyday decisions that people make; 
they are not blindly sharing their information with whoever requests it, rather the 
context in which information is being requested is fundamental to how 
participants feel about sharing that information.  The importance of context is a 
significant finding, especially given the existence of the privacy paradox and the 
subsequent suggestion that while people may express reticence at sharing 
information, they continue to do so.  If we consider the role of context, it is clear 
that the sharing of data is nuanced and simply because a person shares 
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information in some situations, with some audiences, that does not mean they will 
share the same information with a different audience.  Therefore, people are often 
much more aware of concerns regarding their privacy and make different 
decisions regarding whether to share information, dependent upon contextual 
factors. 
 
While some of my results in this area appear axiomatic, in terms of the levels of 
concern raised in relation to particular audiences that we are broadly close to, I 
offer an initial exploration of the impact of context which has rarely been seen 
previously.  Future research could go in any number of directions, following my 
work, given that there is so much still to unpack in terms of context.  It is possible 
that if I were to carry out my research in exactly the same way now, it would elicit 
different responses, given how reliant many have become on online platforms 
since the beginning of the Coronavirus pandemic of 2020.  Given that my 
research offers a snapshot of how individuals negotiate the boundaries of their 
internet privacy at a particular point in time, it could be fruitful to consider a 
longitudinal study of people, over a longer period of time, which could examine 
how concerns regarding privacy change over a person’s lifetime, given the 
different priorities they have over a longer period.  This may answer some of the 
questions which were raised when I considered differences in responses of 
participants of different ages (and potentially different life-stages). 
 
Where do we go from here? 
 
As discussed throughout this thesis, this study is exploratory in nature and so 
offers a suggestion of avenues which would benefit from further examination.  
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Given the importance of context, and the paucity of previous research in this area, 
there is still much to uncover, particularly in terms of which contextual factors 
have a greater impact, or whether they are of equal importance.  This research has 
not only demonstrated that those who use social media do care about their data 
privacy, but also that they are not willing to sit by and allow their data to be 
collected and sold without taking some sort of action, as demonstrated in their 
(small) acts of resistance.  I have also shown the importance of context, which 
adds to the existing research and offers more detailed information regarding what 
is or is not important to individuals.  As such, my work demonstrates that type of 
information and the potential audience for that information affects the levels of 
concern expressed.  As discussed previously, this is in line with Nissenbaum’s 
work regarding contextual integrity (2010) but offers an added level of detail by 
considering particular types of information and specific audiences, which can be 
built upon in future research.  In particular, the work of Stoilova et al. (2019a and 
2019b), could be especially illuminating, as many of their findings regarding 
children can be said to apply to adults also.  Their work regarding the various 
types of contexts and data types in particular offers an area which would only 
benefit from further examination and exploration.  This is especially important 
because as discussed throughout my thesis, much of the data collection that takes 
place when we are online is hidden and as such many adults are unaware that it is 
happening.  This is particularly pertinent, as there is often the expectation that 
parents and teachers will educate children and young people in terms of internet 
usage and how to look after their data online, however, this is difficult (if not 





Given the introduction of the GDPR 2018 and DPA 2018 and in the wake of the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal, it is important to recognise attempts by the 
government and law to provide support for individuals to help them to navigate 
the complicated landscape of internet privacy.  Indeed, it could be argued that 
legally, we are now in a better position in terms of what companies are legally 
sanctioned to do with data we have shared, however, there are questions regarding 
whether the situation has improved in a practical sense.  For example, the 
introduction of the GDPR 2018 was cast as an opportunity for individuals to 
review what they had agreed to regarding companies they had shared information 
with previously, however, as discussed throughout, the sheer volume of GDPR 
notices that people received prior to the legislation coming into force became a 
hindrance to many who were confused by this (Kelion, 2018).  Therefore, we 
cannot assume that new legislation will automatically improve things for 
individuals, regardless of the intention.  Another issue with legislation is that it 
tends to move much more slowly than technology advances and as such may be 
ill-equipped to deal with issues by the time it is introduced.  While it is too early 
to say whether this has been the case when considering the GDPR 2018 and DPA 
2018, it is important to note the wide array of changes and issues that have 
occurred in the time I have been carrying out this project.  For example, the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 has been passed, faced a successful legal challenge 
and been superseded by the Data Retention and Acquisition Regulations 
2018; in the past year, Facebook has faced numerous legal challenges and fines in 
the aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica scandal. 
 
At the same time, technology continues to advance and the introduction of facial 
recognition technology has become part of many individuals’ daily lives, as it 
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allows them to unlock their mobile devices (for example), this is despite the 
technology itself facing much criticism (Kelion, 2019).  Concerns regarding 
electronic assistants, such as Amazon’s Alexa have also been raised regarding the 
potential for conversations to be recorded and stored (Greenberg, 2017).  Any of 
these issues are worthy of further exploration and have the potential to affect how 
we consider and negotiate the boundaries of our internet privacy and so we must 
continue to investigate and question what these changes mean, rather than simply 
accepting them because they make our lives more convenient. 
 
If I were to make recommendations for the future, based on my findings, I would 
strongly urge individuals to take a more pro-active approach to their data privacy, 
although I appreciate that it appears overwhelming to begin with and as such, this 
would also require work on the part of companies who collect and sell our data.  
Terms and conditions documents need to be much clearer for individuals to read 
and understand, so that we are all able to take a more active role in securing our 
own privacy and ensure that we only share our data when we are comfortable in 
doing so. I appreciate that companies are unlikely to volunteer to do this, 
particularly as there is the belief that if individuals are given more control over 
what they share, they will choose to share less.  While this may be true in some 
cases, in others, it may not, and people may feel more empowered and trusting of 
organisations and thus more willing to share their information as the believe that it 
will be dealt with respectfully.  As such, this is likely to require legal intervention 
to take the choice out of the hands of companies and force them to do this and so 
governments and/or regulators would need to work on this.  However, this is only 
a small piece of the puzzle and if companies did not make so much money from 
aggregating and selling user data, they simply would not do it and so I believe 
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there is also work to be done there in terms of encouraging companies to consider 
users to be customers, rather than the product.  This will be particularly 
challenging, given the ambivalent feelings that my participants had towards the 
potential to pay for increased privacy, as such there are no straightforward or easy 
answers here, but I do believe that control should be put back into the hands of 
individuals, so that they can make meaningful decisions regarding the sharing of 
their information.  The GDPR 2018 and DPA 2018 are steps towards this, 
however, already, in the wake of the Coronavirus pandemic, the principles of 
these laws are potentially being ignored (Cellan-Jones, 2020), in the name of 
public health.  Therefore, if we take no other action, it is important that we 
consider the implications in terms of our privacy whenever we are asked to 
provide information, for whatever reason, and where possible ask questions, 
rather than simply providing the information and asking questions later. 
 
“The constellation of inconvenient choices may be all that 
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Appendix A: Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Participant information sheet 
 
 
Thank you for provisionally agreeing to take part in my research.  My name is 
Hayley Evans from the University of Kent.  I am carrying out this research as part 
of my PhD in Sociology, which is looking at how individuals think about privacy 
when it comes to information about them.  
 
This research has been awarded ethical approval by the SSPSSR Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Kent. 
 
Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary, you are under no 
obligation to take part and can withdraw your participation at any time. 
 
If you agree to take part in this research, you will be asked to attend a one-to-one 
interview with myself at a location convenient to you.  The interview will be 
audio-recorded and will take approximately an hour to complete.   
 
Your responses will be kept confidential – there will be no one else involved in 
the transcription of these interviews, which will be stored securely and no one else 
will have access to the audio recordings (unless required to by law).  This research 
will be published as a thesis at the end of my PhD (in 2018) and I will also present 
my research findings at various conferences.  I also hope to have my research 
findings published in various academic journals. 
 
If at any point you are uncomfortable with answering a particular question, or 
discussing a particular topic, please let me know and we can move on to the next 
section or question.  Also, if at any point, you would prefer me to switch off the 
audio-recording device, I will do so.  Equally if you decide that you no longer 
wish to participate during the interview (or even afterwards), you are completely 
free to withdraw your participation and do not have to provide me with a reason 
for this.  If you withdraw your consent, I will delete all data you have provided 
me with. 
 
You will be offered the opportunity to receive a copy of your transcript via e-mail.  
If you would like to receive this, please provide me with your e-mail address or 
(at a later date), please e-mail me on the below e-mail address. 
 
To thank you for taking part in my research, once all interviews have been 
completed, your name will be entered into a prize draw for a £25 iTunes gift card 
(or equivalent).  Please let me know if you do not want to be entered into this 
draw. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me on the below details: 
Hayley Evans, Cornwallis East, SSPSSR, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, 
CT2 7NF.  E-mail address: he91@kent.ac.uk. 
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Participant consent form 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in my research.  Please initial next to each 
statement to indicate that you have read, understood and agree to each statement.  
Finally, sign and print your name at the bottom of this form to indicate that you 








         
I understand that I can withdraw my participation at any time 






I understand that the interview will be audio-recorded and 












I have been given a copy of the participant information sheet and 




I understand that I will be entered into a prize draw for a £25 
iTunes gift card (or equivalent), I understand that if I do not win, 





I understand that the results of this research will be reported in a 




I understand that responses I have given during the interview 







I have been given the opportunity to ask any questions and these 




I have been given an adequate amount of time to consider my decision to 












Date:                         
____________________________________________________ 
 
Please provide your e-mail address if you would like to be sent a copy of your 
transcript: 
 




Please tick this box (and provide me with details) if you know someone 





Appendix C: Interview Schedule 
Interview schedule 
 
General info to note: 
• Gender 
• Age 
• Social media used? 
• Own a smartphone? 
 
1. Are you generally concerned about who has access to or knowledge of 
your activity on the internet and social media? 
 
2. Do you have any experience around issues of data privacy? 
• If so, what was the issue? 
 
3. Do you consider yourself to be a person who values their privacy? 
 
4. Can you think of an example of when you had to stop and think about your 
privacy? 
 
5. Do you feel you are in control of your information and who you share it 
with? 
 
6. Do you think more should be done to protect the privacy of your 
information? 
 
7. What, if anything, might encourage you to do more to protect your 
privacy?  (i.e. time constraints, technical knowledge). 
 
8. Do you employ any strategies or avoid certain things to retain privacy? 
 
9. Are you concerned about sharing some types of information more than 
others? 
 









I am now going to talk to you about a number of different scenarios involving 
various pieces of information that you may share in your day-to-day life.  
Although the situations I describe may not be something you have personally 
experienced, I would like you to imagine how you would feel in these scenarios.  
There are no ‘right’ answers, I am simply trying to find out how people feel about 
the privacy of different pieces of information. 
 
Control of image 
Claire & Gemma are good friends who used to work together.  Claire is a member 
of a popular social networking site, but Gemma is not.  Gemma hosts a small 
party to which she invites some of her friends (including Claire).  After the party, 
Claire uploads a number of pictures from it to the social networking site.  When 
friends who weren’t invited, see the pictures, they are upset with Gemma, who 
asks Claire not to post pictures of her to the social networking site in future. 
 
1. What is your reaction to this story? 
2. In your opinion was Gemma’s privacy invaded? 
 
Location information 
A well-known technology company is launching a new smartphone app which is 
said to make users’ lives more convenient.  The product works like a personal 
assistant, reminding the user of various important events (such as items to buy, 
bills to pay, friends’/families’ birthdays), as well as integrating various 3rd party 
apps to help the user be more organised.  It uses the individual’s location to 
suggest nearby events and attractions, offer public transport timetables, weather 
information and directions for onward travel. 
The company says that users are able to customise what the app reminds them 
about, highlighting its convenience. 
 
1. What are your thoughts about a product like this? 
 
Personal information breach 
A large dating website has been hacked and customer details published online.  
The leaked information includes individuals’ answers to the website’s personality 
questionnaire as well as private messages and conversations people have had on 
the site. 
 
1. What is your reaction to this story? 
 
Financial information breach 
During the summer of 2015 a large telecoms company’s customer database was 
hacked and various pieces of customer information stolen.  Initially the hackers 
said that they wouldn’t release the information if the company paid a large 
ransom.  However, as the company said they couldn’t confirm or deny what (if 
anything) had been stolen, it did not pay the ransom.  As a result, the customers’ 
details were released onto the ‘Dark-Web’. 
Customers were advised to speak to their bank/credit card provider if they noticed 
any suspicious activity on their account. 
 





A man who previously worked as a contractor for the National Security Agency in 
the United States has made claims that the UK government has been collecting 
huge amounts of communications information about all UK citizens.  This 
information includes the content of messages individuals have sent in the form of 
text messages and/or e-mails.  This has been carried out in secret, without anyone 
being aware of this happening. 
The government claims that the collection of information was necessary in order 
to keep ordinary citizens safe from terrorist threats.  The government has argued 
that those who are not involved in illegal activity have nothing to worry about. 
 
1. What is your reaction to this story? 
 
i. Please rank the scenarios we have discussed from most to least 
concerning.   
 






Appendix D: Survey Questions 
General Questions 
I would like to start with some questions about the privacy of your data.  By this, I 
mean your ability to maintain control over the information you share with others, 
either with online companies and organisations or via social networking sites, 
such as Facebook or Twitter. 
 
How often do you think about your online privacy? 
 Whenever I am online 
 When an issue arises 
 When the media reports on a related issue 
 Whenever I am asked for information by an online company or 
organisation 
  Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Have you ever had any of the following issues around the privacy of your 
information? (Please select all that apply) 
 An email account of mine was hacked 
 A financial account of mine was hacked 
 A social media account of mine was hacked 
 A picture of me was shared online without my knowledge or 
consent 
 I received unwanted/spam emails 
 I was stalked online 




 Don’t know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Sharing data online 
In this section, I want you to think about the information that you share online.  
By this, I mean the information you might share on social networking sites, just as 
Facebook or Twitter.  I want to know about the kinds of things you think about 
before posting information online. 
 
Do you share personal information on social media?  Personal information refers 
to any details about you as a person which could be used to identify you or 
express who you are.  For example, your place of work or date of birth/birthday. 
 Share on all social media 
 Share on some social media 
 Share where I trust the site 
 Never share 
  Don’t know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Thinking about the social networking site that you use most often, how much 
personal information do you share?  Personal information refers to any details 
about you as a person which could be used to identify you or express who you are.  
For example, your place of work or date of birth/birthday. 
 Everything I am asked to share 
 A limited amount of information 
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 I never share personal information 
 Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
How much thought do you give to what information you share online before you 
post something?     
 A lot 
 Some 
 Not very much 
 None at all 
 Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Do you think about who can see what you share online before posting?     
 Yes 
 No 
 Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Do you take measures to limit who can see what you post online?     
 Yes 
 No 
 Don't know 




Which of the following measures (if any) have you employed when using social 
media in the past to protect your privacy? (Please select all that apply) 
 Read terms and conditions before signing up 
 Supplied false details, such as a fake date of birth or birthday 
 Amended privacy settings to reduce the audience for your posts 
 Refused to save credit card details on the site 
 Periodically went through my list of ‘friends’ or followers and 
removed those I no longer want to connect with 
 Set-up audience groups to differentiate between who can see my 
posts 
 Refused to give consent for data to be shared with linked sites/apps 
 Opted not to check into locations 
 Other (please specify) 
 I haven’t taken any action 
 Don’t know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
How confident are you that only your intended audience can see your posts? 
 Very confident 
 Quite confident 
 Not very confident 
 Not at all confident 
 Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 





Why would you not share the above information? 
 
 
Collection of data 
In this section, I'd like you to think about the information that you are asked to 
share with online companies and organisations in your daily life.  This doesn't 
need to be a particular online company or organisation, I am interested in how 
you generally feel about the information that is requested: for example when you 
are completing a form to open an account.  
  
Overall, how do you feel about the amount of information online companies and 
organisations collect from you? 
 I think the amount of information they collect is reasonable 
 I would be happy to share more if they asked me to 
 I would not want to share any additional information 
 I think the amount of information they collect is unreasonable 
 Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 
Have you ever refused to share a piece of information (such as your mobile phone 
number or date of birth) with a company? 
 Yes 
 Why? 
 Prefer not to say 
 No 
 Don't know 
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 Prefer not to say 
Do you ever provide false information to online companies and organisations to 
keep your privacy? 
 Yes 
 Why? 
 Prefer not to say 
 No 
 Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 
If an online company asked you for information that you were uncomfortable with 
sharing, what would you do? 
 Refuse to share the information, even if it meant not using that 
product/service 
 Consider the product/service being offered and weigh-up whether 
it is worth sharing the information to access it 
 Share the information anyway 
 Provide false information so that you are still able to use that 
product/service 
 Other (please specify) 
 Don’t know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
 How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statement? “I 
accept that online services are more personalised because of the increased access 
online companies and organisations have to my personal data.” 





 Strongly disagree 
 Don’t know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statement? "I am 
willing to share some information about myself with online companies and 
organisations in order to use their services for free."  
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statement? "I would 
be willing to pay more for a service or product if it meant I could share less 
information." 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 
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Do you think that being particularly concerned about privacy means that you 
would miss out on useful products or services? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don't know/Not sure 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Control 
In this section, the questions are asking you about how much control you feel you 
have over the information you are asked to share with online companies and 
organisations, as well as concerns you may have about what could happen if you 
lost control over your information.  By control, I mean your ability to choose 
which pieces of information you share (or not) with companies, as well as what 
happens to it after you share it. 
 






 Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 
 




 Personal financial data (such as your credit record, salary or taxes) 
 Personal demographic data (such as your date of birth, place of 
work or where you live) 
 Personal communications data (such as texts or e-mails you have 
sent or received; any communication that is not intended to be shared 
publicly) 
 Online behaviour data (such as browsing, searching viewing or 
purchasing activity on the internet) 
 Social data (such as your social networking profile(s) or status 
updates, gaming profile, or dating app profile) 
 Medical data (such as your health records, prescription information 
or test results 
 Other (please specify) 
 I don’t feel I have control over any of my data 
 Don’t know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Would you like to have more control over your information and who has access to 
it?  
 Yes, I would like to have more control 
 No, I have enough control 
 I don't care either way 
 Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
What do you think stops you from having more control? 
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 I don’t have enough technical knowledge 
 It would require a lot of additional time and effort on my part 
 Both of the above 
 Other (please specify) 
 Don’t know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Which of the following statements comes closest to your view of the 
consequences of your information being hacked? 
 It would cause some significant problems 
 It would be a minor inconvenience 
 Don’t know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Are you worried about your information being passed on or sold to third-parties 
without your knowledge? 
 Yes 
o What worries you in particular? 
 No 
 Don’t know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Do you feel that you know enough to be able to fully agree to what happens to 





 Why not? 
 Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Trust 
In this section, the questions are asking you to think about the trust you may or 
may not have in online companies and organisations that you share your 
information with, including how you believe they should treat your information 
once you have shared it.  
Do you think online companies and organisations currently provide you with 
enough information about what happens to the data you share with them?  
 Yes 
 No 
 Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Overall, do you believe that outline companies and organisations will keep your 
information secure? 
 Yes - all of the time 
 Yes - most of the time 
 Some of the time 
 No - never 
 Don't know 




Do you trust online companies and organisations that you share your information 
with to only use it for the purpose it was collected?  
 Yes - all of the time 
 Yes - most of the time 
 Some of the time 
 No - never 
 Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Do you trust online companies and organisations that you share your information 
with not to pass it on to third-parties (unless you have authorised them to do so)?  
 Yes - all of the time 
 Yes - most of the time 
 Some of the time 
 No - never 
 Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Context 
This final section is looking at how you feel about sharing particular pieces of 
information about yourself.  This is in terms of what you generally consider to be 
the most important information about yourself.  It is also asking you to think 
about which groups or individuals in particular you would have concerns over 
knowing specific information about you. 
Can you think of any particular situations in which you are especially concerned 






 Prefer not to say 
 No 
 Don't know 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Thinking about your personal financial data please state how concerned you 
would be about it being shared with each of the potential 'audiences' by selecting 
the radio button under the number which corresponds with your level of concern. 
Personal financial data refers to information such as your credit record, salary or 





2 3 4 5 
 
Spouse: m m m m m m 
Immediate family: m m m m m m 
Friends: m m m m m m 
Neighbours: m m m m m m 
Work colleague/employer: m m m m m m 
Stranger: m m m m m m 
3rd party online companies 
and organisations*: m m m m m m 
The Government/police: m m m m m m 
 
*By 3rd party company, I am referring to online companies and organisations you 




Thinking about your personal demographic data please state how concerned you 
would be about it being shared with each of the potential 'audiences' by selecting 
the radio button under the number which corresponds with your level of concern. 
Personal demographic data refers to information such as your date of birth, place 





2 3 4 5 
 
Spouse: m m m m m m 
Immediate family: m m m m m m 
Friends: m m m m m m 
Neighbours: m m m m m m 
Work colleague/employer: m m m m m m 
Stranger: m m m m m m 
3rd party online companies 
and organisations*: m m m m m m 
The Government/police: m m m m m m 
 
*By 3rd party company, I am referring to online companies and organisations you 





Thinking about your personal communications data please state how concerned 
you would be about it being shared with each of the potential 'audiences' by 
selecting the radio button under the number which corresponds with your level of 
concern. 
Personal communications data refers to information such as texts or e-mails you 
have sent or received; any communication that is not intended to be shared 





2 3 4 5 
 
Spouse: m m m m m m 
Immediate family: m m m m m m 
Friends: m m m m m m 
Neighbours: m m m m m m 
Work colleague/employer: m m m m m m 
Stranger: m m m m m m 
3rd party online companies 
and organisations*: m m m m m m 
The Government/police: m m m m m m 
 
*By 3rd party company, I am referring to online companies and organisations you 





Thinking about your online behaviour data please state how concerned you would 
be about it being shared with each of the potential 'audiences' by selecting the 
radio button under the number which corresponds with your level of concern. 
Online behaviour data refers to information such as browsing, searching, viewing 





2 3 4 5 
 
Spouse: m m m m m m 
Immediate family: m m m m m m 
Friends: m m m m m m 
Neighbours: m m m m m m 
Work colleague/employer: m m m m m m 
Stranger: m m m m m m 
3rd party online companies 
and organisations*: m m m m m m 
The Government/police: m m m m m m 
 
*By 3rd party company, I am referring to online companies and organisations you 





Thinking about your social data please state how concerned you would be about it 
being shared with each of the potential 'audiences' by selecting the radio button 
under the number which corresponds with your level of concern. 
Social data refers to information such as your social networking profile(s) or 
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Spouse: m m m m m m 
Immediate family: m m m m m m 
Friends: m m m m m m 
Neighbours: m m m m m m 
Work colleague/employer: m m m m m m 
Stranger: m m m m m m 
3rd party online companies 
and organisations*: m m m m m m 
The Government/police: m m m m m m 
 
*By 3rd party company, I am referring to online companies and organisations you 




Thinking about your medical data please state how concerned you would be about 
it being shared with each of the potential 'audiences' by selecting the radio button 
under the number which corresponds with your level of concern. Medical data 






2 3 4 5 
 
Spouse: m m m m m m 
Immediate family: m m m m m m 
Friends: m m m m m m 
Neighbours: m m m m m m 
Work colleague/employer: m m m m m m 
Stranger: m m m m m m 
3rd party online companies 
and organisations*: m m m m m m 
The Government/police: m m m m m m 
 
*By 3rd party company, I am referring to online companies and organisations you 






This section asks questions about you.  The information is needed to help in the 
analysis of the survey responses.  The information you share here will not be used 
to personally identify you and will not be shared with anyone else.  If you are not 
comfortable answering a particular question, please select the 'Prefer not to say' 
option before moving on to the next question. 
What is your gender? 
 Female 
 Male 
 Non-binary/third gender 
 Prefer to self-describe (please state) 





 Prefer not to say 
What is the highest level of education you have completed?  If you are currently 
studying, please select the highest qualification that you have completed.  
 No schooling 
 Finished secondary school, no GCSEs/vocational qualifications 
 GCSEs/Vocational qualifications 
 6th form/A levels 
 Undergraduate degree 
 Master's degree 
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 Professional degree 
 PhD 
 Prefer not to say 











 Other (please specify) 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Where did you hear about this survey?  
 Post on Facebook 
 Post on Twitter 
 Forwarded survey information in an e-mail 
 Other (please specify) 
 Can’t remember 
 Prefer not to say 
Thank you for participating in this survey.  If you would like to be entered into a 
prize drawer for a £25 iTunes voucher (or equivalent), please enter your e-mail 
355 
	
address in the box below.  Please note, your e-mail address will not be linked with 
any of your responses.  
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